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ABSTRACT 
The accidental opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, dismantled the 
political narratives of the East and the West and opened up a rhetorical arena for political 
narrators like the East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West 
German leadership to define and exploit the political crisis and put forward favorable 
resolutions. With this dissertation, I trace the neglected and forgotten political directions 
as they reside in the narratives of the East German citizen movements, the West German 
press, and the West German political leadership between November 1989 and February 
1990. The events surrounding November 9th, 1989, present a unique opportunity for this 
endeavor in that the common flows of political communication between organized East 
German publics, the West German press, and West German political leaders changed for 
a moment and with it the distribution of political legitimacy.  
To account for these new flows of political communication and the battle 
between different political crisis narrators over the rhetorical rights to reestablish 
political legitimacy, I develop a rhetorical model for political crisis narrative. This 
theoretical model integrates insights from political crisis communication theories, 
strategic narratives, and rhetoric. My analyses then test this model by tracing the 
narrative trajectories and rhetorical transformations of the narrative enactments by the 
East German citizen movements, the West German press, and the West German political 
leadership.  
As recent historical research revealed, Helmut Kohl favored what others refers to 
as the “pre-fabrication model” for German and European unification, which entails the 
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expansion of West German and European legal, political, and economic systems 
eastward. Using Sarotte’s research about Kohl’s prefab model as a rhetorical anchor, my 
reconstructions of the different political crisis narratives reveal how the individual 
narratives support or weaken Helmut Kohl’s pre-fabrication model for German and 
European reunification. Finally, while the West’s rhetoric of practical politics, economic 
necessity, and rapid unification offered short-term solutions for political and economic 
integration, it concealed long-term narrative possibilities for German and European 
integration. Thus, this dissertation discusses the hidden rhetorical possibility for German 
and European political integration as they reside within the discourse between the East 
German opposition groups, the West German press, and the West German political 
leadership.  
Keywords: Berlin Wall, Political Crisis Narratives, Rhetoric 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Every revolutionary movement also liberates language. What up to that point had been 
so hard to express, now suddenly passes our lips. We are amazed at what we had 
apparently thought for a long time and now call out to each other. “Democracy—now or 
never!,” and what we mean is governance by the people. We remember those beginnings 
in our history that got bogged down or were brutally suppressed, and we do not want to 
pass up the opportunity inherent in this crisis, since it awakens all our productive 
energies. . . . And today I saw a truly unbelievable phrase on a banner: ‘No privileges 
any more for us Berliners.’ Indeed, language is liberating itself from the official, 
newspaper-German in which it was wrapped, and it is remembering the words that 
express feelings” (Speech by East German activist and literary critic Christa Wolf at the 
Leipzig protest at Alexanderplatz on November 4th, 1989 in East Berlin) (Gray & Wilke, 
1996, p. 49) 
 
The GDR leadership finds itself in transition. The partially renewed leadership would 
not be equipped to contribute to any negotiations about German-German reunification. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, First Sentence Lead Article, November 10th, 
November 1989). 
 
Incidentally, there can be no doubt that this is also what the people in the GDR want. 
They want economic freedom, and they want at last to reap the fruits of their labor and 
achieve greater prosperity . . . After free elections in the near future, we imagine the 
following institutions: a joint governmental committee for permanent consultation and 
political agreement; joint special committees; a joint parliamentary committee; and 
many other things in the light of these new developments. What a unified Germany will 
eventually look like, nobody knows. I am certain, however, that unity is coming soon, if 
the people of Germany desire it (Speech by the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
to the German Parliament on November 28th, 1989) 
 
 On November 9th, 1989 the Berlin Wall opened and the decade-old symbol of a 
divided city within a divided Germany within a divided Europe transformed into a 
symbol of new beginnings. The event opened up new possibilities for Germany’s and 
Europe’s political future. During the Cold War, opposing ideological and military 
commitments hindered East Germany and West Germany to interact through diplomacy 
or other non-coercive means of communication. The building of the Berlin Wall not only 
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reinforced the division of Germany, which started in 1945 when the Soviet Union, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States divided Germany into four 
occupational zones, but it also led to opposing political, economic, and military systems. 
In 1949 the French, the British, and the Americans declared independence from the 
Soviet zone establishing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and in 1955 they allied 
with NATO. In turn, the Soviet Union declared itself as the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) and allied with the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The opening 
of the Berlin Wall suddenly disrupted the hardened Cold-War commitments, creating 
room for new social actors and new political directions for Germany and Europe.   
 The opening of the Berlin Wall represents the finale of a political drama that 
involves different domestic and international actors and situations. Weeks and months of 
oppositional activity by East German environmental, peace, human rights, and other 
alternative groups climaxed with mass-demonstrations at Alexanderplatz on November 
4th, 1989 in East Berlin. With 28 speeches, opposition leaders, artists, and activists 
expressed their political vision for the future of the GDR and Europe. They entertained 
the possibility of an independent and democratic German Democratic Republic as well 
as a German federation, a new constitution, and a unified Germany created though the 
participation of Germans in West and East Germany. In addition to specific political 
directions for Germany’s and Europe’s future, they also spoke of the importance of 
political language. In her protest speech, Christa Wolf—an East German activist and 
literary critic—argues that political crises not only offer opportunity for new beginnings, 
but that they liberate language as well. Only five days before the opening of the Berlin 
 3 
 
Wall she urges East Berlin protest groups to detach their political language from the 
discourses of the newspapers and the political leadership. Specifically, she asks Berliners 
to remember and amplify the emotional meanings of their protest language. At the 
beginning of her speech she explains that “language is liberating itself from the official, 
newspaper-German in which it was wrapped, and it is remembering the words that 
express feelings” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 49). For her, a revolution that brings about 
new political action and direction requires its own language. The protestors’ language of 
political independence, confidence, and action gained wide public support in the weeks 
and months leading up to the fall of the Berlin wall. However, this changed after the 
events of November 9th, 1989. With the opening of the Berlin Wall, the East German 
protest discourse of political action, freedom, and independence entered a rhetorical 
arena in which Western newspapers and politicians tried to advance their own narrative 
about what happened and what political future Germany and Europe should work 
toward.  
 In the early day’s following the opening of the Berlin Wall, the five biggest daily 
West German newspapers tended to play down the possibility of the GDR’s involvement 
in the process of German reunification. They depicted GDR’s leadership as not well-
equipped to contribute constructively to possible negotiations about German 
reunification. In his lead article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ), Friedrich Karl 
Fromme argues that the members of the East German government are not prepared to 
participate in negotiations for possible German unification. He says that only 
fundamental change in the GDR would allow for reunification. Specifically, he contends 
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that the opening of the Berlin Wall should be a memorial for overcoming GDR 
leadership. While newspapers are often reactive rather than intentional narrators during 
political crises, their reporting and commentary potentially amplifies, modifies, and even 
mutes other discourses. By questioning the possibility of East German involvement in 
the process of German reunification, West German newspapers made it more difficult 
for voices like Christa Wolf to gain public salience. Inadvertently, these editorials set the 
stage for Western politicians to advance and defend their narratives.  
 After solemn remarks by the former mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt, the German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at 
the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin on November 10, 1989, the political leadership 
of West Germany waited to enter the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and Europe’s 
political future. On November 28, 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
presented his Ten-Point Program for overcoming the division of Germany and Europe. 
In his Ten-Point Plan speech to the German parliament, Kohl’s rhetoric reassures the 
people of East Germany of West German support. He speaks of unity and prosperity and 
lays out a plan for German and European unification. On March 18, 1990 the 
Conservative Alliance Party for Germany, led by the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) and supported by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, won the first free 
elections in the GDR. With its political slogan “no more socialist experiments,” they 
advocated a market economy as well as rapid unification. The conservative Alliance 
Party for Germany won 48% of the vote and not only expedited the process for rapid 
unification, but also weakened any discourse about alternative political directions. From 
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a post-election perspective, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan then sounds less reassuring 
and empowering after it reinforced rapid reunification as the only option for Germany’s 
and Europe’s political future. This rhetoric deprived the GDR of its political identity and 
problematized political integration for East Germans. It thwarted any attempts by East 
Germans’ to see themselves in the narrative of a truly unified Germany.  
 While a large population of citizens from the German Democratic Republic 
favored rapid unification with the Federal Republic of Germany, the rhetorical battle 
between the East German opposition leaders, the West German news media, and West 
German politicians created a unification process of unequal partners. Their competing 
and conflicting discourses opened specific political directions, while foreclosing others. 
With this dissertation, I turn to the neglected and forgotten political directions as they 
reside in the projected narratives and communication networks of the East German 
public, the West German print media, and the West German political leadership. 
Specifically, I focus on the battle over the political crisis narratives of 1989 as it 
unfolded in the days before, during, and after the opening of the Berlin Wall. The events 
surrounding November 9th, 1989 present a unique opportunity for this endeavor in that 
the common flows of political communication between the public, the media, and the 
political leaders changed for a moment and with it the distribution and form of political 
legitimacy. Neither the political leaders of the GDR, nor the political leaders of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) legitimized the opening of the wall. Instead, the 
East German public and the Western media legitimized the opening of the border 
crossings. Encouraged by the overly optimistic reporting by West German media that the 
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wall is now open and mass protests in Leipzig on October 9th, 1989, where the East 
German regime and the USSR resisted to use violence against the protestors, East 
Germans built up the confidence to risk a trip to the wall (Engel, 2009; Sarotte, 2014a). 
Further, the fall of the Berlin wall presents an event that suddenly disrupted the hardened 
Cold-War narrative, opening up room for East Germans to narrate their own possible 
futures for Germany and Europe.  
 With this dissertation I argue that in the political crisis narratives of the East 
German public, the West German news media, and the West German political 
leadership, which emerged right before and immediately after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, reside rhetorical possibilities for German and European political integration that 
today’s narratives neglect. While the West’s rhetoric of practical politics, economic 
necessity, and rapid unification offered short-term solutions for political and economic 
integration, it concealed long-term narrative possibilities for German and European 
integration. The existing literature often approaches the events of 1989 from a historical, 
political, economic or international relations perspective, but not from a perspective of 
narrative possibilities. We remember the West’s narrative of rapid unification and 
eastward expansion, but we often forget that the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and 
Europe’s political future offered and foreclosed other narratives.  
 As the binaries of democracy versus totalitarianism and capitalism versus 
socialism stopped to define the possible political futures for the East and the West, the 
western political leadership was desperately searching for rhetorical resources to narrate 
Germany’s and thereby Europe’s political future. Overnight, the Berlin wall stopped to 
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function as a symbol of economic and military failure, political challenge and 
provocation, or solidarity. This opened opportunities for the East German public, the 
Western print media, and the political leaders of the West to project new narratives about 
the relationship between the East and the West and the future of Germany and Europe. 
For the political leaders of the West, the events of 1989 rendered their narratives and 
political languages meaningless in explaining the causes, consequences, and cures of this 
historical event. The Western print media and the East German public, however, quickly 
used the rhetorical vacuum to narrate their versions of the events and its implications for 
the political future of Germany and Europe.  
 The events surrounding the opening of the Berlin wall not only created a 
rhetorical vacuum for different narratives, but they also structured the battle over 
political crisis narratives between the East German public, the Western print media, and 
the political leaders of the West into a pre-crisis, during-crisis, and after-crisis battle. 
Before the opening of the Berlin wall, East Germans gained a political voice via mass 
demonstrations and social movements. Due to the East German government’s reluctance 
to openly coerce and silence these movements, the East German public emerged as a key 
narrator for German and European unification in the months leading up to November 
9th, 1989. Then, the sudden opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989 created a 
fluid political situation, which invited new narrators into the rhetorical arena of 1989 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2007). The Western print media and the Western political 
leadership now introduced their own narratives about the process of German and 
European unification. It is important to mention, however, that while the Western news 
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media amplified the optimistic voices of the East German narrative for Western 
politicians and publics, they are reactive rather than intentional crisis narrators 
(Lippman, 1927; Lippmann, 1922). The Western print media would report and comment 
on specific political events and elevate them to the level of public salience, while 
neglecting others. Thus, depending on the events of the day, the West German print 
media would play different narrative roles for the East German public and the West 
German political leaders before, during, and after the opening of the Berlin wall. The 
political leadership of West Germany entered the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and 
Europe’s political directions only weeks after the opening of the Berlin wall. On 
November 28th, 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented his Ten-Point 
Program for overcoming the division of Germany and Europe. This not only changed the 
narrative role of the West German print media, but it also created conflicting narratives 
about Germany’s and Europe’s future. Over the years, we have accepted the West 
German narrative of German and European unification as the only 1989 narrative. 
However, we are forgetting the narrative battles that happened between the East German 
public, the West German print media and the political leadership of the West.  
The East German Public 
 The peaceful protests in Leipzig on October 9th, 1989 with 70,000 people in 
attendance and at Alexanderplatz on November 4th with over 1 million protestors not 
only increased the political pressure on the East German government, but they also 
enabled different interest groups to speak with a new political voice. The different 
groups and networks that existed in the years before 1989—environmental groups, peace 
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groups, migration groups, opposition groups, fellow travelers—not only created new 
networks of political communication, but also a new language to air their concerns. In 
the weeks and months after November 9th, 1989, high-ranking German and European 
politicians continued to use Western definitions of unity, democracy, and freedom to 
narrate the process of German reunification and European integration, neglecting the 
political language that East Germans generated in the demonstrations and networks 
leading up to the night of November 9th, 1989 (Sarotte, 2014a, 2014b). Put differently, 
while West Germans used spray cans and graffiti to express their demands for political 
freedom and unity, East Germans risked their lives for it. By ignoring these differences 
in meanings of political action, the political leaders of the West encroached upon the 
process of German and European re-unification without incorporating the language of 
political legitimization that East Germans generated over years and finally expressed 
publicly.  
 The political discourse by East German publics, however, offers a language of 
political confidence and action that the political leaders of West Germany and West 
Europe often ignores or fails to recognize, even up to this day. European political leaders 
use the fall of the Berlin wall as a symbol of political and economic freedoms, but it is 
often difficult to figure out whose freedoms they speak of (Garton Ash, 1990). East 
Germans hoped that their political efforts would not be in vain, but would help to 
enhance the process of German re-unification. For East Germans, November 9th, 1989 
was a day of political liberation, legitimization, and reform, rather than a day of 
unification. German unification would happen nearly a year later on October 3rd, 1990. 
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During the early days of East Germany’s political revolution, reformers spoke of a “third 
path” when addressing German unification. They tried to avoid the ideologically 
hardened political oppositions of democracy vs. totalitarianism and capitalism vs. 
socialism, which defined the Cold-War narrative (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. xix). When 
speaking of a “third path,” East German dissidents and reformers imagined a future that 
would transcend the political directions implicit in the Cold-War narrative. They 
envisioned a Germany driven by mutual political reforms in East and West Germany. 
The “Third Path” refers to a political and economic future, which integrates principles of 
socialist distribution into capitalist production processes and avoid eastern 
authoritarianism as well as western exploitation.1 
 The Central Round Table meetings, which lasted from December 1989 until 
March 1990 present the clearest attempt by former GDR leadership and GDR reformers 
to work toward this “Third Path” (“Weniger als Feigenblätter…“, 2016). On December 
7, 1989, the remaining members of the Socialist Unity Party, trade unions, block parties, 
and the women’s league met with opposition leaders of the popular citizen movements 
(e.g., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and 
Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the 
United Left) in East Berlin to discuss the future of the GDR. The members of these 
weekly Round Table meetings considered themselves as the GDR’s transitional political 
                                                 
1 Historically, the idea of a German “Third Path” is a problematic term in that it reminds people of the 
German Sonderweg, which referred to conservative political programs of the 1920s. These programs 
aimed at bolstering Germany’s political and cultural status due to its geographical location and for a lot of 
people it led to German nationalism and the Third Reich. Not surprisingly, the term caused public 
resentment and suspect (Gray & Wilke, 1996). 
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institution and a watchdog for the GDR.2 They aimed to democratize the GDR, craft a 
new constitution, and initiate free elections. After their initial meeting on December 7, 
1989 the Round Table meetings spread to the regional and local level to influence the 
political directions in local and regional governments. Whereas they hesitated to view 
themselves as a legitimate political force, the mass demonstrations in Leipzig and East 
Berlin built up their political confidence and public visibility. Further, the newly formed 
political networks enabled them to shape the political decision-making processes at the 
regional and local level. When bringing the round table meeting to the local and regional 
level, they refused any top-down or hierarchical approach. Instead, local and regional 
Round tables formed in a spontaneous and independent fashion.  
 In the early weeks and months after the opening of the Berlin Wall, members of 
the round tables deliberated different political directions for the reunification process. 
Those included an independent and democratic GDR, a German federation, a new 
constitution, and a unified Germany created through the participation of Germans in both 
East and West (Smith, 1998, p. 3). However, the West’s rhetoric of political 
responsibility, wisdom, and national and European unity quickly replaced the idealistic 
language, political initiatives, and deliberations of East German reformers. Especially 
Helmut Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics overshadowed East German’s discourses of 
political liberation, reform, and the possibility of a third path (Gray & Wilke, 1996). 
With his Ten-Point Plan, Kohl outlined his vision of a united Germany and Europe under 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive discussion of the political significance of the Round Tables see (Thaysen, 1990, 
2000). 
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the disguise of close political and economic cooperation with the East. Kohl’s Ten-Point 
Plan speech to the German parliament on November 28, 1989 functioned as the first step 
toward what Sarotte (2014a) describes as the West’s pre-fabrication model for Germany 
and Europe. Kohl’s pre-fab model took “the West’s prefabricated institutions, both for 
domestic order and international economic and military cooperation, and simply 
extended them eastward” (Sarotte, 2014a, p. 8). While Kohl’s pre-fab model or grand 
narrative for Germany and Europe provided immediate economic stability and prospect, 
Sarotte does not view this model as the best model for German and European 
integration. Kohl’s ambitions to advance his grand narrative introduced new issues into 
the debates between East and West Germany and silenced alternative strategies. 
Questions of migration from the East to the West, financial aid to the GDR by the FDR, 
the exchange rate between West and East German marks, and consolidation of political 
institutions, started to dominate the discourses between political groups of the East and 
the Kohl government. 
 West Germans wanted East Germans for the process of re-unification, but not for 
their political effort and experience (Kelly, 2011). So, while the East German publics 
offered language and networks for political integration and legitimization, the West 
operated under the old superior West vs. inferior East dichotomy. Thus, a key difference 
between public responses to the fall of the Berlin Wall by West Germans and East 
Germans is that East German publics re-discovered freedom of expression and political 
power by themselves. East Germans also used terms like freedom, unity, and 
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cooperation, but they carried different political meanings. These neglected differences in 
political languages divide Germany and Europe up to this day.  
 In a 2017 interview with the Berliner Zeitung, Thomas Krüger, the leader of 
Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB), argues that Germany’s political 
institutions still struggle to break down the cultural and political walls in peoples’ heads. 
Specifically, he suggests that “[t]here is simply a lack of [political] translators of cultural 
differences. Then a positive appropriation of institutions becomes more difficult” (as 
cited in Knight, 2017). Krüger explains that today’s cultural disconnect between East 
and West Germany is grounded in a deep distrust among East Germans toward state 
institutions and democratic processes. This distrust manifests itself in voter turnout and 
election results in East Germany. States in East Germany barely reached 50% in the 
2013 federal elections, compared to 63% in former West Germany (Lees, 2014). Also, 
political parties critical of Germany’s political and economic system are particularly 
popular and gain wide political support in East German states. Historically, the Socialist 
Left Party (Die Linke) benefitted from people’s deep distrust toward political 
institutions. In Germany’s 2009 federal elections, the Socialist Left Party gained 28.5% 
of the vote in East Germany. In 2013 they dropped to 22.7% (Hagen, 2017). Now, the 
far-right wing Alternative for Germany Party (AfD), exploits East Germans’ distrust 
toward democracy and political institutions. They gained 21.9% of the vote in East 
Germany, compared to only 11.1% in West Germany. For Krüger, East Germans are 
victims of cultural colonialism by the West, which started with Germany’s reunification 
process.  
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The Western Print Media 
 The Western news media played a key role in the sudden and peaceful collapse 
of the Berlin Wall on three important occasions (Kelly, 2011; Sarotte, 2014b). During 
the October 9th protests in Leipzig, a group of protestors secretly recorded the 
demonstration and smuggled the recording to West German news channels in Berlin. 55-
60% of viewers in the GDR who owned a television watched West German News 
regularly (Dittmar, 2005), which meant that at the night of October 9th, 1989 East 
Germans saw how the peaceful protest of 70,000 of their fellow citizens intimidated the 
otherwise violent police force of the GDR. This built up political courage and 
confidence among the people of East Germany and increased the political pressure on 
the regime.  
 Second, at a live news conference on November 9th, Günter Schabowski, who 
was a spokesperson for the East German Politburo accidentally announced that the 
borders to West Berlin are now open. With the new travel regulations, the SED regime 
simply intended to communicate a willingness to listen to the concerns of the East 
German people, rather than bring about actual political change. However, Schabowski 
improvised and answered questions from journalists about the new travel regulations 
without resorting a note that he received right before the news conference from the SED 
leadership. This note specified when and what travel rules would apply. In connection 
with the news reporting that followed, Schabowski’s now historic exchange with 
Riccardo Ehrmann, an Italian journalist with Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata 
(ASNA), politically legitimized the opening of the border. “Journalist Riccardo Ehrmann 
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asked: When will this be effective? Schabowski responded: To my knowledge 
immediately, without delay” (Triandafyllidou, Wodak, & Krzyżanowski, 2009, p. 69). 
With the world media present, Schabowski’s accidental announcement turned into 
newspaper headlines and a political declaration that the Berlin Wall is now open.  
 Finally, encouraged by the news that the wall is now open, East Berliners risked 
a trip to the border crossings. Confused by Schabowski’s comments and overwhelmed 
by the growing masses, the border guards contacted their supervisors who reported that 
the wall is still closed. This confused the border guards even further. Under the pressure 
of the masses, however, the first border crossing opened around 11:00 p.m. at 
Bornholmer Straße. This happened not via orders from the GDR leadership, but due to 
individual decisions by the border guards. Opening the crossing at Bornholmer Straße 
further legitimized Schabowski’s accidental announcement for East Berliners and even 
for other border guards in that images of people crossing the border at Bornholmer 
Straße now flooded the air waves. Accordingly, the Western news media not only played 
a key role in the sudden and peaceful collapse of the Berlin Wall, but it also helped to 
initiate a process that would legitimize political action from the bottom up, rather than 
from the top down.  
 The process of political legitimation through the media continued across Europe. 
In the days after the opening of the wall, major British, Dutch, Italian and Greek 
newspapers framed the fall of the Berlin Wall not only as an event of German unity, but 
also as a historic event for the future of European integration (ter Wal, Triandafyllidou, 
Steindler, & Kontochristou, 2009, p. 217). However, contrary to the optimistic news 
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reporting at the night of November 9th, 1989 and due to a lack of specific framing 
devices for the causes and consequences of political accidents, these European 
newspapers tended to put the prospects of a unified Germany and Europe into a Cold 
War narrative. They discussed German and European unity in terms of peace, stability, 
and the possibility of economic and geopolitical instability, while de-emphasizing East 
Berliner’s role in this process. Within this Cold War narrative, values like freedom and 
unity still functioned as values of the West (ter Wal et al., 2009, p. 218).  
The Political Leadership of the West 
 In the weeks and months after the collapse of the wall, high-ranking German and 
European politicians started to use architectural terminology to narrate the process of 
German reunification and European integration. In his Ten-Point Plan speech before the 
German parliament on Novermber 28, 1989, Helmut Kohl explains that “[t]he 
development of intra-German relations remains embedded in the pan-European process, 
and that always means in East-West relations. The future architecture of Germany must 
conform to the future architecture of pan-Europe” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 84). 
Elsewhere, in a speech at the Centre des Conférences Internationales in Paris on January 
17, 1990, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl invoked a metaphor frequently used by 
Konrad Adenauer and argued that “the German house must be built under a European 
roof” (as cited in Gilbert, 2012, p. 154). Similarly, in a speech to the European 
Parliament on November 22nd, 1989 and in his New Year’s speech on December 31, 
1989, French President François Mitterand described the process of European integration 
as “construct,” “construction,” “structure,” and “arrangement,” (Gilbert, 2012). 
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However, this political language emerged behind closed doors and in political 
institutions and thereby does not carry the political legitimacy and persuasive 
momentum as the political languages that transpired within the news media and public 
discourses of 1989. Also, this vague architectural language raises questions about who 
the architects of this new European house are and what type of house they imagine and 
are working toward. In line with Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan speech and his pre-fabrication 
model for German and European integration, it is hard to ignore the West’s self-assigned 
role as the key architect for German and European unification. In his Ten-Point Plan 
speech, which he delivered only nineteen days after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Kohl 
argues that “. . . there can be no doubt that this is also what the people in the GDR want. 
They want economic freedom, and they want at last to reap the fruits of their labor and 
achieve greater prosperity” (Helmut Kohl's Ten-Point Plan for German Unity).  
 Kohl and other political leaders of the West used the crisis in the GDR as 
legitimation to advance their rhetoric of practical politics and economic necessity. The 
rapid deterioration of the East German economy after the opening of the Berlin Wall put 
the political leaders of the West at an advantage to shape the public discourse in 
economic terms. In addition, while East German politicians and leaders of popular 
citizen movements argued for a constitutional congress that would formulate a new 
constitution for all of Germany, leading West German politicians proposed to extend the 
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constitution or Basic Law of the Federal Republic to East Germany. Article 233 of the 
West German constitution, provided the opportunity to simply extent West German 
constitutional regulations, laws, and institutions eastward. While the West German 
politicians considered this opportunity to be a great advantage to the people of the GDR 
in that it would reduce the struggle over constitutional questions and institution-building 
to a minimum, it would also lead to political and social problems. The western 
institutions would not fit the conditions of a society in transition. The adaption of the 
western model created problems within the GDR’s party system, in and between interest 
groups and citizen movement groups, and within the political system as a whole (Smith, 
1998).  
 However, while the extension of the West’s legal, economic, and political system 
dominated Germany’s reunification process, this does not imply that these were the only 
political direction that emerged during the crises. The political leaders of the West 
started to write a crisis narrative that overshadowed public discourse about possible 
reforms of the FRG. The possibility of a third path died when Hans Modrow, a popular 
East German politician, outlined his Plan for a Unified Germany on February 1, 1990 
(Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. xx). Initially, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan suggested German 
unification as a long-term goal, but Hans Modrow’s plan for a unified Germany, which 
                                                 
3 Article 23 of the Basic Law of the FRG (23, May 1949): For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply 
in the territory of the Laender Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig- 
Holstein, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern. It shall be put into force for other parts 
of Germany on their accession (“The Basic Law of the FRG”).  
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he presented at a press conference on February 1, 1990 introduced new terms into the 
debate about German-German reconciliation. Modrow argued that both German nations 
should surrender their memberships in military agreements like NATO and assume a 
neutral position within Europe. Helmut Kohl quickly rejected Modrow’s proposal for a 
neutral Germany, explaining that a reunited Germany could not afford to be isolated in 
the heart of Europe. In addition, Modrow envisioned a united Germany in which a 
planned and market economy would exist side by side (Kamm, 1990). It is not clear why 
Modrow introduced these specific terms for German unification only three months after 
the opening of the Berlin Wall. Gray and Wilke (1996) argue that “positioning himself 
as the leading spokesperson of unification could serve as a preemptive strike that would 
allow [Modrow] to take the political initiative and create a better bargaining position for 
the GDR and its citizens in the unification negotiations with the FRG” (p. xx).  
 However, Helmut Kohl turned Modrow’s proposal into an opportunity to speed 
up the process of expanding West Germany’s legal, economic, and political systems 
eastward. The West German economic prosperity of the 1980s in connection with the 
economic and political crisis in East Germany, allowed Helmut Kohl and other West 
German political leaders to erode Modrow’s proposal until it conformed with their terms 
for German-German unification. While Modrow allegedly attempted to amplify and 
strengthen the East German’s voice in the negotiations for the process of German 
unification, it backfired and rapidly silenced arguments from the Round Table 
discussions. Instead of considering and debating alternative political directions with 
GDR opposition leaders, the Western discourse of rapid reunification and pan-European 
 20 
 
unity reduced discussions at the Round Tables and the possibility of a third path to 
political idealism and naiveté. Thus, the GDR’s first free and democratic parliamentary 
election on March 18th, 1990 marks the beginning of the end of East German 
participation in the political decision making process for German reunification.  
 Yet, in the weeks and months between November and February of 1990, East 
German politicians and interest groups still resisted the rhetoric of practical politics by 
the West. Interpreting the opening of the Berlin Wall and the new political directions 
that this event implied as the result of the West German or West European policies is 
tempting, but it neglects the rhetorical battles between the East German public, Western 
news media, and Western politicians over who gets to write Germany’s and possibly 
Europe’s 1989 crisis narrative.  
 I will continue to name these three actors in the suggested order to describe the 
general flows of communication and power in the days and months before, during, and 
after November 9th, 1989. With their revolutionary rhetoric of freedom, democracy, and 
unity, the East German public first set the stage for new political directions. Second, the 
western print media narrated and politically legitimized the events surrounding the 
accidental opening of the Berlin wall. In a way, the western print media helped to open a 
rhetorical arena, which invited new narrators to communicate with, against, to, past, or 
about each other (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010). While the western print media 
intervened in crisis of 1989, they played different roles for different actors throughout 
the pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis situation. Finally, surprised by the sudden 
political vacuum, Western politicians exploited the crisis and introduced their grand 
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narrative for Germany’s and Europe’s unification process. The flows of communication 
and power relations between the East German public, the West German print media, and 
the West German politicians quickly changed in the weeks and months after November 
9th, 1989. Through my analyses, we will see how and why these unique power relations 
between the East German public, the Western print media, and West German political 
leaders changed.  
Dissertation Data 
 With my dissertation, I will focus on public political discourses surrounding the 
events of November 9th, 1989 by the East German public, the West German print media, 
and the West German political leadership. These three actors are the key narrators in 
political crisis situations (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Cross, 2017; Hart, 1993) 
and thereby possess the rhetorical power to advance claims, define the causes, 
consequences, and cures of a crisis, assign political and societal roles to actors in a crisis 
drama, and imply specific political futures.  
 For my analysis of the development of the East German narrative, I first turn to 
protest speeches before the opening of the Berlin Wall. Specifically, I will focus on 
speeches at the protest demonstration on Alexanderplatz in East Berlin on November 4, 
1989. These speeches represent an important text to analyze the normative dimensions of 
the public’s narrative. Opposition leaders, artists, and activists formulated their political 
vision for the GDR. To retrace the trajectory of this East German narrative, I then turn to 
the central round table meetings. The round table discussions represent the organized 
public voice of the East German opposition between November 18, 1989 and March 18, 
 22 
 
1990. The round tables functioned like a parliament in that they discussed voting rights, 
party rights and obligations, and debated ideas for a new constitution. While the round 
table discussions include narrative voices from the former Socialist Unity Party (e.g., 
trade unions, block parties, and the women’s league) who defended a strong socialist 
vision for the reunification process, I will focus on the narrative advanced by opposition 
leaders of the popular citizens’ movements (e.g., Democracy Now, Democratic 
Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left). Focusing on the conflicting 
narratives between the former GDR leadership and GDR reformers at the round table 
discussion would distract from the overall narrative battles between the East German 
public, the Western print media and the political leaders of the West. The narrative 
voices of the popular citizens’ movements provide specific policy suggestions for a 
democratic future between GDR and FRG and thus bares more rhetorical potential for 
the communicative battle over Germany’s reunification process than a confrontational 
socialist narrative. With his five volume series Der Zentrale Runde Tisch der DDR (The 
Central Round Table of the GDR), Uwe Thaysen (2000) presents a comprehensive 
collections of transcripts and documents for the 16 round table meetings between 
November 18, 1989 and March 18, 1990. These texts provide direct access to the 
opposition leader’s struggle to defend and advance their narrative.  
 For my analysis of the West German media narrative, I turn to news reporting 
and editorials by five daily West German national newspapers during key political 
events surrounding November 9th, 1989. The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter 
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Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), Die Welt, and the 
Tageszeitung (TAZ), not only represent Germany’s biggest daily national newspapers in 
1989 in terms of regional and national readership, but they also feature both left-wing as 
well as conservative news (Pürer & Raabe, 2007, pp. 151-155). In terms of textual 
analysis, I will only choose editorials that feature information about the political 
situation and directions of the GDR and FRG. A key political moment in this context is 
an event where the media, the pubic, or political leaders play an essential role in 
projecting a policy narrative that implicates political directions for Germany or Europe. 
The key political events that I identified so far include the peaceful mass demonstrations 
in East Berlin on November 4th, 1989, which led to the resignation of the GDR 
government three days later. In speeches to a crowd of over 1 million protestors, GDR 
opposition leaders aired their criticism and demands for democratic reforms. November 
10th, the day after the accidental opening of the Berlin wall represents a second key 
political moment. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl interrupts his visit to Poland 
and delivers a speech at a demonstration in front of the Schöneberg City Hall in West 
Berlin. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt and mayor of Berlin during the construction of 
the Berlin wall and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s foreign minister also deliver 
speeches. The third political event that is relevant to the West German media narrative is 
Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan speech in front of the German parliament on November 
28th, 1989. His Ten-Point Plan lays out a program to overcome the political and 
economic divisions of Germany and Europe. The press conference on February 13th, 
1990 between Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow, who was the last premier of the GDR 
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represents the fourth and final event. This is a particularly important event in that 
historians consider Kohl’s and Modrow’s press conference to be the final nail in the 
coffin of the East’s ambitions to create a unified Germany through the participation of 
Germans in both the East and the West.  
 Finally, for my analysis of the West German political leaders, I turn to speeches 
by Kohl, Brandt, and Genscher in front of the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin, 
Kohl’s speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden on 
December 19th, 1989, his New Year’s television address, his press conference with 
Modrow, and his policy statement before the German parliament on February 15th, 
1990. Except for the newspaper articles and the round table discussions, all of the 
aforementioned texts are available in the English language.  
Approach 
 Narratives not only shape people’s perceptions of the salience of a crisis and 
thereby guide their responses to a crisis, but they also put political actors on rhetorical 
trajectories that enable and constrain their actions (Kluver, 2010). Via language, a 
narrative threads together individual “events into a contextual whole in which an 
audience is not only affected but somehow implicated” (Crick, 2014, p. 267). Others 
define narratives in terms of their past-present-future structure to account for causal links 
between events (Frank, 2010). Yet others highlight the importance of resolution and 
catharsis (Cross, 2017; Shenhav, 2006). For this dissertation, I ground my definition of 
narrative in Miskimmon, Loughlin, and Roselle’s research about strategic narratives. 
They draw upon Kenneth Burke’s ideas of form and the pentad to identify actors, 
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settings, actions, agency, and goals, while recognizing the importance of temporality. 
For them “the past (history), the present, and the future (where are ‘we’ going) are tied 
together through explication of the setting, action, and goal or purpose” (Miskimmon, 
Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017, p. 7). Further, Miskimmon distinguishes between system, 
identity, and issue/policy narratives. To analyze the political drama of 1989, I will focus 
on issue narratives in that they “set out why a policy is needed and (normatively) 
desirable, and how it will be successfully implemented or accomplished. Issue narratives 
set political actions in a context, with an explanation of who the important actors are, 
what the conflict or issue is, and how a particular course of action will resolve the 
underlying issue” (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 8). Finally, according to Miskimmon et 
al., the communicative process involves the formation, projection, and reception of 
strategic narratives. I will focus on questions of narrative projection: What statements do 
West German politicians, the West German press, and organized East German publics 
project about how the process of German unification ought to play out? How do the 
policy narratives of the East German public, the West German media, and the West 
European leaders differ? Where do the narrative of the East German public, the West 
German media narrative, and the narrative of the West European leadership conflict and 
collide? What are the obstacles that prevent actors to advance their narrative? How are 
they constraining each other during the early days and months after the opening of the 
Berlin wall? How does the media environment and networks of 1989 constrain or enable 
actors to advance their narratives? Why did certain narrative dominate the public debate 
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during, before, and after the crisis, while others failed? Why did today’s political 
narrative about the crisis of 1989 prevail in the end? 
 Unlike Miskimmon et al., however, I am not viewing the different strategic 
narratives of 1989 through the lens of international relations4, but through the lens of 
political crisis communication. Political crises refer to “episodic breakdowns of familiar 
symbolic frameworks that legitimate the pre-existing sociopolitical order” (Olmeda, 
2008, p. 3). By comparing and contrasting the different pentads of the public’s, the 
media’s, and the politician’s narratives, we will see what aspects of their sociopolitical 
order the events of 1989 tore down and what new symbolic possibilities opened up. 
Because the breakdowns in symbolic orders were different for each actor—especially for 
East German publics—I am curious to see whether the normative aspects of their 
pentads like the purpose and agency reflect those differences. Also, considering that 
Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics prevented East Germans to deliberate different 
political possibilities for the process of German reunification, it will be interesting to 
explore how this foreclosed the possibility to even develop a crisis narrative that features 
all aspects of the pentad. Accordingly, it will be interesting to see whether and why 
certain narratives are incoherent or fragmented.  
 Miskimmon’s definitions of strategic narratives, narrative projection, and issue 
narratives serve as the overall theoretical framework for my analyses of the different 
narratives. However, to further flesh out why Kohl’s grand narrative of practical politics 
                                                 
4 For a detailed account of the events of 1989 and the process of German reunification through the lens of 
international relations, turn to Sarotte (2014a). 
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gained momentum, while the narrative of the East German public struggled to gain 
momentum, I will turn to Habermas’s distinctions between strategic/communicative 
action and the system/lifeworld (Habermas, 1984, 1987). This will not only reveal what 
types of validity claims (i.e., truth, rightness, truthfulness) different actors project, but 
also how a particular narrative enables or constrains claims of other actors. It allows the 
reader to see why public statements turn from potentially being oriented toward 
communicative action into strategic communication, simply because they are perceived 
through a different narrative. Also, the system/lifeworld distinction will draw the 
reader’s attention to why narratives embedded in or emerging from the lifeworld 
legitimize a political system and not the other way around. Finally, I turn to Castells’ 
(2013) ideas about power, communication, and networks to account for how narratives 
gained political power and flowed through the communication environment and 
networks of 1989. How did the communication environment of 1989 enable certain 
narratives and constrain others? Who controlled what narrative traveled through the 
important political networks in 1989? What networks legitimized and empowered the 
different political narratives? 
 It is obvious, even tempting to argue that due to the vast amount of Berlin wall 
research, returning to the conflicting public, media, and politician discourses of 1989 
will not reveal any new insights. However, my intention is to use the existing historical 
and international relations literature surrounding the event of 1989 as a starting point to 
direct the reader’s attention to the communicative battles during the crisis moments right 
before, during, and after November 9th, 1989. From historical accounts, we know that 
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the GDR’s first free and democratic parliamentary election on March 18th, 19905 
stopped any deliberation about alternative political futures and paved the way for rapid 
reunification and Kohl’s pre-fabrication model (Engel, 2009; Joppke, 1995; Sarotte, 
2014a; Smith, 1998; Thaysen, 1990). From international relations research, we know 
that border openings with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Austria and Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s 1985 Glasnost and Perestroika programs helped to bring down the East 
German regime and the wall (Gilbert & Large, 2009). Further, we know that years 
before the opening of the Berlin wall, the USSR and the Americans militarily and 
politically disengaged from the conflict in Berlin, leaving it up to the East Germans to 
bring about political change (Engel, 2009; Sarotte, 2014a, 2014b). Finally, the events at 
Tiananmen square of June 1989 failed to transfer to Europe, establishing a consensus for 
nonviolence and setting the political stage for protests movements to publicly air their 
concerns and demands.  
 The 20th and the 25th anniversaries of the fall of the Berlin Wall produced a lot of 
historical and international relations research that focuses on the end of the Cold War, 
German-German unification, and the reorientation of global power dynamics (Allen, 
2014; Clack, 2009; Engel, 2009; Gerstenberger & Braziel, 2011; Lees, 2014; Schulz-
                                                 
5 Polls predicted a victory for the Social Democrats. Like the Round Tables, the Social Democrats favored 
a slower unification process, a new constitution, and a unified Germany created through the participation 
of Germans in both East and West. However, the elections revealed a resounding win for the conservative 
bloc. The Alliance for Germany, which consisted of members of the Christian Democratic Union, the 
Democratic Awakening movement, and the German Social Union received 48 percent of the vote 
compared to 22 percent for the Social Democrats. Voter turnout was a staggering 93 percent. Lothar de 
Maiziere became prime minister for the GDR transition government with Angela Merkel as his 
spokesperson (“The vote that set the course”, 2010).  
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Forberg, 2009). However, there is also research that urge us to focus on the long-range 
cultural and political challenges that the fall of the Berlin wall created for Germany and 
Europe (Kelly, 2011; Koelle, 2014; Lees, 2014; Silberman, 2011). These authors focus 
on the stories behind the wall and investigate the events surrounding the night of 
November 9, 1989 through the eyes of ordinary citizens as well as political figures from 
East and West Germany. By drawing attention to the forgotten stories from behind the 
wall and the political and cultural implications for the people of East Germany and 
Eastern Europe, these authors disrupt the dominant success story of 1989. This research 
helps to illuminate individual stories from both sides of the Berlin wall, but it does not 
reveal the political battle that unfolded before, during, and after the sudden and 
accidental revolution of 1989. Mary Elise Sarotte (2014a, 2014b) is the first who 
describes the competing conceptions and political directions of post-cold war Europe. 
She reinterprets the political struggle over different models for the future of Germany 
and Europe from the perspective of international relations and concludes that other 
political directions would have been possible for Germany and Europe. She introduced a 
revolutionary argument into the debate about alternative political directions for a post-
1989 Germany and Europe. Sarotte’s research not only encourages researcher to pay 
closer attention to the competing political directions in the drama of 1989, but she also 
opened up new areas for Berlin Wall inquiry.   
 Inspired by Sarotte’s analysis of the competing and conflicting political models 
for post-1989 Europe and Germany, this dissertation examines the rhetorical battle over 
the political directions for Germany and Europe. Despite the abundance of Berlin Wall 
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research, what we still do not know enough about is how and why the strategic crisis 
narratives of the east German public, the western news media, and west German political 
leaders enabled or constrained these political directions. Answering these questions will 
then also reveal the forgotten political crisis narratives of these social actors and add to a 
deeper understanding of the rhetorical processes that set Germany and Europe on a 
trajectory of rapid unification and eastward expansion. Further, this approach not only 
allows us to learn lessons about the processes of narrative projection during political 
crisis moments, but also to critique whether and how political actors exploited the crisis 
to advance their narratives, manipulated publics, and obscured reality.  
 Historians often conclude that the West German and West European media 
framed the events of 1989 in terms of peace, stability, and the possibility of economic 
and geopolitical instability. They emphasized the Western definitions of freedom and 
unity, while de-emphasizing East German’s role in the process (ter Wal et al., 2009, p. 
218). On the other hand, the East German public perceived the opening of the wall as an 
opportunity to reform their political and economic system, while the political leaders of 
the West viewed the crisis as legitimation to expand their legal, economic, and political 
systems eastward. What is missing in this discussion is a systematic analysis of the 
communicative strategies and narratives that helped to bring about these processes and 
outcomes. From a perspective of rhetoric and strategic communication, it is possible to 
bring together politics and discourse. Focusing on the public political communication of 
the crisis of 1989 is crucial to understand how the key narrators of political crisis 
situations, namely the media, the public, and the political leaders (Boin et al., 2017; 
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Cross, 2017; Olmeda, 2008), set the political directions for the reunification process. 
Turning to a crisis moment like 1989 is particularly useful for this kind of endeavor in 
that the symbolic order that legitimized the pre-existing political practices and networks 
was suddenly in flux, opening up possibilities for the public, the media, and political 
leaders to rewrite their strategic narratives. Accordingly, this dissertation will address the 
following tentative research questions: 
RQ1: How do the policy narratives of the East German public, the West German print 
media, and the West German leadership differ regarding the process of German 
unification?  
RQ2: How do fragmented narratives or internal tensions (i.e., pentadic ratios) in the 
narratives of the East German public, the West German print media, and West German 
political leaders produce or fail to produce their desired outcomes for Germany’s 
reunification process?  
RQ3: What forms or political appetites for German and/or European political integration 
reside in the different policy narratives of the East German public, the West German 
print media, and West German political leaders? 
RQ4: How do the different policy narratives by the East German public, the West 
German print media and West German political leaders turn claims that are potentially 
being oriented toward communicative action into strategic communication? 
RQ5: How does the communication environment of 1989 enable certain narratives and 
constrain others? Who controlled what narrative traveled through the important political 
networks of 1989?  
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Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 Chapter one will introduce the reader to my dissertation project. Like this 
prospectus, I will begin with a brief discussion of how the East German public, the West 
German print media, and the West German political leadership projected competing 
political narratives about what the wall symbolizes and how people should respond to it. 
This introduces the reader to the political power of narratives and the role of the public, 
the media, and political leaders as key political narrators. It will also remind the reader 
of how the Cold war narrative of East vs. West, democracy vs. totalitarianism, and 
capitalism vs. socialism resulted from rhetorical battles and not only military threats and 
economic sanctions. This brings the reader to a discussion of the drama of November 
9th, 1989 and how the East German publics, West German print media, and the West 
German political leadership all played different political roles in the sudden collapse of 
the Berlin wall. I will then introduce my approach, in which I develop a rationale for 
analyzing the drama of 1989 through the conflicting crisis narratives of the East German 
public, the West German print media, and West German political leaders, I will argue 
why 1989 presents a new political beginning for Germany and Europe and why strategic 
political crisis narratives present a promising approach for exploring the drama of 1989 
and other crisis moments in Europe’s recent crisis-ridden history. Finally, I will explain 
the significance of my dissertation and outline its organization.  
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Chapter II: Political Narratives of Crisis: Theory and Definitions 
 Chapter two will develop the argument that a political crisis implies an 
ideological crisis over symbols and that narratives help to describe and diagnose this 
crisis of symbols. Symbols legitimize political actions, but during a crisis political 
symbols are in flux, opening up a battle between opinion leaders over defining the 
meaning of political terms. To this end, chapter two will introduce the reader to 
important theories, definitions, and literature on political crises, narratives, and the 
rhetorical interactions between the public, the media, and politician in response to crises. 
As the key narrators of political crises, I will discuss the public’s, the media’s, and 
politician’s roles in projecting narratives. Drawing primarily upon communication 
research, chapter two will develop a heuristic lens for analyzing the rhetorical aspects of 
conflicting and fragmented narratives. Chapter two will also situate my dissertation 
within the broader discussions of strategic narratives, rhetoric, and political crisis 
communication. 
Chapter III: The Rhetorical Transformation of East German Publics 
 Via pentadic analyses of speeches by opposition leaders and public discourse by 
the Central Round Table, this analysis will focus on the development of pentadic ratios 
within the East German crisis narrative. Being perceived as a people that require 
democratic and political assistance, this chapter explores how the round table 
discussions led to more coherent or fragmented narratives. To put it another way, this 
analysis examines how the East German public’s vision of a united Germany changed 
over the course of key political events before, during, and after November 9, 1989. This 
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allows me to draw conclusions about what constrained the public to project their 
narrative.  
Chapter IV: Setting the Stage for Rapid German Reunification: The West German Print 
Media as Political Actor 
 Whereas the public, the media, and political leaders all played important roles in 
the drama of 1989, the media holds disproportionately more political power in defining a 
crisis than the public or political leaders. The media possesses unique political power, 
not only because they can disseminate information to large audiences, but because they 
act as a mediator between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 
1922, p. 3). While journalists and news editors are reactive rather than intentional crisis 
narrators, they still frame events and set the news agenda for the day. In the great 
blooming, buzzing confusion of the political world, the media define events for us, so 
that we inevitably perceive and respond to political events through mental shortcuts or 
stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18). That way, media discourses “define, describe and 
delimit what is possible to say and not possible to say” (Critcher, 2003, p. 170). Via 
pentadic analyses of editorials and cover stories of the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), Die Welt, and 
the Tageszeitung (TAZ) during key political events before, during, and after November 
9th, 1989, this chapter will flesh out the dominant political directions for Germany and 
Europe as they reside across these key events. To this end, I will examine tensions 
within (i.e., pentadic ratios) and across the different media pentads. Further, I will 
explore how these fragmented or coherent media narratives define the political crisis and 
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how they constrain or enable public deliberation of political alternatives for the East 
German public and West German politicians at these different political key moments. 
Finally, this analysis address how the fragmented or coherent narratives reflect or distort 
the political developments and deliberations in East Germany. 
Chapter V: Rapid Reunification and the West German Rhetoric of Practical Politics 
 In addition to analyzing the internal tensions in Kohl’s rhetoric, this chapter 
applies Habermas’s ideas of validity claims and world relations to flesh out how Kohl’s 
rhetoric of practical politics enables or constrains claims of other actors. From this I will 
draw conclusions about how Kohl positioned West Germany communicatively to 
advance his pre-fabrication model and set Germany and Europe on a trajectory for rapid 
unification and eastward expansion of western legal, political, and economic systems. 
Habermas’s distinction between the system and the lifeworld will guide me in this 
endeavor. 
Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 This chapter brings together the individual levels of analysis and retraces how the 
networks of 1989 and the different narratives themselves constrained each other over the 
course of the key political moments. To map out the different conflicting and 
intersecting narrative trajectories, I will start with the victory narrative of the rhetorical 
battle between the East German public, the West German print media, and the West 
German political leadership. Popular history and ideological news often regurgitate the 
crisis narrative of 1989 from the perspective of the victor, namely West German political 
leaders. By starting with the familiar narrative and working backwards along the 
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trajectories of the different narratives, it will be possible to flesh out the unfamiliar and 
forgotten narratives of the drama of 1989. Also, considering that crises direct political 
and societal actors to new forms of public deliberation to address the underlying social 
contingencies, I will also identify deficiencies in the interactions between the public, the 
media, and political leaders to deliberate new forms of political directions for Germany 
and Europe and recommend strategies for contemporary initiatives to better project crisis 
narratives. Finally, I will turn to Castells’ ideas about power, communication, and 
networks to account for how the East German public, the West German print media, and 
the West German political narratives flow through the communication networks of 1989 
and thereby gain or lose political power. I will identify the programmers and switchers 
that enhanced and diminished the political power of the individual narratives. Castells 
will help to widen our focus and draw conclusions about the different narratives from a 
societal perspective.  
Significance of Analysis 
 Commonly, historians tend to describe the events of 1989 as the result of 
structural factors like the border openings with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Austria and Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1985 Glasnost and Perestroika programs (Gilbert & 
Large, 2009). While these conditions aided in setting the stage for the drama of 1989, 
recent research suggests that the events surrounding November 9th, 1989 not only 
resulted from Glasnost and Perestroika, but that the interplay between the Western media 
and the East German public led to the political legitimation of the accidental opening of 
the Berlin wall. In addition, historians and international relations researchers often treat 
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the fall of the Berlin war as the end of the Cold war era. Jeffrey Engel (2009) and Mary 
Elise Sarotte (2014a) are among the first who treat the events of 1989 not as the end of 
international and European relations and the result of border openings and Glasnost and 
Perestroika, but as a political beginning for European integration and the international 
order. They view the events surrounding November 9th, 1989 as a new political 
beginning that exerts a lasting impact on European politics today and established a new 
form of political communication. Assuming an international perspective, Sarotte (2014a) 
argues: 
. . . I see 1989 not as an end, but as a beginning. It created the international order 
that persists until today. The need to understand this nonviolent transition from 
the Cold War to the present is enormous, because we greatly prefer nonviolence 
to the alternative (p. xi).  
 By treating the crisis of 1989 as a political beginning that established new forms 
for political deliberation and nonviolent German and European integration, my aim is to 
gain a deeper understanding of the rhetorical processes that set Germany and Europe on 
a trajectory for rapid unification and eastward expansion. In line with Arendt’s ideas 
about modern revolutions, I consider the rhetorical battle of 1989 as a battle over new 
political beginnings. Arendt argues that in the modern era, political revolutions do not 
imply a restoration of a pre-existing order, but “revolutions are the only political events 
which confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning” (Arendt, 2006, 
p. 21). Pre-modern revolutions often implied a return to a pre-existing political order, 
however, modern revolutions involve the end of an old order and the birth of a new 
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political beginning. Specifically, Arendt argues that “the modern concept of revolution, 
inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, 
that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold . . . “ 
(Arendt, 2006, p. 28). The aim of modern revolutions is not the replacement of one 
political system with another political system, but to abolish any division between rulers 
and ruled. Drawing upon the idea of no-rule or isonomy and the Greek city-state, Arendt 
argues that neither freedom nor equality are qualities inherent in human nature, but that 
they are the product of human effort and convention (pp. 30-31). Accordingly, to gain 
political freedom and equality requires citizens to appear before each other in a political 
space proper. For Arendt, political freedom and equality is not a private experience but 
necessitates public action and interaction with others (Arendt, 1958). It is in this political 
space or space of appearance that language and speech constitute action and the social 
actors themselves. She argues that it is the “space of appearance, [where] . . . men are 
together in the manner of speech and action” (Arendt, 1958, p. 199). Elsewhere, she 
expands upon this idea and argues that “[s]peechless action would no longer be action 
because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible 
only if he is at the same time the speaker of words” (pp. 178-179). Analyzing a modern 
revolution like the revolution of 1989 through the lens of narratives brings together the 
aspect of new political beginnings with the importance of political action and language. 
Hence, viewing the 1989 drama as a new rhetorical anchor for German and European 
political beginnings opens up conversations about rhetorical strategies used for 
contemporary EU initiatives and crisis narratives.  
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 If 1989 functions as a political beginning for European political integration, then 
what are the lessons to learn from it about how the public, the media, and political 
leaders deliberated or failed to deliberate their political visions for Germany and Europe. 
After all, public deliberation and rhetoric build political communities of discourse that 
enable people to act with unity to deal with contingencies and crises. Political crisis 
situations not only break down the familiar narratives that legitimate the pre-existing 
sociopolitical order, but they direct political and societal actors to new forms of public 
deliberation to address the underlying social contingencies. (Aristotle, p. 1357a).  
 Investigating the drama of 1989 through the lens of competing crisis narratives 
also draws our attention to the political role of rhetoric, rather than stopping at the 
structural dimensions of political crisis. Specifically, it is my intention to contribute to a 
new line of research in European politics, which focuses on understanding the nature and 
impact of European political crises from the perspective of social construction and 
narratives. With her 2017 study, The Politics of Crisis in Europe, Mai’a Davis Cross 
examines the role of the international media, European public, and politicians in 
misrepresenting the EU’s resilience to deal with crisis situations. While she draws our 
attention to the importance of the social construction of a crisis via the interactions 
between the media, the public, and politicians, she operates with a definition of political 
crisis narratives that primarily focuses on international media framing and the causes and 
consequences of recent European crises. She identifies narrative tensions at the global 
level (e.g., Public-Elite, East-West, North-South) across the Iraq crisis (2003), the 
Constitutional crisis (2005), and the Eurozone crisis (2010-2012). However, with my 
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analysis I will introduce a rhetorical lens to the research of political crisis narrative, 
which not only allows researchers to explore the tensions within individual crisis 
narratives and compare them to crisis narratives of other key crisis narrators, but also to 
compare them to the societal tensions at the global level. This approach also allows me 
to go beyond the descriptive level of political crisis analysis and point to specific 
rhetorical strategies and political terminologies to project narratives.   
 Finally, this dissertation contributes to what Miskimmon et al. (2017) call the 
study of communicative and reflexive action of strategic narratives. At the level of 
communicative action and strategic action this dissertation will flesh out what validity 
claims the different crisis narratives accommodate or reject. Further, my analysis 
examines whether the different narratives guard against criticism for all Habermasian 
world relations and thus invite communicative action or whether they lack a world 
relation and thereby invite strategic communication. This makes it possible to discuss 
and explain the prospects of a democratic reunification process from the perspective of 
the East German public’s, the West German media’s, and West German politician’s 
claims and type of communication and not only in terms of global political, economic, 
and societal tensions. At the level of reflexive action my dissertation helps to flesh out 
the strategic moments in which the East German publics, the Western media, and West 
German politicians target the tensions in other actor’s narratives, while presenting their 
narratives as coherent. By analyzing the drama of 1989 at the level of 
communicative/strategic and reflexive action, I hope to further flesh out the discursive 
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patterns that enabled or foreclosed the possible political directions for German and 
European unification.  
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL NARRATIVES OF CRISIS: THEORY AND DEFINITIONS 
 A political crisis implies a crisis over symbols. Political crises disrupt the 
symbolic order that legitimized the pre-existing socio-political system, opening a 
rhetorical arena for opinion leaders to shape a new symbolic order. During a crisis, 
political symbols like security, freedom, and unity are in flux and activists, media 
reporters, and government officials, redefine the meaning of those symbols. By 
responding to a crisis, they reinforce existing symbols or shape symbols to fit the 
situation. The way that the public, the media, and politicians order political symbols 
often conflict and contradict each other, resulting in different interpretations, 
evaluations, and reactions to a political crisis. To account for how these different 
political actors arrange political symbols during crisis moments, this chapter will bring 
together theories and definitions from the area of rhetoric, political crisis 
communication, and strategic narratives. The goal is to introduce a narrative perspective 
of political crisis communication, which explores political crises not as a series of events 
and statements, but as a dynamic transformation of symbols modifying one another 
(Burke, 1942, p. 15).  
 Assuming a rhetorical view of political crisis narratives, the following sections 
will introduce definitions that are not only relevant to the present project, but will 
generate new ideas for research and theory building. To help set the tone for a rhetorical 
perspective of political crisis narratives, I will begin with a discussion of political crises 
and rhetorical legitimacy. This discussion will flesh out the relationship between 
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symbolic orders and disorder and political legitimacy. Then I will explore and define 
narratives. Specific attention will be dedicated to the relationship between frames and 
narratives. This will be followed by a detailed discussion of policy narratives and crisis 
resolutions Finally, I will end this chapter with a discussion of the interaction between 
politicians, the media, and the public.  
Political Crisis as Crisis of Rhetorical Legitimacy 
 Political crisis is a vague term within the area of international political crisis 
communication (Auer, 2016). While crisis theories in the area of organizational crisis 
communication offer ways to discuss the relationship between crisis types, crisis 
responsibility, organizational legitimacy, and choice of verbal response (T. Coombs, 
2007), the debate about political crises lacks clear definitions. This is surprising in that 
crisis not only defines politics and policy making (Cross, 2017), but political actors, 
situations, and responses differ significantly from communication by private 
organizations. Political crisis communication is inherently a public endeavor (Arendt, 
1958, 2006). In democratic systems, to gain and maintain political power, politicians 
depend on legitimacy and trust of the public. Due to this democratic obligation to the 
public, politicians are under constant media scrutiny during crises. To address the lack of 
clear definitions of political crisis, I will define political crises from a rhetorical 
perspective, focusing on the discursive dimensions of legitimization and opportunity 
exploitation. This way, I am following Hart (1993) who argues that “crisis is a key issue 
for crisis analysts, [t]o answer it, analysts will need to examine the role of language, 
symbols and communication in the formation of collective perceptions” (p. 46).  
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 Political crises are crises of legitimacy. Max Weber put forward an influential 
definition of political legitimacy, which suggests that a political system is legitimate if 
people believe and follow its rules. If people recognize the legitimacy of authorities to 
collect taxes, then they will pay their taxes without the widespread use of violence or 
incentives. It is people’s belief in the existence of a legitimate political order or process 
that elicits and guides their actions. He argues that “[t]he basis of every system of 
authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief 
by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber, 1968, p. 382). 
Specifically, Weber suggests that political legitimacy derives from people’s belief in and 
adherence to tradition, a ruler’s charisma, and the rationality of the rule of law. For 
Weber, it is possible to describe any modern political system according to these defining 
qualities of political legitimacy. While tradition, charisma, and legality are all sources of 
political legitimacy, Weber assumes that, eventually, all Western powers would 
legitimize the power-relation between citizens and the state through rational-legal 
means. In his view, “the most usual basis of legitimacy is a belief in legality, the 
readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by 
accepted procedures” (Weber, 1968, p. 131). Weber grounds his definition of political 
legitimacy in the assumption that people’s beliefs in a political order (i.e., 
Legitimitätsglaube) create social and political regularities and power relations, which are 
firmer than those resulting from self-interest or habitual rule-following (Weber, 1968, p. 
124). Accordingly, to support a political system, which suffers from weak political 
legitimacy, it is necessary to ensure political and social continuation, which guard 
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against or reduce the impact of crises. In the end, Weber’s definition implies a 
teleological understanding of political legitimacy. Improving a state’s institutional 
capacities and state-society relations leads to more political legitimacy.  
 While Weber’s definition of political legitimacy recognizes the importance of 
people’s perceptions of political legitimacy as a source of political action, it turns a blind 
eye to people’s individual standards for evaluating political legitimacy (Bielinski, 2017). 
Citizens not only derive political legitimacy from tradition, charisma, and the rule of 
law, but they ask themselves how politicians and political institutions should run a 
country. Those standards for political legitimacy are rooted in people’s norms, values, 
and social symbols. Political legitimacy then arises not from people’s general 
recognition of the legitimacy of authority and rules, but from rules that are in line with 
people’s ideas about political legitimacy. Even when tradition, charisma, and the rule of 
law break down due to crisis, people’s demands for political legitimacy endure. During 
political crises, the challenge for politicians is then not to restore legitimacy via 
traditions, personality cult, and laws, but to evoke people’s values, norms, and social 
symbols that align with their demands for legitimacy. A misalignment between people’s 
values, norms, and symbols and policies often originated the political legitimacy crisis. 
A political crisis not only disrupts people’s perceptions of rules and authority, but it 
contests societal values, norms, and symbols. It is this system of norms, values, and 
symbols that lends a political system legitimacy. It ensures continuity and credibility of a 
political system. To explore how rulers and ruled attempt to rhetorically reestablish 
political legitimacy during moments of crisis, it is necessary to develop a definition of 
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political legitimacy that not only accounts for normative dimensions of legitimacy, but 
also recognize the interaction between the state and society in relegitimizing political 
symbols during crisis.  
 Weber’s typology would lead us to conclude that liberal democracy and 
communism are different versions of charismatic legitimacy, or that communist systems 
comprise a unique combination of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy. 
While Weber’s ideas help to explain social and political order and disorder in terms of 
people’s perceptions and sources of authority, it would draw our attention away from 
discussing political crises as crises of legitimacy and the rhetorical interaction between 
state and society as a key necessity for political legitimacy (Nash & Scott, 2008). David 
Beetham introduced a definition of political legitimacy that not only allows us to 
describe different degrees of political legitimacy, but also accounts for the interaction 
between state and society. He describes political legitimacy not in terms of its sources, 
but in terms of its state-society relations and interactions. For example, when we speak 
of legitimacy deficit, we refer to a situation in which people’s beliefs and values only 
weakly support politics and policies. Whereas we speak of delegitimization when people 
withdraw their recognition and consent. Specifically, Beetham argues the following: 
A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its 
legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs. This may 
seem a fine distinction, but it is a fundamental one. When we seek to assess the 
legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other power relation, one 
thing we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified in terms of people’s 
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beliefs, how far it conforms to their values or standards, how far it satisfies the 
normative expectations they have of it. We are making an assessment of the 
degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and the 
beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification. We are not making 
a report on people’s ‘belief in its legitimacy’. (Beetham, 1991, p. 11) 
 This concept of political legitimacy directs our attention to political legitimacy as 
a societal rather than individual or institutional dimension, which demands an analysis of 
society’s norms, values, and symbols. If legitimacy arises out of social interactions and 
deals with whether political decisions and directions are desirable or appropriate within a 
system of norms, values, and symbols, then it is essential to examine the role of 
language and communication in legitimation processes during crisis moments (Biegoń, 
2016; Schneider, Nullmeier, & Hurrelmann, 2007). Questions about political legitimacy 
as a social construct can then be answered by turning to public discourse (Beetham, 
1991, p. 13).  
 Beetham’s ideas are especially important when describing political systems that 
are transitioning from authoritarian to democratic systems due to crisis. While a 
totalitarian regime like East Germany relied on party monopoly and Marxist-Leninist 
traditions to maintain political legitimacy and build a political future, modern democratic 
governments ensure their credibility and continuity by engaging in public interactions 
with society. Their political legitimacy depends on norms, values, and symbols like 
unity, freedom, transparency, public debate, and balanced media coverage. Inevitably, a 
democratic form of government will engage in state-society interactions to maintain or 
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regain its legitimacy. Accordingly, for this dissertation, political legitimacy is defined as 
discursively constructed norms, values, and symbols by which rulers and ruled assess 
politics and policies. A political crisis potentially delegitimizes the power relations that 
exist within the discursive interactions between and among key political narrators and 
opinion leaders. Whether it is a state-breakdown, a (transnational) ethnic conflict, 
revolutionary upheavals, terror attacks, intergovernmental conflicts, or economic 
recessions, these macro level crisis events threaten the socially accepted values, norms, 
and symbols that ensure political legitimacy. Depending on the magnitude, duration, and 
reason of the crisis, a crisis will not threaten or disrupt the entire system of values, 
norms, and symbols and thereby delegitimize the entire political system. Rather, crises 
events like the opening of the Berlin wall draw people’s attentions to values relating to 
unity, freedom, and (economic/political) security, whereas the Jyllands-Posten 
Muhammad cartoon crisis in Denmark in 2005, for example, threatened freedom of 
speech and religion.  
 Crisis events then bring about a political crisis when they disrupt the discursively 
constructed legitimacy between state and society. When this discursive link between 
state and society is under threat, then it is difficult for politicians and publics to set 
directions for the future. Hence, for any public political discourse to be effective, it is 
important to (rhetorically) establish or reestablish a legitimate socio-political order. It is 
important to recognize that legitimacy not only lies at the heart of any socio-political 
order, but it lies at the heart of any political crises. While others locate political 
legitimacy in institutions or the perceptions of legality during crisis situations, I 
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approach political crisis and political legitimacy from a rhetorical perspective. It is the 
rhetoric and discourses between media, politicians, and publics that establish and 
reestablish the socio-political order and its legitimacy. By approaching political crises 
from the perspective of rhetoric and public discourse, it is possible “to look behind 
‘official’ actions and rationales and to probe deeper into issues of authority, legitimacy 
and power that are inextricably connected to the way in which crises are defined and 
handled . . . ” (Hart, 1993, pp. 46-47).  
 While a symbolic perspective of political crisis as crisis of legitimacy directs our 
attention to the role of symbols for the formation of collective perceptions, it does not 
mean that crisis narrators like the media, politicians, and publics are all interested in 
restoring a healthy state-society relationship during crisis. Opportunity exploitation is 
another key dimension of political crises (Hart, 1993, p. 41). This often involves 
rhetorical battles over the definition of the situation, its causes, and consequences. Was 
the fall of the Berlin wall a crisis of German solidarity? A crisis of mass emigration from 
the East to the West? A crisis in geopolitics? A crisis of communism? Or an opportunity 
for German and European Unification? An opportunity for Western expansion 
eastwards? What caused the opening of the Berlin wall and what will the political future 
of Germany and Europe be like? To answer these and related questions, people often 
turn to political opinion leaders. Defining the crisis situation is then essential for political 
opinion leaders and crisis narrators to rhetorically legitimize any future directions or 
obscure alternative directions. If the dominant narrative does not support a specific 
political direction for the country, it will be difficult for political crisis narrators to not 
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only establish or reestablish legitimacy between state and society, but also to exploit the 
crisis to introduce and advance specific directions for a political future. Thus, selecting 
and enacting specific crisis narratives not only defines people’s perception of a crisis, 
but also invites support for policies and politics.  
 The rhetorical exploitation of a political crisis often involves an “or else” 
statement or implications (Arsenault, Hong, & Price, 2017, p. 190). By its nature, policy 
narratives work toward a specific short-term or long-term goal. Whether it is rapid 
German-German unification, the expansion of NATO and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) eastwards, or the weakening of the Warsaw Pact, West German and 
European policy makers explicitly and implicitly exploited the political vacuum in 1989 
by presenting their resolution to the crisis as the only reasonable alternative. Helmut 
Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics implied that the pre-fabrication model is the only real 
political direction for German-German unification or else East Germany would miss its 
opportunity to free itself from the political and economic grip of the USSR. However, 
opportunity exploitation and specifically or else statements and implications work 
together with political legitimation. Or else statements depend upon whether people trust 
their leaders and share the desirability of their policies. Political crises orient people 
toward resolutions, but crisis narratives must enact imaginable political futures before 
presenting them as the only possible solution. Thus, rhetorical exploitation of a political 
crisis and or else statements and implications must be rooted in the discursive legitimacy 
in a society to exert political power.  
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 To further illustrate the importance of language, symbols, and communication for 
a rhetorical perspective of political crisis communication, I will now turn to the 
rhetorical dimensions of crisis events. Events are essential to a discussion of political 
crisis communication in that key crisis actors attribute causes and consequences to 
events (W. T. Coombs & Holladay, 1996) and thereby select and enact a specific crisis 
narrative. It is the rhetorical response to an event that defines the crisis situation and 
opens the door for new possibilities and directions.  
A Rhetorical View of Crisis Events and Situations 
 A political crisis starts with an event or a series of events that invite rhetorical 
responses. Seeger and Sellnow (2015) argue that “describing an event as a crisis is a 
rhetorical act that calls for some immediate action to alleviate the potential threat” (p. 
12). The event threatens the existing discourse of political legitimacy and thereby 
demands a crisis narrative that would help to return to the old narrative or enact a new 
narrative that coordinates the interactions between state and society (Heath, 2004, p. 
168). The search for a new narrative of political legitimacy then presents a rhetorical 
exigency in that it demands crisis actors to deliberate directions for a possible political 
future (Bitzer, 1968). The event is so significant that crisis narrators cannot simply turn 
to familiar means and methods to resolve the situation, but must turn to public 
deliberation and discourse for help and support. They are not sure about how to 
communicate the nature of the crisis and how to resolve it. Aristotle argues: 
The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without 
arts or systems to guide us . . . The subjects of our deliberation are such as seen 
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to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, 
and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them 
to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation. (Aristotle, 2007, p. 1357a) 
 The political crisis of the opening of the Berlin wall constitutes a rhetorical 
situation in that the political future after October 9th, 1989 is in doubt and demands key 
opinion leaders and crisis narrators to deliberate political possibilities for Germany’s and 
Europe’s reunification process. Only through the discursive interaction between key 
crisis narrators is it possible to explain the crisis event and enact a crisis narrative that 
helps to return to a narrative of political legitimacy and order. Similarly, Crick (2014) 
argues the following: 
. . . rhetoric always responds to disruptive events that reveal gaps in our habits, 
laws, beliefs, and relationships by creating and publicizing a discourse that gives 
a new meaning to situations, audiences, beliefs, and actions in order to promote 
certain possibilities over others within the context of choice and judgment. (p. 
254) 
 Further, by drawing upon Dewey’s and Bentley’s transactional perspective of 
rhetoric and Orwell’s ideas about political situations 6, Crick explains that rhetoric 
transforms fluid events into situations. Situations do not exist in the absences of rhetoric. 
Public discourse by the media, politicians, and publics construct a situation by threading 
                                                 
6 Dewey, J. (1970). Characters and events: Popular essays in social and political philosophy. Edited by 
Joseph Ratner. New York: Octagon Books. 
Ratner, S., & Altman, J. (Eds.). (1964). John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A philosophical 
correspondence. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
Orwell, G. (1945). As I please. Tribune. London 
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together isolated events into a coherent whole. Actions, actors, settings, and motives that 
already captured people’s attention through direct experience or media reporting are put 
together to suggest possible solutions to the situation. Only by rhetorically transforming 
isolated event into situations is it possible to act toward it. An isolated crisis event or 
series of isolated crisis events do not invite or demand political action. It is the 
rhetorically constructed crisis situation that opens room for political action and 
directions. However, to act out and entertain new directions for political action, it is 
necessary for actors to see themselves implicated in the rhetorically constructed 
situation.   
 Crick (2014) explains that for an event to count as a disruption of a socio-
political order—a crisis—the audience must be rhetorically implicated in the crisis 
situation and its resolution. For an audience to accept that an event threatens the existing 
narrative of political order and legitimacy, the audience must step into the character role 
of the crisis narration. If the audience is not the type of audience that the crisis narrative 
demands, then it will be difficult to encourage collective political action and reestablish 
legitimacy. Hence, public statements for social and political reform and action rest upon 
narrative identification.  
 The idea of narrative identification also entails that crisis narrators might attempt 
to drag other political crisis actors into the narrative or exclude them depending on what 
events and issues they make salient. For example, if the dominant discourse between 
media, politicians, and publics depicts a new common democratic constitution between 
East and West Germany as an important first step toward German reunification, then this 
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invites democratic political decision makers into the narrative, but would excludes all 
former East German officials. This dominant narrative would lead people to say: “Why 
are we hearing from former East German officials. They play no role in democratic 
decision making”. By making the issue of democratic German-German unification 
salient, this leading crisis narrative would not only invite democratic political actors to 
play the role of crisis managers, but it would also warrant their statements as 
contributions to a democratic solution.    
 For a narrative to effectively construe an event as a political crisis situation and 
orient people toward a politically desirable resolution, it is necessary to enact narratives 
that invite people to assume specific roles in the narrative. A political crisis narrative 
should not only explain what happened, when it happened, why it happened, who made 
it happen, and how people should respond to it, but also why does this event threaten 
political legitimacy, what means and values should be used to restore political 
legitimacy, who should and shouldn’t act, and what socio-political order are we now 
working toward? Only when these and related questions dominate the discursive 
interactions between the media, politicians, and publics can we speak of a rhetorical 
crisis situation and political crisis narratives. Hence, by rhetorically responding to events 
that are in the public’s eye and connecting them into a coherent whole, crisis narrators 
bring into existence a situation.  
 This position should not be confused with Vatz’s (1973) position who argues that 
“utterance strongly invites exigence” (p. 159). While crisis narrators evoke a crisis 
situation by tying together confusing events that demand explanation and deliberation, 
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they do not entirely control the significance of a situation. Rather, their efforts to bring 
together disconnected puzzling events that bare the potential of threating the socio-
political order are rhetorical enactments of other narratives. Statements by key political 
crisis narrators like the media, political leaders, and publics shape political crisis 
narratives, but they do not originate them. For instance, in a speech to the German 
Parliament on November 28th, 1989, Helmut Kohl said: “[The East Germans] want 
economic freedom, and they want at last to reap the fruits of their labor and achieve 
greater prosperity (Gray & Wilke, 1996). These statements about economic freedom and 
prosperity are enactments of broader narratives, specifically Cold War narratives of 
peace and prosperity and economic liberalism in general. Kohl’s statements enact an 
existing narrative and thereby invite East German’s to assume the role of liberalists and 
democrats to work toward greater personal freedom and economic prosperity. While 
crisis narrators can connect events in new ways, draw attention to specific events and 
issues and thereby implicate or exclude actors, actions, settings, plots, and themes they 
are constrained by broader narrative forms that already suggest how events are put 
together and what the events will lead to.  
 Burke’s (1968) insights about rhetoric and form suggests that rhetorical 
enactments of common political plots, settings, actors, actions, motives, and themes (i.e., 
political topoi) arouse and then satisfy audience expectations about crisis events. To 
evoke a political audience response to a crisis event, it is important for crisis narrators to 
be aware of the political appetites that their rhetorical enactments create. Helmut Kohl’s 
aforementioned enactment of the Cold War narrative of peace and prosperity evoked and 
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satisfied West Germans’ desire to stop Europe from entering into another war. A 
rhetorical enactment of the Cold War narrative of the economic failure of the East would 
have possibly elicited an appetite of political caution and suspicion toward German-
German unification. Thus, rhetorical enactments that attempt to thread crisis events 
together into a coherent narrative carry with them the political forms or expectations of 
larger political narratives. Interestingly, Burke’s insights about narrative forms also 
suggests that crisis actors can anticipate other actor’s reactions to new events. Burke 
(1969b) explains:  
Perhaps the ‘ultimate’ order comes most natural to narrative forms. . . . in 
narrative, it is so implicit that we may not even discern it. For instance, if the fate 
of our hero is developed through a succession of encounters, each of these 
encounters may represent a different ‘principle,’ and each of these principles or 
states may so lead into the next that the culmination of one lays the ground for 
the next. (p. 197) 
 As the media, politicians, and publics narrate crisis events, they enact narratives. 
This way, a new event only registers as a political crisis event if it is a rhetorical 
enactment of a broader narrative. Only within the boundaries of a narrative is it possible 
to link isolated events into a coherent narrative. In addition, as a new event enters the 
political crisis drama, actors rely on familiar crisis narratives to not lose their right to act 
within it and rationalize their public statements. Crisis narrators who do not enact 
narratives that are grounded in the existing political culture risk delegitimizing 
themselves and writing themselves out of the crisis narrative.  
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 So far, we established that political crisis events disrupt rhetorical legitimacy, 
which resides within the discursive interactions between state and society. The 
disruption of political legitimacy leaves key crisis narrators searching for a narrative that 
reestablishes socio-political order and warrants their public statements and directions for 
a political future. Their search for a new narrative of order and continuity constitutes an 
exigency that demands key crisis narrators to make sense of the event or events that 
disrupted the old narrative. Their rhetorical efforts to explain the crisis events transforms 
isolated events into a situation, which invites societal actors to play specific political 
roles and work toward a political future. Their efforts to transform fluid events into 
tangible situations include rhetorical enactments of familiar but broader narratives, 
which arouse and satisfy audience’s appetites for how events evolve into a situation. 
Freedman (2006) argues that “[narratives] do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately 
constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current” (p. 22). 
As different actors thread together isolated events differently, we end up with different 
definitions of the situation. Was the opening of the Berlin wall an economic burden for 
the West, a humanitarian challenge due to mass East-West migration, an opportunity for 
German and European unification, or a chance for the West to extend its geopolitical 
power? As different definitions of a situation offer specific roles, responsibilities, and 
resolution, key political narrators fight over the definition of the crisis situation, which 
often results in conflicting narratives, counternarrative, and fragmented narrative. But 
before we turn to a discussion of fragmented narratives and political legitimacy, we will 
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first develop a rhetorical definition of political crisis narratives. and rhetorical definition 
of crisis events.  
 
A Rhetorical Lens for Political Crisis Narratives 
 The literature about rhetorical crises during political crises tends to focus on the 
success and effects of crisis responses like framing and rituals (Boin et al., 2017; Boin, 
McConnell, & Hart, 2008; Boin, t Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Hart, 1993). Specifically, 
Boin, Hart, and McConnell treat crises as a way for governments and opposition leaders 
to successfully survive the blame games and framing contests during political crises. 
While they view a political crisis as a breakdown of people’s symbolic orders, they pay 
attention to effective crisis management and strategies by which governments and critics 
exploit a crisis event to defend and gain political reputation and advance policies. Their 
theory of crisis exploitation examines the impact of crisis rhetoric on political support 
for office-holders and public policies. Drawing upon Entman’s definition of frames7, 
they suggest that a political crisis should be conceived as a framing contest between 
political actors concerning the severity, responsibility, and implication of crises (Boin et 
al., 2009, p. 82). During and after a political crisis, “[c]ontestants manipulate, strategize 
and ﬁght to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative” (Boin et al., 2009, p. 
82). While they view frames as rhetorical enactments of broader political narratives, they 
                                                 
7 According to Entman, framing means to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993, p. 52). 
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remain at the level of framing analysis and do not put them into the context of the 
narrative trajectories that exist pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis.  
 Other researchers of political crisis communication (Cross, 2017; Kuipers, 2006; 
Seeger & Sellnow, 2015) also speak of political crisis narratives and turn to frames as 
their unit of analysis. For Cross, narratives refer to how politicians, the media, and the 
public socially construct causes and consequences of a political crises. She defines a 
narrative in terms of society’s perceptions of the causes and consequences of a crisis 
event. Cross traces a meta-narrative across three recent EU crises in terms of how the 
international newspapers like The Economist, TIME Magazine, and the International 
Herald Tribune framed the causes and consequences of the Iraq Crisis (2003), the 
Constitutional Crisis (2005), and the Eurozone Crisis (2010). While she argues that 
“there is a metanarrative in the international community’s understanding of the EU, 
which is deeply flawed and detrimental to the goals that Europeans share in common” 
(p. 20), she does not explicate the relationship between frames and narratives and 
operationalizes narratives only in terms of their constructed and perceived causes and 
consequences.  
 From a rhetorical perspective, it is important to not only distinguish between 
frames and narratives, but also to discuss how these elements of political crisis 
communication interact with each other. Miskimmon et al. (2017) argues that “ . . . 
narratives have a structure that sets them apart conceptually from framing or branding—
although both framing and branding can be seen to trigger or evoke narratives” (p. 7). 
Further, Miskimmon et al. (2017) explains that policy frames are compared to existing 
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policy narratives and audiences evaluate whether the new policy frame aligns with 
existing narratives (i.e., frame-narrative alignment). Thus, for a policy frame to be 
politically impactful, it must be anchored in a broader narrative that people are familiar 
with. (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 111). For Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 
(2013), framing is a way for political leaders and journalists to shape public opinion, but 
“frames as an analytical unit lack the temporal and causal features narratives necessarily 
possess” (p. 7). To put it differently, understanding narratives help us to understand 
frames as rhetorical enactments of narratives. While the media, political leaders, and 
publics frame individual elements of a narrative (i.e., actors, settings, action, means, 
goals), these frames do not necessarily feature past causes or future outcomes.    
 As the media, publics, and political leaders narrate crisis events, they not only 
activate different narratives, but also suggest possible resolutions with each rhetorical 
enactment. In a way, each rhetorical enactment of a political crisis foreshadows 
possibilities for a political future. Burke suggests that “a given terminology contains 
various implications, and there is a corresponding ‘perfectionist’ tendency for men to 
attempt carrying out those implications” (Burke, 1966, p. 31). Elsewhere, Burke explains 
that language and narratives generate a persuasive momentum or appetite which tends 
toward satisfaction (Burke, 1968, pp. 31, 124). Applied to political crisis 
communication, this means that crisis discourse implies possibilities for political action 
and resolutions. Further, the language used during political crises imply specific policies 
that crisis narrators will follow through regardless of their outcomes. Drawing upon 
Burke, Kluver (2010) explains:  
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The terms, or language, we use to define a situation have built into them an 
implied trajectory, or an end, by virtue of the characteristic of humans that Burke 
calls a terministic compulsion. The compulsion to act according to a terministic 
screen, or visions constrained by our language, meaning that we act out of the 
implications of our terms, regardless of the consequences. (p. 73) 
 Using Miskimmon’s and Burke’s ideas about narratives as a starting point, this 
section will introduce the reader to the rhetorical elements of narratives. After discussing 
the rhetorical elements of narratives, I will bring in the above-mentioned ideas about 
political crisis, rhetorical legitimacy, and crisis events. Guided by Burke’s idea that “the 
most characteristic concern of rhetoric [is] the manipulation of men’s beliefs for political 
ends . . . “ (Burke, 1969b, p. 41), this section will develop a rhetorical lens of political 
crisis narratives. 
 Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) draw upon Foucault’s ideas about 
discourse to develop their definition of strategic political narratives. Specifically, they 
explain: 
We take a Foucauldian conception of discourse as a set of meanings and 
practices that contain rules about what is say-able and know-able and that creates 
roles which actors fill. Discourses do not feature a causal transformation that take 
actors from one status quo to another as narratives do. Actors can only form and 
project narratives based upon the discourses available to them in the historical 
situation, so discourses have a structuring effect upon narrative action. (p. 7) 
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 What is important here is not only the Foucauldian idea that discourse opens or 
closes off knowledge and speech, but it is that narratives feature identification as well as 
temporal and causal transformation. Accordingly, a narrative perspective of political 
crisis discourse makes it possible to identify actors, settings, acts, means, and goals, 
while also recognizing relationships between past, present, and future.  
 At a press conference on November 9th, 1989 in East Berlin, Günter Schabowski 
surprised journalists with his announcement that the Berlin wall is now open. Journalists 
rushed to pay phones and wire services to report the news to their news networks. West 
German TV channels included the news in their evening programs, which encouraged 
East Berliners to walk up to the border crossing at Bornholmer Straße. East Berliners 
asked the border guards what was happening. Unable to reach their supervisors, the 
border guards referred to TV and radio reports about Schabowski’s announcement and 
decided to let East Berliners cross into West Berlin. In the days after the accidental 
opening of the Berlin Wall, politicians, journalists, and citizens asked themselves: “What 
happened, why did it happen, and where are we going from here?” West German and 
European politicians answered these questions by declaring it an event of freedom and 
unity and suggesting rapid German-German unification. They used this political crisis to 
expand their legal, economic, and political systems eastward, which eventually led to the 
rapid unification of East and West Germany and the advancement of the European 
Union.  
 This brief narrative of political events surrounding the opening of the Berlin Wall 
not only identifies key actors, actions, settings, means, and goals associated with the 
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opening of the Berlin Wall, but it also suggests causal and temporal transformation of 
events. In addition, the accidental opening of the Berlin Wall opened new rhetorical 
opportunities to enact political crisis narratives that answer the questions of what 
happened, why did it happen, and where are we going. Thus, the past, present, and future 
are expressed through the discursive interplay between actors, actions, settings, means, 
and goals.  
 Drawing upon Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad, Miskimmon, Roselle, and 
O’Loughlin (2017; 2013; 2014) define narratives in terms of actors, settings, acts, 
actions, tools, and resolutions. The following summary fleshes out the rhetorical 
elements of narratives and offers examples that relate to the political context of the 
opening of the Berlin Wall and specifically to the present inquiry. 
• Characters/Actors (Agent): Actors possess agency or the means to carry out 
acts that are important to a narrative. Political crisis actors include several 
different interest groups like policy makers, political parties, opposition leaders, 
social movements, and newspapers. Political crisis actors are different from 
political crisis narrators. As key political crisis narrators, political leaders and 
publics can write themselves as well as other actors into a narrative by speaking 
to the popular news frames of the media8. Actors that lack societal significance 
or popularity might appear in a narrative as actors, but will be denied rights to 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion of news frames from a rhetorical perspective and how enactments of a 
narratives transform into newsworthy statement in the media, please turn to (Jamieson & Campbell, 2001). 
Jamieson and Campbell also speak to the process by which societal actors influence the media and thereby 
write themselves into the media’s narratives about political events.  
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authorship of the narrative. Within the context of domestic political 
communication surrounding the opening of the Berlin Wall, actors include East 
German political opposition groups represented at the Round Table Meetings 
(e.g., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for 
Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany, and the United Left) and West German policy makers like Germany’s 
chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. These 
actors potentially function as actors and/or narrators. Whoever is included or 
excluded in a political crisis narrative reveals who is considered important or 
irrelevant to possible resolutions of the crisis. Further, political crisis narrators do 
not create actors from scratch, but the existing political narratives (e.g., Cold War 
narratives) attribute specific interests, qualities, and abilities to an actor. In a 
way, narratives ascribe political identities to actors that induce limitations and 
shape people’s public perceptions of these actors. Thus, political actors are 
rhetorically charged when entering a narrative, creating opportunities and 
constraints for political crisis narrators. Finally, as political actors exist within the 
interplay of different discourses, their identities are subject to changes in these 
discourses. 
• Setting/Environment/Space (Scene): Within the context of political crisis 
communication, settings refer to the discursive constraints and opportunities for 
political crisis actors to enact narratives. Settings refer to depictions of political 
systems. During the Cold War, political systems were largely depicted in realist 
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term (Kennedy, 1988; Waltz, 2010), describing the Cold War world as a battle 
over limited power resources and the effective and efficient use of the available 
resources. According to a realist view of the political system in 1989, political 
order would best be achieved via balancing and containment of power. Further, 
settings refer to crisis situations. Was the fall of the Berlin wall a crisis of 
German solidarity? A crisis of mass emigration from the East to the West? A 
crisis in geopolitics? A crisis of communism? An opportunity for German and 
European Unification? An opportunity for Western expansion eastwards? A new 
political beginning for German and European integration or just the beginning of 
the end of communism and the Cold War? Similarly, within a democratic system 
narrative, the opening of the Berlin wall suggests political and economic 
liberation, whereas within a communist system narrative, the opening of the 
Berlin wall suggests political failure. As with actors, political crisis settings carry 
rhetorical constraints, opportunities, assumptions, and rationales. These rhetorical 
limitations also define what issues actors will be able to discuss and what policies 
they can propose to address these issues. Finally, the language used to describe a 
political setting shapes an actor’s political motives. For Burke (1984), motives do 
not reside within people but are “distinctly linguistic products” (p. 35) that reside 
in language. Specifically, Burke explains “. . . man’s words for motives (e.g., 
duty, love, revenge, faith, devotion, preference) are merely shorthand 
descriptions of situations. One tends to think of a duality here, to assume some 
kind of breach between situation and a response. Yet the two are identical. . . . 
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[t]he situation was our motive, and our word for the motive characterizes the 
situation” (Burke, 1984, p. 220). Thus, rhetorical depictions of Germany’s 
political system and the crisis situation of the opening of the Berlin Wall imply 
constraints and opportunities for crisis actors and narrators, as well as specific 
political motives.  
• Conflict/Action (Act): Political acts structure narratives in terms of past, 
present, and future. Political actions drive and shape a narrative as they 
potentially invite reactions from other actors. Opposing actions possibly 
reinforce existing policies or lead to a conflict of political directions. Like actors 
and settings, actions do not exist independent of a narrative. The qualities of the 
political actor and the definition of the political system and crisis situation 
determine what political actions are possible. Depending on the enacted 
narrative, a political act limits or enables a corresponding reaction. Burke (1968, 
2003) argues that narrative acts are inherently dialectical. A political action 
entails resistance. For example, during his speech at the Centre des Conférences 
Internationales in Paris on January 17, 1990, the German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl invoked a metaphor frequently used by Konrad Adenauer and argued that 
“the German house must be built under a European roof” (as cited in Gilbert, 
2012, p. 154). The metaphor not only suggests Kohl as one of the key architects 
for German and European unification, but also implies that a unified Germany 
would live under the military roof of NATO. As the military muscle against the 
Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, NATO defines the security elements of the 
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European roof. Any political action against NATO would be rendered as an 
offense against European and German integration. In the political setting of 1989, 
any opposition to divorce from NATO or Europe’s political and economic 
agreements (e.g., European Economic Community EEC, European Political 
Cooperation EPC) would risk German and European political, economic, and 
military vulnerability. On February 1, 1990 Modrow proposed a plan for 
German-German unification where both German nations should surrender their 
memberships in military agreements like NATO and assume a neutral position 
within Europe. This enactment of a narrative of military neutrality invited 
reactions from the existing Cold War narratives, which Kohl enacted shortly after 
Modrow argued for German neutrality. The self-ascribed qualities of Kohl as an 
architect for German and European integration, the metaphor of a Germany 
under a European and NATO roof, and international system at the end of 1989 
thwarted Modrow’s political action and implied conflicting political trajectories. 
Accordingly, actions not only structure a narrative in terms of causality and 
temporality, but they also invite corresponding reactions. 
• Tools/Behavior (Agency): How do the political agents act? By what means do 
they act? What instruments do they use to carry out their acts? While the 
qualities of the actor, settings, and acts, limit what tools are available, political 
agency for the present analysis specifically include policies and political 
legitimacy as it resides in values, norms, and symbols like peace, prosperity, 
security, liberty, equality, unity, human rights, and even bravery and dedication. 
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Theories within the area of international politics often distinguish between hard 
power and soft power instruments. Hard power resources refer to military and 
economic tools, while soft power tools denote the perceived attractiveness of 
political culture, values, and policies (Nye, 2004). Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and 
Roselle’s (2013) definition of narrative tools, however, transcends the distinction 
between hard and soft power. They contend that “strategic narratives . . . bridges 
the gap between hard and soft power concepts . . . [t]he use of military and 
economic instruments can be understood to be part of a narrative projection of a 
state” (p. 75). Hence, within the structure of a political crisis narrative, tools of 
political power exist in relation to the actor and the possible crisis resolution that 
they promise.  
• Resolution/Suggested Resolution/Goal: (Purpose): The rhetor’s account of the 
resolution is particularly important for political crisis narratives in that people 
expect to return to a narrative of political order and legitimacy. The suggested 
solution should offer an imaginable and actionable future that rests upon 
legitimate state-society relations. As a crisis disrupts the routine narrative of 
political legitimacy, people await a narrative that transforms political chaos into 
order and continuity. A political crisis narrative without a clear resolution would 
not only disappoint in reestablishing political legitimacy and foreclose any 
opportunity to rhetorically exploit the situation, but it would also fail to function 
as a policy narrative. By its nature, political discourse carries with it an 
expectation to address the future. A political crisis narrative that lacks a short-
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term or long-term resolution would struggle to rhetorically define a crisis 
situation. Within international politics of the Cold War, goals by Western nations 
included nation building, regime change, and the containment of Soviet 
geopolitical expansion (Craig & Logevall, 2012). Via the Marshall Plan and the 
Truman Doctrine, the US aimed at rebuilding Europe’s political and economic 
systems, while defending it from communist influence. Between 1989-90, 
international policy makers competed over different models for rebuilding 
Europe and creating a new transatlantic architecture (Sarotte, 2014a). They 
competed over possible resolutions or goals for a post-Cold War narrative. 
Hardliners within the Soviet government wished to return to the four-power 
agreement of 1945, before subsequent layers of Cold War modification opened 
room for political maneuvering by Germany (e.g., Détente). The old Allied 
Control Commission should dominate all proceedings in divided Germany. 
Sarotte (2014a) refers to this as the “Restoration Model” (p. 7), which represents 
a realist vision for Germany’s political future. The ultimate goal was to divide 
and thereby weaken Germany and Europe, in line with the idea that a divided 
power is a weak power. In opposition to the hardliners within the Soviet 
government, Mikhail Gorbachev favored a “Heroic Model of Multinationalism,” 
creating a common European home with many rooms. States under this model 
would retrain their own political orders, but cooperate via international economic 
and military institutions. The goal was the construction of an improved socialism 
in East Germany. Interestingly, the East German dissident movements argued for 
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a similar resolution in that they imagined political and economic modernization 
to exist side by side with socialism. The French President François Mitterrand 
proposed a political order where both Germanies would maintain its own 
sovereignty under a common national roof. This two-states in one Germany 
model or “Revivalist Model” aimed at creating a Europe of confederations. 
Moscow’s “Restoration Model”, Gorbachev’s “Heroic Model of 
Multinationalism”, and Mitterrand’s “Revivalist Model” would not speak to the 
concerns of European policy makers (e.g., How should East Germany be 
integrated into Europe economically, politically, militarily, and culturally?) or 
adapt to the rapidly changing political landscape between 1989 and 1990. In the 
end, Helmut Kohl developed the winning resolution in early 1990—the 
“Prefabrication Model”. Kohl suggested to extend the West’s domestic and 
international economic, military, and political institutions eastward. The West 
German Basic Law, the Deutsch Mark, the European Community (EC), and 
NATO’s mutual defense guarantee (i.e., Article 5) all allowed for eastward 
expansion. Thus, the winning resolution of Germany’s reunification process 
occurred under the existing West German/European structures.  
 While this meta-narrative of the process of German reunification introduces the 
reader to key actors, settings, actions, tools, and resolutions, these are only examples to 
illustrate the relationships between and among key elements of the political crisis 
narrative of 1989-1990. Further, this meta-narrative relies upon different historical 
accounts of what happened, rather than how the political crisis of 1989 unfolded 
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rhetorically. Sarotte (2014a), Engel (2009), and others explain how Kohl’s resolution 
defeated alternative resolutions from a historical and international relations perspective, 
however, the present analysis explores this battle from a rhetorical perspective. 
 Burke (1969a) speaks of ratios and dominant terms to describe how narrative 
elements influence each other. There are numerous ways in which the different 
relationships between narrative elements or ratios enable and restrict a specific crisis 
resolution (Kneupper, 1979). Does the rhetorical nature of the political setting of 1989 
require a specific type of politician? (setting-actor ratio). What political actions are 
possible within the political setting of 1989? (setting-action ratio). How does Helmut 
Kohl describe the political and economic setting of East Germany so that it warrants his 
prefabrication model as the only resolution? (setting-resolution ratio). Do the rhetorical 
depictions of the political actions by East German publics demand the setting be a 
certain way? (action-setting ratio). Does Kohl’s appeals to unity and freedom demand 
him to be a certain politician? (agency-actor ratio). To answer these and related 
questions, it is necessary to not only identify the ratios or what goes with what, but also 
to ask questions like: “What is it about the political setting of 1989 that demands a 
certain political actor, action, tool, and resolution?”. To discover the relationship 
between narrative elements, it is important to analyze ratios as manifestations of the 
political values, norms, and symbols that existed during 1989.  
 As different crisis narrators draw upon different political values, norms, and 
symbols to narrate an event, we often end up with conflicting narratives. This is not due 
to a narrative’s internal structure, but because the ratios are rooted in different political 
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cultures and symbols. With his prefabrication model, German Chancellor Kohl won the 
battle over creating a post-1989 resolution for Germany and Europe. For him, the 
political setting of 1989 required the expansion of Western institution eastwards and 
rapid reunification. The political culture of the Cold-War informed Kohl’s rhetoric of 
practical politics. Within the setting of 1989 as a new political beginning, the Round 
Table meetings in East Germany considered deliberations between East and West 
Germans over alternative political futures as the right action within the setting of a 
bottom-up political revolution. Thus, narratives not only differ and potentially conflict in 
terms of individual elements, but also regarding the political culture that informs the 
relationships between narrative elements.  
 Miskimmon, Roselle, and O’Loughlin (2017; 2013; 2014) distinguish between 
international system, identity, and policy/issue narratives. International system narratives 
include Cold War narratives and War on Terror narratives, for example. At the level of 
international political systems, these narratives define how the world works, who its 
players are, and what global political future we are working toward. The Cold War 
narrative divided the world into democratic, communist, and non-aligned systems. 
Within this Cold War narrative, states and policymakers functioned as protectors of 
ideology and territory. On the other hand, identity narratives describe a nation’s political 
identity, its values, and goals. Is East Germany a nation committed to human rights? Is 
West Germany a nation that acts out of self-interest or humility? Is West Germany a 
political conqueror or a rescuer? While international system narratives, identity 
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narratives, and policy/issue narratives are rhetorically linked, this analysis focuses on 
policy narratives. Miskimmon, Loughlin, and Roselle (2017) explain: 
. . . policy narratives set out why a policy is needed and (normatively) desirable, 
and how it will be successfully implemented or accomplished. Issue narratives 
set political actions in a context, with an explanation of who the important actors 
are, what the conflict or issue is, and how a particular course of action will 
resolve the underlying issue. (p. 8) 
 By analyzing the normative dimensions of narratives, policy narratives highlight 
the importance of the suggested resolution in a narrative. As a political crisis demands a 
narrative that reestablishes political order and legitimacy, policy/issue narratives help to 
reveal why specific political futures are chosen over others.  
 One reason for why political crisis narrators choose one policy narrative over 
another is because they approach the crisis event from different terminologies. The 
attribution of actors, settings, action, tools, and resolution will be different depending on 
the crisis narrator’s language. In a way, the desirable policies available to a crisis 
narrator reside within that narrator’s language, which also means that a shift in 
terminology would potentially open new political futures that the old terminology 
concealed. Burke (1932) explains how our language shapes our views of a crisis 
situation and limit our ability to discover alternative resolutions. By approaching a 
personal crisis like losing a job from different vocabularies, we act one way rather than 
another: 
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. . . one man, dismissed from a job, but having a Marxian “configuration of 
meanings,” will fit his particular fate into a larger social progress, and so feel 
resentment rather than humiliation, and may perhaps organize an ominous hunger 
march; another, similarly dismissed, and with only the older pioneer 
configuration, the doctrine that ability will out, takes his dismissal simply as 
evidence that he was insufficiently endowed, and so may slink out of existence 
with a few. (Burke, 1932, p. 312). 
 As a result, each crisis event and each reaction to a crisis event is interpreted by 
the media, political leaders, and publics through their idiosyncratic narratives. 
 In summary, political crisis narratives potentially differ in terms of how crisis 
narrators attribute actors, settings, actions, tools, and resolutions to an event, how they 
relate these elements to warrant a crisis resolution (i.e., ratios), and what political culture 
and language these ratios represent. However, policy narratives not only differ regarding 
the pentad, the ratios, and political culture and language, they also differ in terms of their 
level of narrative probability or fragmentation.  
Fragmented Political Crisis Narratives 
 Political leaders, journalists, and publics are narrative critics. They engage in 
rhetorical battles over the who, what, where, when, why, and how of events and how the 
answers to these questions should relate to each other. However, they also argue over 
what language should be used. Burke (1969a) explains:  
Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the 
character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation 
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he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act 
itself. (p. xv) 
 In the process of these language battles, crisis narrators potentially fail to develop 
complete and coherent narratives. Maybe political crisis narratives lack elements or fail 
to relate elements in meaningful ways. Maybe political crisis narrators ground their crisis 
responses in a political culture and language that is foreign to their target audience. As 
crisis narrators try to thread together fluid crisis events into narratives of political order 
and legitimacy, they may connect events in a way that violates the integrity of a 
narrative.   
 Fisher (1984), suggests that people evaluate reality against narrative integrity. 
For Fisher, narrative integrity rests on three key assumptions: (1) narrative fidelity, or a 
narrative’s correspondence to reality, (2) narrative probability, or a narratives internal 
coherence, and (3) good reason or a narrative’s values. Narrative fidelity examines 
whether the narrative “rings true” for an audience. For Fisher (1987), narrative fidelity 
addresses the following questions: “Does [the narrative] provide a reliable guide to our 
beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions? . . . are the central conclusions of [the narrative] 
reliable/desirable guides for one’s own life? (pp. 175-176). For example, does the 
political crisis narratives of 1989 imply a desirable political future for East Germans? 
What are the “truth qualities” of the 1989 narrative for different audiences? (Fisher, 
1985, p. 349). As West German political leaders and the West German press enacted 
narratives during the 1989 crisis, East German publics had the chance to test their ideas 
about German-German reunification against these narratives and the implied crisis 
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resolutions. Specifically, people consider a narrative’s fidelity in terms of its 
consequences and desirability (Fisher, 1987, p. 48). This not only speaks to the 
normative dimension of policy narratives, but Fisher’s idea of narrative fidelity further 
fleshes out the rhetorical power of a crisis resolution for narrative identification. If an 
audience sees itself implicated in the narrative resolution of a crisis, then it is likely to 
desire it. For example, between December 1989 and February 1990, Hans Modrow 
enacted a policy narrative that envisioned German-German unification as the vehicle to 
achieve political and military neutrality for East Germany. Rather than narrating 
German-German unification as a desirable resolution without preconditions, Modrow 
evoked a desirability for military and political neutrality. In the end, his suggested crisis 
resolution lacked narrative fidelity or political desirability. As a political crisis continues 
until a resolution reestablishes order and legitimacy, it is essential that crisis narrators do 
not omit or minimize the significance of the suggested resolution in a political crisis 
narrative. Thus, higher levels of narrative fidelity would manifest themselves in pentadic 
ratios that involve or highlight the suggested resolution. The absence of depictions of 
desirable political resolutions to the 1989 crisis would not only mean that the narrative 
does not register and function as a policy narrative, but it would also weaken narrative 
identification overall.  
 On the other hand, narrative probability includes an assessment of whether the 
elements of a narrative hang together and whether the narrative is free of internal 
contradictions (Fisher, 1985, pp. 349, 364). A political speech or newspaper editorial 
that only includes details about the actor, action, and setting of an event fails to address 
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questions about the why and the how of the event and thereby fails to narrate possible 
futures. While narrators can limit themselves to transform only specific elements of a 
crisis event into a narrative, their audiences expect them to offer a coherent and complete 
crisis narrative that resembles other narratives, depicts reliable actors, and presents a 
logical set of events. If narratives lack “material,” “characterological,” and 
“argumentative,” coherence, then people are less likely to see themselves implicated in a 
crisis resolution. Material coherence describes the relationship between raw events and 
discourse, or the way that crisis narrators depict those events. Specifically, it refers to an 
audience’s tendency to compare narratives by the media, political leaders, and organized 
publics to similar narratives. An inquiry into the similarities between narratives political 
revolutions available to East Germans around 1989 and Kohl’s prefabrication narrative 
would be another project in and by itself, however, it draws our attention to reasons for 
discrepancies between the policy narratives by East Germans, Western politicians, and 
the Western press. In addition, narrative fragmentation can also happen at the level of 
narrative actors. Fisher argues that (1987) “coherence in life . . . requires that characters 
behave characteristically . . . without this kind of predictability, there is no trust, no 
community, no human order” (p. 47). A democratic actor will continue to be democratic, 
while an authoritarian actor will continue to be authoritarian. Depictions of coherent 
political actors evoke political predictability, whereas fragmented political actors suggest 
an ambiguous political future. Finally, argumentative or structural coherence refers to 
the order of events in a narrative. How does the narrative flow from one event to 
another? Narrative probability manifests itself in strong links between narrative elements 
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and consistent depictions of narrative elements. Only when crisis narrators depict 
narrative elements in a coherent and consistent way and relate them in a way so that they 
imply a desirable future is it possible to speak of high levels of narrative probability. The 
elements should be internally consistent and build upon each other in a way to point 
toward a resolution to the political crisis. This would enhance narrative identification by 
suggesting political predictivity.  
 While Fisher’s ideas about narrative fidelity and probability are important to 
facilitate narrative identification, and draw our attention to a narrative’s internal 
inconsistencies, the assumption of good reasons is particularly important to develop the 
idea of fragmented political crisis narratives (Caldiero, 2007; Heath, 2004). Good reason 
refers to people’s culture, history, values, and experiences. Specifically, Fisher argues 
that “[t]he ground for determining meaning, validity, reason, rationality, and truth must 
be a narrative context: history, culture, biography, and character” (Fisher, 1984, p. 3). 
West German politicians, journalists, and East German publics may agree on the 
probability and fidelity of a 1989 narrative, but disagree over the good reasons for 
German-German unification. The history, culture, and character that a bottom-up 
political revolution like the opening of the Berlin wall evokes for West German 
politicians and journalists is different than for people in Eastern Germany. This 
distinction between narrative fidelity, probability, and good reasons is particularly 
important in that organized East German public generally supported German-German 
unification as a desirable, reliable, and predictable crisis resolution, but doubted the 
process of integrating East German’s political culture into West Germany’s political 
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culture. This way, narrative identification is generally a question of degree; however, 
Fisher’s idea of good reasons specifically draws our attention to the significance of good 
reasons for the 1989 battle over political narratives and crisis resolutions. East Germans 
were not doomed to buy into or out of narratives. Recent research suggests that Kohl’s 
prefabrication narrative activated political desirability and predictability, but failed to 
address issues regarding political cultures (Gerstenberger & Braziel, 2011; Hockenos, 
2008; Kelly, 2011; Koelle, 2014). Hence, it is not only due to external conflicts between 
and among narratives that people do not see themselves implicated in a crisis narrative 
and crisis resolution, but also due to internal inconsistencies, especially along the lines of 
good reasons. 
 Further, Fisher argues that rational discourse favors informed and educated 
audiences, but the application of good reason in a narrative allows all audiences to 
participate in the creation and execution of narratives (Fisher, 1984, p. 9). Narratives 
allow non-experts or publics to enter the rhetorical construction of a future political 
order, whereas rational and logical discourse restricts narrative participation and 
identification to experts. Developing non-fragmented policy narratives is a rhetorically 
powerful tool in that it not only invites political experts as well as political non-experts 
to work toward a specific (common) future, but it also allows experts to appear to 
facilitate inclusive political discourse, while they can strategically exclude voices and 
political possibilities from the narrative. This way, Fisher’s assumption about narrative 
fidelity, probability, and good reason as key conditions for narrative integrity and 
identification further warrants a narrative perspective of the rhetorical battle between 
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West German political leaders, the Western press, and the East German public over 
possible political futures for Germany.  
 Similar to Burke’s idea of symbolic action (Burke, 1942, 1966), Fisher’s 
narrative paradigm refers to “a theory of symbolic action, words and or/deeds, that have 
sequence and meaning for those who live, create, and interpret them” (Fisher, 1984, p. 
2). A fragmented political crisis narrative along the lines of political desirability, 
political predictability, and political culture does not offer political equipment to 
envision or work toward a political future. Considering that the goal of a political crisis 
narrative is to reestablish political legitimacy, it is particularly problematic if a 
narrative’s elements and ratios fragment internally or among each other. Whether 
political crisis narratives lack elements or fail to depict and relate elements in a way to 
invoke political desirability, predictability, and culture, it weakens narrative 
identification. In turn, this lessens a narrative’s chance to shape or reestablish political 
order and legitimacy. Fisher’s narrative theory helps to supplement Miskimmon’s et al. 
idea of policy narratives by revealing that it is not only due to external conflicts between 
and among narratives that people do not see themselves implicated in crisis narratives 
and crisis resolution, but also due to internal inconsistencies. Specifically, by extracting 
political desirability, predictability, and culture out of Fisher’s assumptions about 
narrative fidelity, probability, and good reasons is it possible to see how within the 
context of political crises, narrative integrity tends to move toward crisis resolution. To 
put it another way, political crisis narratives as equipment for political action are more 
inviting if they suggested desirable, predictable, and culturally resonant crisis resolution.  
 81 
 
 In summary, Fisher’s narrative theory further supports the argument that 
narratives function as “equipment for [political] living” (Burke, 1941). Fisher’s 
assumption about narrative fidelity further fleshes out the importance of desirable crisis 
resolutions. A crisis narrative should offer a reliable and desirable guide for political 
action. To this end, it is important that political crisis narratives evoke and highlight a 
desirable and reliable crisis resolutions. People would not see themselves implicated in a 
crisis resolution if a narrative lacked desirable crisis resolution. This desirability 
manifest itself in pentadic ratios that emphasize suggested resolutions. On the other 
hand, narrative probability supports the argument that narrative identification depends on 
strong rhetorical links between and among narrative elements. Specifically, if narrative 
elements do not build upon each other to highlight the normative dimensions of a policy 
narrative, then it will be difficult for audiences to predict a political future or even 
envision it. This way, high levels of narrative probability rhetorically enhance political 
predictability. Finally, it is good reasons that lets political leaders, journalists, and 
publics act as narrative critics and engage in rhetorical battles. To put it another way, 
Fisher’s idea of good reasons directs our attention to the rhetorical battle over political 
legitimacy as it resides in political culture, history, values, norms, and symbols. 
Discussing Fisher’s ideas of narrative fidelity, probability, and good reasons within the 
context of policy narratives and crisis resolutions helps to link a lack of narrative 
integrity to a decline in political legitimacy and desirability, which is necessary to 
propose reliable crisis resolutions and future directions.  
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 In line with Burke and Miskimmon et al., Fisher considers narratives as a guide 
for (political) action. Through internal and external narrative identification it is possible 
for a policy narrative to carry political power. In turn, this means that any statement only 
carries political power if it enacts a desirable policy narrative. Specifically, with each 
statement, crisis narrators enact a crisis narrative that aims at aligning the crisis-shaken 
symbols and values in a way to imply a desirable and reliable political future.  
 By bringing together the key insights from our discussion so far,  
the chart below illustrates my rhetorical approach to political crisis narratives  
 
 
Figure 1: A Rhetorical Model of Political Crisis Narratives 
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 A legitimate political order allows policy makers to propose desirable directions 
for a country’s future. By rhetorically enacting political futures that are grounded in 
political legitimacy as it resides in values, norms, and symbol systems, policy makers 
reify the existing political order. As political crises disrupt the symbolic order that 
legitimized the pre-existing political order, it weakens policy makers ability to propose 
desirable and reliable political futures. Whether it is revolutionary upheavals, terror 
attacks, intergovernmental conflicts, or economic recessions, the crisis is so significant 
that political symbols and values like unity, order, equality, freedom, and solidarity now 
point to a new, but ambiguous political future. Pre-crisis political narratives put these 
symbols and values into a coherent whole that pointed to a desirable and predictable 
future, but a political crisis demands a realignment of political symbols and values. A 
policy narrative is a rhetorical vehicle to realign political symbols, reestablish 
legitimacy, and imply a crisis resolution that helps to restore symbolic order. The search 
for a new narrative of political legitimacy is driven by policy makers’ need to enact 
politically legitimate and desirable directions for the future. To legitimize a new political 
future, policy makers must turn to public discourses for help and support. The old 
narratives of political order do not explain the impact and implications of the crisis, 
which requires policy makers to turn to public deliberation and discourse. Other political 
narrators, specifically organized publics and the media generate discourse by 
commenting on the fluid crisis events and attempt to rhetorically transform them into a 
situation. The battle over who gets to define the situation is important in that it defines 
the political problem that a policy narrative attempts to resolve. Was the 1989 political 
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crisis an opportunity for German-German unification or a faux pas of the East German 
leadership? Whoever defined the crisis situation is well-positioned to advance a specific 
policy narrative. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue that “[i]t is fairly evident that 
which ‘narrative’ of the crisis come to prevail will strongly affect which strategies and 
policies win out and what the effects of the crisis and the long-term outcomes are” (p. 6). 
Thus, a policy narrative as an answer to the ambiguous future that the crisis left behind, 
not only reifies the definition of the situation, but also reestablishes legitimacy by 
aligning political symbols and values in a way that implies a desirable crisis resolution.  
 The following sections will now discuss the interaction between politicians, the 
media, and the public in the process of enacting political crisis narratives. While my 
analysis will reveal the intricacies of these different narratives, the existing historic 
accounts about the fall of the Berlin wall allow me to formulate assumptions or general 
tendencies about how the West German political leadership, the West German press, and 
organized East German publics threaded together and responded to the crisis events of 
1989. Special attention will be dedicated to differences in rhetorical power and the 
political communication environment of 1989. Why was it rhetorically possible for the 
West German press to initially treat the events at the night of November 9th, 1989 as a 
political revolution and involuntarily legitimized the opening? Why was it so difficult 
for organized East German publics to voice their demands and concerns via the national 
press? What enabled the political leadership of West Germany to narrate the crisis of 
1989 as legitimation to expand their legal, economic, and political systems eastward? 
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West German Political Leaders as Crisis Narrators 
 In 1989, people in East and West Germany predominantly relied on political 
leaders to articulate their concerns and demands. While political leaders in 1989 
depended on the press to enact crisis narratives to a broader audience, it was the vertical 
flow of political communication that bestowed special rhetorical powers upon political 
leaders in 1989. A crisis event occurs, politicians respond, and the media mediate it to 
the public. This hierarchical or hegemonic news model dominated the Cold War era, 
especially when politicians discussed policy issues (Entman, 2003, 2004) 9. During the 
Cold War, political communication generally followed a vertical or cascading model of 
political communication (Entman, 2003). This vertical flow of communication allowed 
political leaders of West Germany to relatively freely narrate political directions for a 
post-Cold War order and ascribe cultural and political desirability to a specific policy. 
Entman (2003) explains: 
Ideas that start at the top level, the administration, possess the greatest strength. 
The president and top advisors enjoy the most independent ability to decide 
which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their 
own thoughts into general circulation. (p. 420) 
 Miskimmon, Loughlin, and Roselle (2017) agree with Entman’s vertical model 
of political communication when they argue that “ . . . ‘frames’ [as enactments of 
                                                 
9 While Entman’s vertical model of political communication helps to describe the power relations between 
political leaders, the media, and the public during the Cold War in regard to policy narratives, today’s 
political communication environment often works like a rhetorical arena where hierarchical power 
relations begin to flatten (Frandsen & Johansen, 2007, 2010, 2011). 
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narratives] move from policy elites to media to publics” (p. 42). Further, when other top-
level politicians (e.g., foreign ministers, interior ministers) enact similar narratives with 
their public statements, then this further reinforces the initial narrative and weakens any 
enactment of counter-narratives from the media or the public. Initial enactments of 
policy narratives by other political leaders gain and sustain rhetorical power if other 
political elites collectively enact the initial narrative. Conflicting policy narratives 
among political leaders would make them vulnerable for criticism by the press and 
organized publics.  
 Initially, the opening of the Berlin Wall represents an exception to this general 
flow of political communication in that the public and the media legitimized the opening 
of the Wall on November 9th, 1989. While it is often difficult for the public or even the 
media to send policy narratives upward Entman’s vertical model of political 
communication, the revolutionary moment of November 9th, 1989 disrupted the 
rhetorical power relation between political leadership, the media, and the public for a 
moment. In authoritarian regimes like the GDR, enactments of policy narratives rarely 
travel upward through the media. The GDR government ensured that mass-protests in 
the spring and summer of 1989 would not be broadcast in East Germany. Yet, media 
systems in democratic Cold War societies also limit contraflows of counter-narratives 
due to the demands of a rapid news cycle and a lack of detailed knowledge among 
journalists (Entman, 2003). With his 10-Point Program for overcoming Germany’s and 
Europe’s division on November 28th, 1989, Helmut Kohl started to reestablish the 
traditional flow of policy narratives. However, it is not only the vertical flow of political 
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communication which creates a power relationship between the political elites, the press, 
and publics that favors political leaders.  
 During crisis moments, people turn to political leaders for answers and solutions. 
This way, political leaders are initially freer in defining the situation than the media or 
the public. They are key crisis narrators in convincing others of the nature and impact of 
the crisis situation. Specifically, East Germans relied on the Chancellor and Foreign 
Minister of West Germany to express their demands and reservations for a German and 
European future. After a crisis situation has manifested itself in the public discourse, 
political leaders become the key narrators for proposing and advancing a crisis 
resolution. Boin, Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (2017) argue:  
In times of crisis, citizens look at their leaders: presidents and mayors, local 
politicians and elected administrators, public managers and top civil servants. We 
expect these policy makers to avert the threat or at least minimize the damage of 
the crisis at hand. They should lead us out of the crisis; they must explain what 
went wrong and convince us that it will not happen again. (p. 1)  
 People’s expectations for political leaders to resolve the crisis not only puts 
pressure on them to act, but within the vertical flows of communication in the media 
environment of 1989, it also privileges the role of political elites as crisis managers and 
narrators. They are intentional with their policy statements, whereas the press and 
organized publics are responsive in that they usually follow, criticize, or protest their 
policy suggestions. Politicians could potentially exploit this role and define the crisis 
situation in their favor. In addition, while publics are distracted by the crisis and 
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overwhelmed by the ambiguity of events, politicians can narrate futures that are only in 
the short-term interest of the population (Klein, 2007). A political crisis that shakes a 
nation’s value and symbol systems like the fall of the Berlin wall, also allows political 
leaders to disregard normal legal and political procedures to resolve the crisis. Along the 
lines of the ends justify the means, people’s demands and desires for a crisis resolution 
warrant political leaders’ actions. To put it differently, political leaders can propose and 
implement a crisis resolution in the name of a false sense of reliability and desirability 
(e.g., “Economic security … isn’t this what we all want”). On the other hand, if leaders 
enact an undesirable policy narrative, then the crisis could intensify, enhancing the risk 
of losing legitimacy and the chance to propose reliable crisis resolutions (Boin et al., 
2017; Boin et al., 2008; Boin et al., 2009).  
 While this dissertation focuses on the rhetorical battle over policy narratives 
between organized East German publics and the West German press and policy makers, 
it is important not to neglect that policy narratives exist within broader narratives like the 
European narrative of integration and cooperation and the Cold war narrative 
(Miskimmon et al., 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). The West 
German political leadership could not enact policy narratives that would run contrary to 
existing narratives10. Within the Western Cold War narrative of peace and prosperity, 
politicians enacted policy narratives that established political order in terms of state 
sovereignty and Western cooperation. The key drivers of this international political 
                                                 
10 See Ellul’s discussion about the internal and collective characteristics of political communication and 
propaganda (Ellul, 1972, p. 38).  
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system narrative included George Kennan’s containment policy, the Truman Doctrine, 
and the Marshall Plan, which aimed at stopping the spread of communism and Soviet 
expansive tendencies through economic and military measures. At the European level, 
this implied that German policy narratives would advance European economic and 
military cooperation and integration as a means to support the West’s international 
narrative, or else risk political and economic vulnerability. Any enactment of political 
crisis narrative of the Cold war would thereby be constrained by expectations about 
European sovereignty and economic cooperation and integration. 
 In summary, the vertical flow of political communication during the Cold War 
privileged West German politicians to enact desirable policy narratives as resolutions to 
the 1989 crisis. While political leaders like Kohl and Genscher depended on the media to 
reach a mass audience, they had the advantage to enact policy narratives and introduce 
specific directions for the future of Germany and Europe. As the political crisis 
situations of 1989 created shared contingencies for East and West Germans, people 
turned to politicians as the political and cultural compass for the future of Germany and 
Europe. Finally, whereas the Cold War flow of political communication and uncertainty 
of the 1989 crisis situation favored the West German political leadership as crisis 
narrator, West German politician’s crisis rhetoric was still constrained by the Cold War 
narrative of European sovereignty and economic cooperation and integration.  
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The West German Press as Crisis Narrator 
 Neither the political leaders of West Germany, nor the organized East German 
publics or the press of West Germany shaped the crisis narratives of 1989 on their own. 
The interaction between and among the West German political leadership, the West 
German press, and organized East German publics constructed the conflicting policy 
narratives for a post-1989 Germany and Europe. By enacting different policy narratives, 
assigning political and societal roles to actors in the crisis drama, and implying a specific 
political future, they all—voluntarily or involuntarily—constructed different political 
crisis narratives. The West German press played a significant role in this co-creation of 
meaning in 1989 in that East and West German publics as well as West German 
politicians would turn to the national press to get information about the crisis.  
 Whereas the press does not announce political directions or policy alternatives, it 
does hold disproportionately more rhetorical power in shaping public perceptions about 
policies than organized publics of East Germany and the Western political leadership. As 
the largest daily West German national newspapers between 1989-90, the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Frankfurter Rundschau 
(FR), Die Welt, and the Tageszeitung (TAZ), had unique rhetorical political power, not 
only because they could disseminate information to large audiences, but because they 
acted as a mediator between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads” 
(Lippmann, 1922, p. 3). As the world people deal with politically is “out of reach, out of 
sight, and out of mind” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 29), it is the role of the press to create a 
political world for publics to act upon. In the process of mediating between the outside 
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political and the political pictures in people’s heads, the press inevitably narrates events 
and issues in a shortened way. In the great blooming and buzzing confusion of the 
political world of 1989, the West German press reduced the political events and issues 
for a large portion of the German population to mental shortcuts or stereotypes 
(Lippmann, 1922, p. 18). These stereotypes or political pictures in people’s heads often 
mislead people in their dealings with the outside political world. Even in democratic 
political systems, stereotypes create a gap between the outside political world and 
political pictures in people’s heads. Specifically, Lippmann (1922) argues that “[t]he key 
problem of democracy and democratic decision making results from a gap between 
fiction and reality . . . because the pictures inside people’s heads do not automatically 
correspond with the world outside” (p. 30). The political pictures in people’s heads are 
summaries or generalizations of political crisis events and issues that people read about 
and ultimately act upon. Whatever policy narratives the press enacts possibly registers as 
the world of political action. Lippmann (1922) explains that “. . . whatever we believe to 
be true pictures, we treat as if it were the environment itself” (p. 4).  
 The press is a key crisis narrator in the early hours and days of a crisis, especially 
when publics demand information about a crisis in order to act and react. While the press 
plays a key role in defining a situation as crisis, their influence on policy narratives 
begins not before they include official sources in their reporting and framing. 
Specifically, when the press incorporates quotes from politicians to build credibility they 
inevitably enact policy narratives for the broader German population. Even though 
journalists and news editors are reactive rather than intentional crisis narrators, they still 
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enact narratives by referencing and quoting policy makers and policies. Via the process 
of framing, the press activates or enacts specific narratives while deactivating or 
silencing others. That way, political press discourses “define, describe and delimit what 
is possible to say and not possible to say” (Critcher, 2003, p. 170). Further, by triggering 
specific narratives through news framing, the West German press could—intentionally 
or accidentally—invoke the desirability and reliability of specific narratives, while 
playing down the desirability and predictability of other policy alternatives. Thus, via 
news framing, the West German press could support specific political directions for 
German and European integration, while potentially opposing others.  
 News frames and agenda setting enable journalists and news editors to “select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 
52). Yet, whereas media agendas and news frames trigger or activate a narrative, it is 
important to remember that narratives are structurally different from frames 
(Miskimmon et al., 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). News frames do 
not exert rhetorical power by themselves, but they gain their rhetorical power from the 
enactment of other narratives and narrative identification. News frames as enactments of 
narratives exert rhetorical power by activating existing narratives and encouraging 
identification with the desirability and reliability of the narrative. That way the media 
plays a key role in shaping a political crisis narrative and its implied political 
possibilities for other political actors like the public and political leaders.  
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 Finally, the West German press in 1989 operated within a media system that 
tended to reflect the governing political philosophy of Western societies. Siebert, 
Peterson, and Schramm (1963) argue that “the press always takes on the form and 
coloration of the social and political structure within which it operates (p. 187). This 
means that Germany’s largest daily newspapers tended to reflect the Federal German 
Republic’s political philosophy of democracy and European and German integration and 
cooperation to contain the spread of communism. In a way, the West German press 
tended to develop its reporting in opposition to the communist media system of the GDR 
where the press functioned as an instrument of the Social Unity Party of Germany 
(SED). While the West German media system grew out of the enlightenment, the East 
German media system followed Marxist ideas about the relationship between the press 
and society. Seibert et al. (1963) argue that communist and libertarian media system 
“line up almost diametrically opposite in their tenets” (p. 5). Elsewhere, Seibert et al. 
(1963) explain that the communist and the libertarian media systems are “incompatible” 
(p. 105) and that nothing can be “farther from Soviet thinking than our concept of the 
press as Fourth Estate” (p. 116). Specifically, Seibert et al. (1963) explain: 
The concepts of man are wholly different—on the one side, man as a mass, 
malleable, unimportant in himself, in need of Promethean leadership; on the 
other side, man as intelligent, discriminating, perfectly able to purchase by 
himself in a ‘free market of ideas.’ The concepts of the state are nearly 
opposite—on the one hand, an elected democracy conceived as governing best 
when governing least; on the other, a self-appointed dictatorship, conceived of as 
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‘caretakers’ of the people against untrue or misleading ideas. The concepts of 
truth are correspondingly different—on the one hand, something to be arrived at 
by argument and confrontation of evidence; on the other, something to be derived 
by straining events through a ready-made theoretical sieve. (p. 145) 
 Along these lines, Szpunar (2011) argues that “an ideal needs an Other” (p. 16). 
This means that the West German media system, which operated according to libertarian 
and social-responsibility ideals developed and defended its identity in opposition to the 
communist media system of the GDR. These general differences in media systems 
between East and West Germany do not imply that Germany’s biggest daily newspapers 
inevitably framed all their stories in opposition to the communist media system, but it 
suggests general influences on their news reporting and style. Thus, not only does the 
general flow of political communication during in 1989 amplify the rhetorical powers of 
West German politician and the West German press, but the interactions between the 
press and the political system enhanced the rhetorical powers of the FDR over the GDR 
in general.  
East German Publics as Crisis Narrator 
 The East German public is not a single entity, but comprises different social 
movements, networks, and groups. The popular citizens’ movements included groups 
and networks like Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative 
for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 
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and the United Left. Under the symbolic protection of the Protestant Church,11 these 
social movement groups organized peaceful demonstrations throughout the East. It 
started with Monday night candlelight marches in Leipzig in the spring of 1989. In 
September, the Leipzig marches grew in numbers and from October through early 
November, protests spread to other cities. These efforts culminated in a mass 
demonstration of over 1 million people at Alexanderplatz in East Berlin on November 
4th, 1989. Only three days later, the entire GDR government, the Social Unity Party 
(SED), and the East German politburo resigned. Via a common protest culture, political 
language, and horizontally-organized networks, East German publics engaged in 
collective political action and delegitimized the political regime of the East.  
 However, while opposition leaders in East Germany expressed their ideas for the 
future of Germany and Europe in mass demonstrations throughout the spring and 
summer of 1989, the events on November 9th, 1989 demanded a vertical approach to 
political action. Their grassroot movements lacked hierarchical organization, clear 
division of labor, and centralized leadership, which is key to exerting political power via 
public discourse (Gladwell, 2010). Gladwell argues that political demonstrations and 
movements are not a natural enemy of the status quo. Specifically, he reasons that 
“[n]etworks aren’t controlled by a single central authority . . . decisions are made 
through consensus, and the ties that bind people to the group are loose” (Gladwell, 2010, 
                                                 
11 The East German leadership (SED) tolerated the Protestant Church because they were convinced that 
under the economic and cultural system of communism, people would soon realize that religion is 
obsolete.  
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p. 7). To exert political power, it is important for activists to channel their concerns and 
demands through an organizational structure that allows them to speak with a politically 
authoritative voice. The Central Round Table meetings, which lasted from December 
1989 until March 1990 present the clearest attempt by the former GDR leadership and 
GDR reformers to organize their political voice in a vertical or hierarchical way.  
 Yet, it is important to recognize that while hierarchical organization, division of 
labor, and centralized leadership is important to speak with a single political voice, the 
East German citizen movements and later the Round Table Meetings aimed at exerting 
political power through communicative action within the public spheres of Germany’s 
civil society or lifeworld (Olivo, 2001, p. 207). Specifically, they considered self-
organized democratic participation and discussions as a means to cut across political 
lines and influence the Germany’s reunification process without succumbing to the 
instrumental and strategic communication that dominated institutionalized politics. The 
citizen movements and the Round Table Meetings operated under the assumption that 
exerting political power via communication happens from the outside. Institutionalized 
political communication involves bargaining and power politics, whereas political 
communication by publics spheres exerts political power through civic responsibility, 
equal access, democratic participation, and rational public debate (Habermas, 1984, 
1987, 1989; Habermas, Lennox, & Lennox, 1974). Under normal conditions the 
rhetorical political power of the citizen’s movements and later the Round Table 
Meetings would be tied to the question of whether they remained a citizens’ movement 
or transitioned to a political party (Padgett, 1993). However, the crisis situation of 1989 
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potentially opened up political spaces for East German public spheres and specifically 
the Round Table Meetings to play the role of policy makers.  
 Habermas argues that during crisis situations it is possible for public spheres to 
exert political power within the political system without surrendering its independent 
voices. Within democratic political systems and civil societies, it is possible for public 
spheres to play a significant role in the policy making process during crises despite its 
structural disadvantages. Specifically, Habermas (1996) explains:  
. . . in a perceived crisis situation, the actors in civil society thus far neglected in 
our scenario can assume a surprisingly active and momentous role. In spite of a 
lesser organizational complexity and a weaker capacity for action, and despite 
the structural disadvantages mentioned earlier, at the critical moments of 
accelerated history, these actors get the chance to reverse the normal circuits of 
communication in the political system and the public sphere. In this way they can 
shift the entire systems mode of problem solving. (pp. 380-381) 
 However, the political powers that a crisis situation offers for public spheres is 
often counteracted by political leaders’ tendencies to exploit the crisis to legitimize their 
policies. During the political crisis of the 1989-1990, political leaders contemplated 
rapid German-German unification, the expansion of NATO and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) eastwards, and the weakening of the Warsaw Pact. Helmut Kohl’s 
rhetoric of practical politics implied that the pre-fabrication model is the only real 
political direction for German-German unification or else East Germany would miss its 
opportunity to free itself from the political and economic grip of the USSR. In the wake 
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of the Central Round Table Meeting, West German politicians had to ask themselves 
how self-organized political voices would fit into the larger political system, policies, 
and party politics of the West. This way, the demands by the Central Round Table 
meetings to slowly reform Germany’s political system worked against West Germany’s 
and West Europe’s aspirations to grow economically and militarily. Within this tension, 
the East German citizens’ movement attempted to formulate its vision for the future of a 
reunited Germany. At the heart of this tension lies the question of whether West 
Germany’s politicians would have been willing to surrender their monopoly of political 
power and develop a closer relationship with independent members of East Germany’s 
civil society. While members of the roundtables build relationships with members of 
West German political parties to solve problems regarding East Germany like the 
dissolution of the East Germany’s State Security Service (STASI), their involvement in 
the discussions about the future directions of Germany and Europe ended quickly (Olivo, 
2001, p. 213). Hence, the interactions between the Central Round Tables and political 
parties enhanced their rhetorical power in areas concerning East Germany, but not for 
policies regarding German and European integration.  
 The political crisis of 1989 potentially allowed the East German public to 
organize themselves into a self-sustaining multipartisan political voice for Germany’s 
reunification process and beyond. But within the interplay between political leaders of 
the West and the West German press, their rhetorical political power to articulate new 
political possibilities for Germany depended on their ability to associate with political 
leaders of the West. In addition, it depended on their ability to navigate the tension 
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between strategic political communication and communicative action without 
surrendering their independent role as mediator between the public and the state. The 
West German press would possibly function as a way to influence the West German 
government’s ideas about German and European integration. Entman (2003) argues that 
“[i]f the news creates impressions that the idea is held widely and intensely by large 
swaths of the public, it can affect leaders’ strategic calculations and activities” (p. 420). 
However, during the crisis drama of 1989—due to reasons discussed earlier—the 
distribution of rhetorical power between organized East German publics, the West 
German press, and West German politicians as crisis narrators resembles the following 
figure.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Rhetorical Power among Crisis Narrators 
Organized East 
German 
Publics 
West German 
Press 
West German 
Political 
Leaders 
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Methodology 
 Guided by critical theory, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and specifically 
Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) are interdisciplinary methods to examine language 
as a form of political action and deliberation (Dunmire, 2012). PDA researchers not only 
assume that discourse maintains social and political power relations, but also that it 
opens rhetorical room for political actors to deliberate possibilities for change. 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) explain:  
. . . political discourse analysis views political discourse as primarily a form of 
argumentation, and as involving more specifically practical argumentation, 
argumentation for or against particular ways of acting, argumentation that can 
ground decision. In deciding what to do, agents consider both reasons that favour 
a particular line of action and reasons against it, as well as reasons in favour or 
against alternatives, i.e., they deliberate over several possibilities of action. (p. 1) 
 While CDA examines the role of language in the struggle over political power, 
ideology, and the normalization of discourses in general, PDA draws our attention to the 
possibilities that discourse and deliberation offer for political action. When the political 
future is vague and the right way to act is fluid, political actors turn to discourse and 
deliberation for help (Aristotle, 2007). What political possibilities are represented and 
how they are represented in the discourse and deliberations affect the political actions 
and policies. In a way, political actions and policies follow from the available discourse 
and deliberations during a crisis situation (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 8). This not 
only explains the rhetorical battles between crisis narrators over winning acceptance for 
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their crisis narratives, but also that the available crisis resolutions and policies for the 
political future of Germany and Europe are embedded and even hidden in the available 
discourses.  
 Further, PDA directs our attention to the broader macro-level social and political 
conditions that shape micro-level processes of political action and deliberation between 
key political actors like political leaders, the press, and organized publics. As political 
crisis discourses exist within specific political, economic, social, historical, and 
linguistic contexts (i.e., macro-level), crisis actors are limited in their abilities to enact 
desirable policies (i.e., micro-level). Political crisis discourses are fundamentally about 
advancing policy statements to restore political order and legitimacy to implement crisis 
resolutions and shape the political future. This processual nature of political crisis 
discourses, however, requires a method that accounts for the use of language as a form 
of political power, action, and deliberation as well as the transformation of political 
deliberation over future political directions.  
 The critical lens of Political Discourse Analysis in conjunction with Narrative 
Analysis allows us to examine the transformation of desirable policy narratives, while 
paying attention to rhetorical power relations and inequalities. When crisis narrators 
enact a crisis narrative, they bring together the micro-level meanings (i.e., individual 
speech acts) with macro-level meanings (i.e., existing political narratives/public 
memory/social knowledge), but their rhetorical enactments also exist within the broader 
power relations between political leaders, the press, and organized publics (see Figure 
2). Habermas’s ideas about instrumental, strategic and communicative action, the 
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lifeworld and the system as well as Castells’ insights about power, communication, and 
networks account for how narratives gained and maintained political power and political 
power relations. While Habermas’s critical lens often leads researchers to only consider 
how institutionalized political discourse colonizes public spheres (Souto-Manning, 2014, 
p. 160), narrative analysis extends this one-way flow of power politics to account for the 
complex interaction between key political crisis narrators. It is important to understand 
the transformation of communication power in the rhetorical interplay between 
politicians, the press, and publics. Habermas and Castells inform the Political Discourse 
Analysis aspect of this analysis, while Burke, Miskimmon, and Fisher represent the 
theoretical foundation for the Narrative Analysis aspect of the present inquiry. Bringing 
together PDA and Narrative Analysis helps us to consider the relationship between 
rhetorical transformation of parts and wholes, while recognizing its existence within the 
power relations between politicians, the press, and organized publics. I will now explain 
how my analysis chapters combine narrative analysis and Political Discourse Analysis12.  
 The following three case studies retrace the different policy narratives developed 
by West German politicians, organized East German publics, and the West German 
press, while recognizing the disproportionate distribution of rhetorical political power 
between these crisis narrators. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the German 
foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher embody the key narrators for policy narratives 
                                                 
12 For a detailed discussion about the methodological relationship between Critical Discourse Analysis, 
Political Discourse Analysis, and Narrative Analysis see (Dunmire, 2012; Janks, 1997; Souto-Manning, 
2014). 
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by the West German political elite. Evidence for their policy narratives included all 
public statements (e.g., press conferences, parliamentary speeches) that predominantly 
featured enactments of the desirability and reliability of a specific future for Germany 
and Europe. Data for the West German press’s narrative included editorials, lead articles, 
and frontpage articles that mentioned propositions for the political future of the FDR, 
GDR, and Europe. As the press responds to, rather than initiates policy announcements, I 
selected the data from newspaper editions after political leaders from the FDR and the 
GDR made their announcements. Evidence for the policy narratives by organized East 
German publics predominantly included texts related to the Central Round Table 
discussions and statements by East German opposition leaders at demonstrations. To 
demonstrate how the policy narratives and specifically the proposed crisis resolutions 
changed throughout the rhetorical interplay between and among the crisis narrators, I 
focused on discourse between November 4th, 1989 and February 15th, 1990. While a lot 
of political events between November 1989 and March 1990 featured power politics, 
where parties reinvented themselves, crafted new constitutions, argued for early 
elections in the GDR, and forged new political alliances, this analysis focused on the 
rhetorical enactments of crisis resolutions by key political voices during 1989-90.  
 While guided by narrative elements and ratios as codes for policy narratives, I 
analyzed the different discourses at each political event following an open coding 
method. As themes emerged, I grouped them according to political actors, actions, 
settings, tools, and resolutions. I regrouped and recoded these narrative elements until I 
reached a satisfactory level of data saturation. This way, I let the data guide me in 
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reconstructing the enactments of policy narratives for each event. Specifically, the 
discourse at each event was treated as an enactment of a policy narrative. An event like 
the Alexanderplatz demonstrations on November 4th, 1989 not only featured diverse 
speeches by 26 different speakers, but their speeches also include several different 
pentads. The term emerging most frequently or the dominant term in a speech then 
determined the overall orientation of the speech. If a speech had 7 pentads and action 
emerged 4 times as the dominant term in these pentads, I would identify action as the 
controlling term for the speech. Then, I compiled a list by speakers at an event to 
determine the dominant terms for each speaker at the event to discover frequencies, 
differences, and similarities across speeches for the event. By synthesizing political 
discourse around political events, it is possible to not only retrace the trajectory of policy 
narratives by dates, but also to recognize the relationship between events, rhetoric, and 
situation. Other political crisis narrators in 1989, especially political leaders in the FDR 
and GDR reacted to the Alexanderplatz protest speeches not in terms of individual 
speeches, but as a political crisis event that constituted a political situation of unrest. As 
the selected political events represent key moments in the deliberations about the 
political future of Germany and Europe and a resolution to the political crisis, the 
political discourses at these events transform into enactments of policy narratives. Thus, 
by enacting different policy narratives at different political events, key political 
representatives of the West German political elite, organized East German opposition 
groups, and the West German press shaped the rhetorical crisis resolution for the 1989 
drama.  
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 The conclusion then addresses how and where the individual crisis narratives 
conflicted and what enabled and constrained certain narratives to gain or lose 
communicative power. Table 1: Research Design maps the general design for the present 
analysis.  
 
Texts: Political Enactments of Crisis 
Resolutions: 
Issue/Policy 
Narratives: 
West German Politicians: 
• Speeches and Press 
Conferences by Kohl 
and Genscher 
• Nov. 4: Protest Speeches at 
Alexander Platz 
• Nov. 10: Speeches at 
Schoneberg City Hall 
• Nov. 28: Kohl’s 10-point plan 
speech to the German parliament 
• Dec 7: First Round Table 
meetings between GDR and the 
opposition  
• Dec. 18: Second Round Table 
meetings 
• Dec. 19: Kohl’s speech at the 
ruins of the Church of our Lady 
(Frauenkirche) in Dresden  
• Jan. 1: Kohl’s New Year’s 
television address 
• Jan. 11: Hans Modrow’s State 
of the Nation Address  
• Feb 1: Hans Modrow proposes a 
step-by-step plan for German 
unification and neutrality 
• Feb 13 Joint press conference 
Kohl & Modrow 
Why is a policy 
desirable? 
• Actors 
• Actions 
• Settings 
• Tools 
• Goals  
West German Press: 
• Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(SZ) 
• Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) 
East German Publics:  
• Speeches political 
leaders of the GDR 
• Transcripts of Central 
Round Table 
Negotiations 
 
Table 1: Research Design 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RHETORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE  
GDR’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
 This chapter traces the rhetorical transformation of the GDR’s political discourse, 
specifically the discourse by GDR opposition movements and GDR reformers. By first 
analyzing the policy narrative enacted by speakers at the Alexanderplatz demonstration, 
it will be possible to reveal what narrative elements are present and what political futures 
the speakers enact by relating actors, actions, settings, tools, and goals. As the 
Alexanderplatz demonstration happened five days before the opening of the Berlin wall, 
its discourse establishes a rhetorical baseline against which the discourse by the round 
tables can be compared. How does the opposition movement’s policy narrative change 
from the Alexanderplatz demonstration to the first meeting of the round tables? What 
narrative elements remain? How do the relationships between narrative elements 
change? Each analysis will start by contextualizing the political event. This will help to 
understand to what extend the two policy narratives function as a response to the rapidly 
changing political and economic situation in the GDR or whether they follow their own 
logic. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a comparison of the overall policy 
narratives from the Alexanderplatz speeches and the minutes and negotiation transcripts 
of the Round Table meetings.  
Alexanderplatz Demonstration 
 In 1985, Gorbachev introduced his Glasnost and Perestroika programs. 
Glasnost—meaning transparency or openness—introduced freedom of expression and 
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information to the former Communist bloc and transformed the Soviet Union politically. 
Perestroika, which implies reconstruction, aimed at bringing the East up to par 
economically with the West. Before Gorbachev introduced Glasnost and Perestroika, the 
East German government would act in line with the Soviet leadership. However, this 
suddenly changed after 1985. Disappointed in Gorbachev’s political reforms, the GDR 
leadership banned magazines from the Soviet Union, especially if they included 
speeches by Gorbachev. Instead of containing public criticism, this act of political 
disobedience by the SED provoked public protests (Kelly, 2011). Screaming “Gorbi!” 
and carrying banners that read “Gorbi, help us” at demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, 
and East Berlin during the spring and summer of 1989 functioned as criticism of the 
SED regime. East Germans and East Berliners, specifically those who refused to migrate 
to the West, demanded political and economic changes. Within the context of Glasnost 
and Perestroika, these people started to view the SED not as a political extension of the 
USSR, but as a party of political and economic oppression. To them, Glasnost and 
Perestroika offered political and economic possibilities to reform East Germany from 
within, rather than leaving it behind like thousands of East Germans who migrated to 
West Germany between 1961 and 1989. Thus, the SED’s rejection of Glasnost and 
Perestroika led GDR remainers to develop their demands and concerns not in opposition 
to the USSR, but in opposition to the SED and its resistance to political and economic 
change.  
 While other Eastern European countries started to implement Gorbachev’s 
reform programs between 1985 and 1989, which politically and economically 
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empowered their citizens, the GDR leadership used the symbolic and political power of 
the Berlin wall to develop its socialist identity in opposition to Glasnost and Perestroika 
(Bruner, 1989; Mueller, 1999). Initially built to regulate the flow of refugees to West 
Germany and deter GDR citizens from leaving, the Berlin wall defined East Germany’s 
political and economic exceptionalism. It allowed the East German leadership to 
politically and economically oppress its citizens. Specifically, it enabled them to repress 
any attempts to mobilize and publicly criticize or reform the SED and East Germany’s 
socialist system (Hirschman, 1993). However, this changed in the spring and summer of 
1989. The events in the spring and summer of 1989 would enable East German publics 
to transform from a secret opposition movement operating under the protection of the 
Lutheran church into organized public movements. In May of 1989, Hungary 
demilitarized its border with Austria, which allowed East Germans to escape to West 
Germany through Austria. As Hungary and Poland began to dismantle the physical and 
ideological legacy of the iron curtain throughout the summer of 1989, East Germans 
built up a political confidence that manifested itself in a significant increase of 
demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and walkouts by East Germans who wished to reform 
the GDR, rather than leave. Between January and August of 1989, the average number 
of protest participants fluctuated between 700 and 900 per week. However, between 
September and early November, the average number of demonstrators rose from 1,000 
to 400,000 per week (Mueller, 1999, p. 535). In addition, recent research refutes the 
assumption that after the opening of the Berlin wall the number of protestors per week 
declined. While opposition movements in the GDR stopped using the communicative 
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infrastructure of the Lutheran church (e.g. public announcement boards, phones, church 
events and services) to air their concerns and demands, the total number of protestors 
increased between December 1989 and March 1990. The number of mass 
demonstrations declined, but the overall number of protestors at the local and regional 
level increased (“Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig e.V,” 2018). The slow transformation 
from protest movements under the protection of the church to public movements reached 
its peak at a mass demonstration of over 1 million people at Alexanderplatz in East 
Berlin on November 4th, 1989. 
 At Alexanderplatz, 26 speakers including opposition leaders of the popular 
citizen movements, representatives of the GDR regime, artists, novelists, actors, and 
dissidents expressed their concerns and demands for political and economic reform. 
Specifically, their most frequent demands ranged from a new constitution for the GDR, 
the rule of law and a new political culture to transparent dialogue between the GDR 
leadership and its citizens and a renewed or democratic socialism for the GDR. Ulrich 
Mühe, Gregor Gysi, Jens Reich, Friedrich Schorlemmer, Tobias Langhoff, and 
Christoph Hein all explicitly referred to the rule of law and the GDR’s constitution, 
which in theory, but not in practice guaranteed freedom of speech and freedom of 
assembly (Timmer, 2000). Ulrich Mühe and Gregor Gysi specifically referred to article 
27 and 28 in the East German constitution, which implies free speech and the freedom to 
assembly. The protestors never overtly demanded the opening of the Berlin wall, nor a 
possible German-German reunification. While 5 out of 26 speakers explicitly 
communicated domestic goals like labor union reforms, constitutional reform, SED 
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restructuring, and the legalization of social movements, most speakers put forward 
abstract goals like a new political culture, democratic socialism, political dialogue, and 
the rule of law. Members of theaters in East Berlin organized the Alexanderplatz 
demonstrations in response to the violent crackdown on peaceful protestors during the 
40th anniversary celebrations of the GDR on October 7th, 1989, but only a few speakers 
directly addressed the issue of police brutality and violence. Instead, the speakers used 
this opportunity to express their ideas about the ends and means for a renewed GDR. 
The East-German television televised the three-hour-long demonstration live.  
The Alexanderplatz Crisis 
 As the Alexanderplatz demonstration presents the first legal demonstration in 
GDR’s history, it threatened the symbolic order or rhetorical legitimacy of the GDR 
leadership and weakened its efforts to narrate desirable and reliable political futures. Are 
demonstrations now legal in the GDR? Does this mean that freedom of speech and 
assembly is the new order of the day? What is the relationship between demonstrators 
and the police? And what is the relationship between state and society? While the 
assaults and arrests of the peaceful demonstrators during the 40th anniversary of the 
GDR constituted an obvious rhetorical exigency for the demonstrators, the 
Alexanderplatz speeches are not a direct response to police brutality and violence. Only 
Eckehard Schall, an actor and theater director with the East German Theater Company, 
Gregor Gysi, an attorney and political reformist, and Marianne Birthler, an East German 
actress explicitly mentioned policy brutality and violence. Eckehard Schall explains: “It 
is indisputable that there were peaceful protestors and violent police officers; 
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troublemakers on both sides. But I find that police brutality weighs even heavier and 
evokes painful memories. Now, we all must learn how to deal with each other anew” 
(Schall, 1989). On the other hand, Gregor Gysi argues that “ . . . our goal must be that 
the police protect protestors and thereby lives up to its name as the police of the people” 
(Gysi, 1989). Birthler explains: “We are here because we have hope. At this very square 
we gathered hope, imagination, audacity, and humor. This hope, which has finally been 
growing in the GDR over weeks was bludgeoned at the evening of October 7th” 
(Birthler, 1989). While Schall, Gysi, and Birthler are the only speakers that implicitly 
and explicitly reference police brutality, most speakers’ responses reveal a different 
rhetorical exigency that arose out of the GDR’s unwillingness to reform its cultural, 
political, and legal structures. The Alexanderplatz speakers used the first legal GDR 
demonstration to respond to the political urgencies and doubts which built up over years 
of political inaction by the GDR leadership.  
 19 out of 26 speakers articulated desirable goals that either related to a new 
political culture, a new political order and system, legal principles and norms, or 
domestic goals. Most frequently these 19 speakers demanded reforms to the GDR’s 
political culture. The second most frequently expressed goals involved demands 
regarding the GDR’s political order or system, while the third most frequently 
mentioned goals included demands relating to the legal principles and norms. Finally, 
only 3 speakers articulated specific domestic goals like reducing the number of water 
guns and increases in average wages.  
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 The most frequent goals within the area of political culture include democracy by 
the people for the people and maintaining GDR’s political culture. For instance, 
Friedrich Schorlemmer, a theologian and founder of the East German movement 
Democratic Awakening considers democracy by and for the people as a desirable goal in 
that the absence of that goal would lead to dictatorship. Specifically, Schorlemmer 
explains: 
But to make sure that nobody can ever again pass off errors as the truth without 
being challenged, we need total democracy that is not based on the indisputable 
claim to truth or leadership of a single group. Never again. Therefore: democracy 
now or never. Without the active solidarity of all democratic forces, we will not 
succeed in building a sustainable democracy; the fragmentation of democratic 
forces is always the hour of the dictators. We will still have to pass through low 
ground, we will not distinguish ourselves with remarkable prosperity. But maybe 
with more friendliness and warmth (Schorlemmer, 1989).  
 Schorlemmer envisions a sustainable democracy by the people that counteracts 
any authoritarian tendencies. For Schorlemmer, democracy and democratic leadership 
works through open disputes. Further, Schorlemmer’s statements also hints at a common 
goal-tool ratio. Schorlemmer’s vision of a sustainable democracy demands disputes over 
the truth, solidarity, hard work (i.e., “We will still have to pass through low ground”), 
and economic endurance. However, the way he articulates democracy as the goal or 
solution for the GDR’s problem with political oppression (i.e., “we need that total 
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democracy,” “democracy now or never,” “sustainable democracy”) reveals the 
desirability of democracy for and by the people.  
 Manfred Gerlach, head of the liberal-democratic party of East Germany (LDPD) 
imagines a future for the GDR that retains its political heritage. He wishes for the GDR 
not to lose its ideas for political action and possibilities. Specifically, he argues that 
working toward maintaining GDR’s political intellect will ensure political 
representation:  
Just as our country must not lose its intellectual potential, so it must not lose its 
rich political scope . . . as liberal democrats we consider social movements to be 
effective if the ideas, thoughts, and suggestions of all people are represented. Our 
thoughts and ideas for political action should be maintained. (Gerlach, 1989).  
 The maintenance of the GDR’s political culture is an important and desirable 
goal for Gerlach and three other Alexanderplatz speakers in that it not only guarantees 
representation of political diversity, but it also promises effective social movements.  
 The most frequent goals within the area of political order and system include 
demands for new political structures and a renewed socialism for the GDR. For example, 
Friedrich Schorlemmer argues for a peaceful bottom up solution for the GDR. 
Schorlemmer explains: 
Anyone who yesterday was still convinced that the Chinese solution was the 
correct one, must declare today—and with genuine commitment—that this is not 
an option for the GDR, otherwise the fear will remain. We now need a 
democratic structure from the bottom up. The government must listen to the 
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people and not the people to the government. We will no longer let ourselves be 
patronized. (Schorlemmer, 1989) 
 By reminding the audience of the Tiananmen square macaque, where Chinese 
police used physical violence against students, Schorlemmer articulates a peaceful 
political future for the GDR. Specifically, he desires a political future where a “bottom-
up” democracy averts public anxiety and political oppression. The desirability of his 
solution for the GDR derives from possible empowerment of the people and peaceful 
relationships with the GDR leadership. 
 Markus Wolf, a dissident of the GDR leadership also argues for a new political 
order, but specifically asks for a renewed socialism. He also hints at the common goal-
tool ratio in that the goal of a renewed socialism requires public debate for him. Wolf 
explains: 
Thousands of decent and hardworking communists expect a clear solution. Many 
who have already fought for solutions proposed wide ranging directions and 
fundamental reforms for a renewed socialism. These directions now belong in the 
public discourse. This way, it will be even clearer that my party [SED] does not 
lack courageous and engaged people at every level. (Wolf, 1989).  
 Like other Alexanderplatz speakers who speak of democratic socialism or a 
renewed socialism, Wolf does not define what renewed socialism means. It remains a 
desirable but abstract political direction and solution. However, Wolf hints at a common 
relationship between ends and means. To him, the attainability and desirability of 
fundamental reforms and renewed socialism depends on public discourse. He also 
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implies that one of the reasons why the GRD’s socialism lacked public support is 
because people considered SED members as despondent and failing to engage people at 
every societal level.  
 While demands for new political structures and a renewed socialism for the GDR 
represent the dominant goals in regard to a new political order for the GDR, 2 out of 26 
Alexanderplatz speakers explicitly demand democratic socialism. Stephan Heym, an 
East German writer argues:  
Socialism—not the Stalinist kind, but the right kind—the kind which we finally 
want to develop for our sake for the sake of Germany; this socialism is not 
conceivable without democracy. Democracy, a Greek term, means the 
governance of the people. Friends, citizens, let us exercise this form of 
governance” (Heym, 1989).  
 Heym clearly distinguishes the idea of a democratic socialism from the GDR’s 
idea of party monopoly and Stalinist traditions. By differentiating between Stalinist 
socialism and democratic socialism, Heym rhetorically introduces new political 
possibilities and directions into the Alexanderplatz discourse (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). 
Rather than narrating political possibilities from within the available GDR discourse, 
which was traversed by Marxist-Leninist propaganda and anti-Gorbachev, specifically 
anti-Glasnost and Perestroika discourse, Heym and others introduced truly new political 
directions to the public deliberations about the GDR’s political future. Thereby, Heym 
also started to rhetorically delegitimize the existing political system of the GDR. The 
symbols, values, and norms associated with Marxist-Leninist traditions are difficult to 
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reconcile with democratic forms of governance. However, Heym’s idea of a political 
future for the GDR is “not conceivable without democracy”. By distancing himself from 
a Stalinist version of socialism to maintain political legitimacy in favor of democratic 
socialism, Heym defines a political goal that threatens the symbol and value system that 
the GDR rests upon. Christoph Hein, an East German novelist echoes Heym’s desire for 
a new political order and system by demanding that “[t]he structures of this society must 
be changed if it is to become democratic and socialist, and there is no alternative to this” 
(Hein, 1989).  
 While the Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands for a new political order and 
system include a range of different goals or solutions (e.g., new political structures, 
renewed socialism, democratic socialism, decentralization of political power, and 
liberalization from oppression, European integration), 11 out of 26 Alexanderplatz 
speakers ask for a new political order for the GDR from within. Despite the differences 
in individual goals, most speakers who articulate goals for a new political order and 
system for the GDR desire a political future that reforms rather than replaces the existing 
order. Like Heym’s and Hein’s demands for a democratic-socialism, the GDR should 
work toward a political future from within. 
 The most frequent goals within the area of legal principles and norms include 
rule of law/constitution and lawful demonstrations. Tobias Langhoff (1989), an actor 
with the East German theater envisions a political future where GDR politicians are 
publicly prosecuted for their judicial wrongdoings and the outcomes of investigations 
should be made public. Others reference article 27 and 28 of the East German 
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constitution, which in principle implies free speech and the freedom to assembly. These 
speakers criticize the SED for not living up to its own laws (Mühe, Gysi, 1989). The 
desire for political publicity, transparency, and accountability runs through most 
statements regarding demands for a renewed rule of law. For Gregor Gysi, a revised rule 
of law in connection with the legal protection of social movements offers politicians and 
people of the GDR an opportunity to rebuild their relationship. As an attorney and 
political reformist, Gregor Gysi’s speech features the most references to legal reforms. 
For instance, he argues:  
Any abuse of power needs to be eliminated or at least severely penalized. We 
need to revise our right to vote and reform the GDR’s constitutional court . . . 
Without going into detail, I would like to say that we need a new relationship 
between politics and the rule of law and a completely renewed relationship with 
the truth. And the question about the legalization of social movements should be 
promptly decided in line with the constitution. (Gysi, 1989).  
 In addition to Gysi, 8 out of 26 speakers demand a renewal of the GDR’s legal 
principles and norms. Table 2: Code System Political Goals Alexanderplatz Speakers 
summarizes the codes for the political goals of the Alexanderplatz speakers.  
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Number of Codes: Political Goals Alexanderplatz Speakers 58 
Political Culture 24 
  Democracy by the people and for the people 5 
  Maintaining GDR’s political culture 4 
  Democracy through hard work 3 
  Renewing political culture 3 
  Transparency and Accountability 2 
  Creating room for moral courage 2 
  Dialogue as constant element of state-society relations 3 
  Political Independence 1 
  A united GDR 1 
Political Order/System 17 
  A renewed Socialism for the GDR 5 
  New Political Structures 4 
  Freedom or Liberalization from Oppression 3 
  Decentralization of political power 2 
  Democratic Socialism for Germany 2 
  European integration 1 
Legal Principles and Norms 14 
  Rule of Law/Constitution 9 
  Peaceful and lawful Demonstrations 4 
  Constitutional reform 1 
Domestic Goals 3 
 
Table 2: Code System Political Goals Alexanderplatz Speakers 
 
 The number of statements that the Alexanderplatz speakers dedicated to goals 
relating to the area of political culture implies a disruption of the symbolic order that 
legitimized the GDR’s pre-existing political order. For the first time, GDR opposition 
movements legally articulated their goals in public, which in and by itself presents a 
rhetorical situation. However, by deliberating different political goals for the GDR, the 
speakers also rhetorically disrupted the GDR’s existing political order and symbols. As 
political crises upset the symbol and value system that legitimized the pre-existing order, 
the Alexanderplatz speakers disrupted the GDR’s symbol system along the lines of 
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political culture, political order, and legal principles and norms. Manifested in the range 
of articulated political goals, the deliberation of or search for a new political culture, 
political system, and legal principles created a political urgency for the GDR. This way, 
the Alexanderplatz demonstration present a political crisis which demanded new 
rhetorical guidance and transformation. The existing GDR narrative, which foreclosed 
political opportunities for political and legal reforms would not accommodate or support 
demands by organized political voices other than the SED. However, the Alexanderplatz 
speakers did not see themselves represented in the existing GDR narrative. It not only 
restricted them from articulating alternative political directions for the future, but it also 
hampered them from playing a legally recognized public role in the political culture of 
the GDR.  
 While the speakers hint at the role that protestors and politicians should play in a 
renewed GDR, they are not entirely clear about what policy narrative to enact. The 
speakers’ deliberation of different goals is indicative of a search for political directions 
rather than a clear definition of the who, what, where, when, why, and how. This is not 
surprising as the GDR’s political symbols relating to political culture, political order, 
and legal principles and norms are in flux at this moment and demand rhetorical 
realignment. For example, the Alexanderplatz speakers began to redefine the meaning of 
socialism for the GDR. They spoke of “democratic socialism” (Heym, Hein, Schall, 
Schabowski, Tschirner, & Wolf, 1989). Throughout the existence of the GDR, the SED 
attempted to rally people around a myth of leadership, party patriotism, and a version of 
socialism that derived it’s meaning from a comparison with the socialism of the USSR. 
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However, as the mass demonstrations in the summer of 1989 and the Alexanderplatz 
speeches indicate, it was difficult for the East German leadership to rally people against 
the USSR and its version of socialism. While the wall allowed the SED to develop and 
enforce its version of socialism as a state, it problematized its efforts to build a political 
culture or nation. The SED regime rallied people around a myth of leadership, but in the 
absence of clear nationalistic symbols, the East German opposition movements seized 
the opportunity to define its own political culture and political system. Further, the 
SED’s not only attempt to define GDR socialism in opposition to the USSR and thereby 
develop its own political identity, but its very existence as a German state separate from 
the Federal Republic of Germany rested on its definition of political symbols. By 
redefining the GDR’s socialism in democratic terms, the Alexanderplatz speakers 
attacked the GDR’s reason for existence as a separate from Germany and the USSR. It 
questioned the sovereign character of the GDR (Mueller, 1999, p. 532).  
 In addition, the Alexanderplatz speakers discussed the rule of law as 
empowerment for the people rather than in terms of Marxist-Leninist traditions and the 
GDR leadership. For instance, Jens Reich, a GDR biologist and essayist argues that 
“[w]e must seize our constitutional law, not just here at this demonstration, also in front 
of our supervisors, our co-workers, teachers, authorities, simply everywhere. And we 
must support everyone who practices this law (Reich, 1989).  
 Manifested by the high number of demands for a new political culture, political 
order/system, and legal principles and norms, it is the lack of political opportunity, 
directions, and resistance by the GDR leadership to change which guided the 
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Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands for a new political future. To address these 
limitations without invoking the existing narrative of GDR exceptionalism and Marxist-
Leninist tradition, the Alexanderplatz speakers started to define the political crisis 
situation of the GDR in terms of a lack of alternative political futures for the GDR. As 
the Alexanderplatz demonstration represents the first legal demonstration in GDR 
history, they started to loosely define the political and legal situation of the GDR to 
suggest possible solutions. They began the process of rhetorically transforming isolated 
political events and issues into a crisis situation in which GDR citizens would work 
toward a new political culture, political system, and legal principles and norms. By 
starting to define the political crisis situation in terms of a lack of cultural, political, and 
legal goals for the GDR, the Alexanderplatz speakers not only rhetorically opened room 
for political action and directions, but also invited GRD citizens to play a specific 
political role. The new political, cultural, and legal goals articulated by the speakers 
implicated the East German public as self-aware, active, and confident actors in the 
GDR’s political process. Schorlemmer (1989) argues: 
We now literally need everyone. It is true, our country is ruined. Pretty much 
ruined. It is true, we have lived a dull, oppressed, dependent existence—for so 
many years. We came here today more open, standing taller, more self-aware. 
We are finding ourselves. We are ceasing to be objects and becoming subjects of 
political action. We can be proud.  
 Whereas the goals relating to political culture, political order/system, and legal 
principles and norms dominate the overall discourse of the Alexanderplatz speakers, the 
 122 
 
goals do not exist independent of the other narrative elements. The following section 
will now explore the Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands for a new political culture, 
political system, and legal principles and norms in relation to other narrative elements. 
Specifically, the following section will draw attention to the tools that the 
Alexanderplatz speakers see as necessary to reach the aforementioned goals.  
Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches 
 Most Alexanderplatz speeches feature pentadic ratios where goals control the 
other terms of the pentads. Among those ratios, the goal-tool ratio emerged as the most 
frequent ratio. Despite a variety of different specific goal-tool ratios, the overall 
tendency for most Alexanderplatz speaker is to depict a specific goal as an element from 
which the tool follows. 15 out of 26 speakers consider tools relating to political 
discourse as tools for new political beginnings, whereas 8 speakers see tools involving 
peaceful protests as tools to retain and/or renew the GDR. Finally, 4 speakers regard 
solidarity and courage as tools to eliminate political oppression and 2 speakers articulate 
self-organization and political representation as tools to achieve a new political culture 
for the GDR. As the Alexanderplatz speeches feature a wide range of goal-tool ratios, 
Table 3: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches 
summarizes the number of goal-tool ratios and groups them according to their overall 
themes.  
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Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios 49 
Discourse as a tool for new political beginnings in the GDR 31 
  Dialogue/Disagreement to open new political directions 10 
 Language for political reform/liberation 8 
 Difficult deliberation/hard work for a renewed socialism 6 
  Speaking up/Breaking the silence to escape oppression 3 
  Dialogue to retain political independence 3 
  Deliberation to change distribution of political power 1 
Peaceful protest as a tool to retain and/or renew the GDR 10 
  Peaceful protests to renew political structures 4 
  Lawful demonstrations for a healthier political culture 3 
  Demonstrations against political forgetfulness 2 
  Hope against political oppression 1 
Solidarity and courage against political oppression 5 
Self-organization/political representation for GDR culture 3 
 
Table 3: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Alexanderplatz Speeches 
 Within the group of discourse as a tool for new beginnings, dialogue and 
disagreement as a tool to achieve new political directions and possibilities emerged as 
the most frequent goal-tool ratio. Christa Wolf, an East German activist and literary 
critic defines political dialogue as a tool that leads to new political directions via 
disagreement and political tension. For Wolf, new political directions and possibilities 
require dialogue of continuous political effort and argument.  
We never talked as much in our country as during these past few weeks, never 
with such passion, with so much scorn and sadness, and yet so much hope, as 
well. We want to make use of every day. We do not sleep, or sleep very little. We 
make friends with people we did not know before, and we fight in a hurtful way 
with others we thought we knew. That is what we now call “dialogue”. We 
demanded it. Now we are almost sick of the word. And yet we have not really 
understood what it means. We stare suspiciously at many a suddenly outstretched 
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hand, into many a face that was previously so blank. It is good to be suspicious, it 
is better to be in control. We are turning around old slogans that oppressed and 
injured us and are returning them to sender. We fear being used. And we fear 
declining an honest offer. Our entire country exists in this tension. We know, we 
have to practice the art of not letting this tension devolve into confrontation. 
These weeks, these possibilities are given to us just once—through us ourselves. 
(Wolf, 1989).  
 The possibility of new directions for the GDR not only demands continuous 
political effort and dialogue, but Wolf specifically suggests that these new political 
possibilities originated from the dialogue that the opposition movements generated 
themselves (i.e., “through us ourselves”). Wolf locates the tools for new political 
possibilities and directions in the public’s efforts to engage in dialogue rather than 
political institutions. Further, the idea of “turning around old slogans that oppressed and 
injured us and returning them to sender” implies two-way political communication in 
which organized GDR publics gain a political voice. In a way, Wolf suggests that 
argument-driven dialogue requires organized East German publics to gain a political 
voice. Without a political voice, the public will never “be in control”. It is this voice that 
would not only allow the social movements of the GDR to engage in argument-oriented 
dialogue, but this type of dialogue would also help to reveal new political directions for 
the GDR. Thus, to reach the goal of opening new political directions for the GDR, the 
social movements should resort to tools of argument-oriented dialogue.  
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 The Alexanderplatz demonstration not only included speakers from the popular 
citizens’ movements, artists, novelists, and actors, but also representatives of the GDR 
leadership. Günter Schabowski, a spokesperson of the SED echoed aspects of Wolf’s 
goal-tool ratio. Specifically, he considers a new political beginning for the GDR as 
dependent upon a political culture of dialogue: 
Let’s agree to a culture of dialogue for all of us! What moves us communists at 
this hour, in light of and in sight of thousands of protestors? Bitter things have 
been said today. It concerns us, and also me. Only those who listen and 
understand this warning can conceive of new beginnings. We all want a GDR of 
which everyone says: This is our country! . . . And we will use the productivity 
of disagreement. I want to say it again very clearly: We are willing—and we 
sedulously learn—to deal with disagreement, to live with the spices of political 
debate. And we will use these forces of disagreement. (Schabowski, 1989) 
 Schabowski construes the Alexanderplatz demonstration as a warning to the 
GDR. As a representative of the SED it is not only surprising that he recognizes the 
speakers’ demands for a new political culture, system, and legal principles, but also that 
he considers their public criticism of the GDR leadership as a tool for new beginnings. 
Only people who understand the demonstrators’ demands can imagine new political 
directions for the GDR. In addition, if the new political future of the GDR rests upon the 
“forces of disagreement” and the “spices of political debate,” then Schabowski also 
implies that GDR’s social movements should play an important political role. This way, 
he grants the Alexanderplatz speakers and demonstrators a political voice. Finally, like 
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Christa Wolf, Schabowski suggests dialogic political communication as a tool to work 
toward a new political order. It is only those who listen who can use the forces of 
disagreement. Hence, for Schabowski the solution of new political beginnings requires 
two-way flows of political communication, granting organized GDR publics a political 
voice, and living with political debates and disagreement.  
 Within the group of discourse as a tool for new beginnings, language as a tool to 
achieve political reform and liberation from political oppression emerged as the second 
most frequent goal-tool ratio. Gregor Gysi, an East German attorney and political 
reformist considers language as a vehicle to not only initiate changes within the SED but 
also to bring together socialism and democracy. He explains: 
The party must renew itself. These are no ordinary times, which is why we can’t 
wait for the next ordinary party convention. Extraordinary times call for 
extraordinary measures. We already adopted new terms into our language, which 
I have nothing against. But from the Russian language we only adopted the word 
Datscha [i.e., country cottage]. I think it is time to adopt two other words; namely 
Glasnost and Perestroika. And if we practice the meaning of these words, then 
we will succeed in bringing together the GDR with socialism, humanism, 
democracy, and the rule of law. (Gysi, 1989)  
 Like most Alexanderplatz speakers, Gysi turns to discourse and language for 
renewing and rebuilding the GDR from within. He suggests that a tighter link between 
words and deeds will bring about reforms to the SED and finally reconcile the 
differences between GDR’s political system and democracy. For Gysi, the new political 
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beginning for the SED and the GDR in general requires people to adopt the language and 
practices of political transparency, openness, and freedom of expression (i.e., Glasnost) 
and Perestroika, which implies political and economic reconstruction. He defines 
language as a tool that exists within the realm of political action. Words without deeds 
do not carry meaning for him. It is through the tight link between words and deeds that 
the tool of language gains its rhetorical power to eventually bring together the GDR with 
(real) socialism, humanism, democracy, and the rule of law.  
 Other Alexanderplatz speakers echo Gysi’s goal-tool ratio and his idea that 
language is political action. Markus Wolf argues: 
On October 7th, Mikhail Gorbachev gave us new hope, and that evening we had a 
bloody incident. Ever since then our people have reclaimed speech for 
themselves on the streets and squares of this country. But now this dialogue must 
not exhaust itself. Words must be followed by deeds. (Wolf, 1989) 
 Like Markus Wolf, most Alexanderplatz speakers who enact goal-tool ratios 
demand language as a tool to achieve new political beginnings. They speak of language 
as a tool that originated through social movements and demonstrations in East Germany. 
Wolf specifically speaks of speech that people reclaimed for themselves. This further 
supports the Alexanderplatz speakers’ demands to rebuild the political culture, political 
system, and legal principles and norms of the GDR from within.  
 In summary, the Alexanderplatz demonstration presents a political crisis for the 
GDR not because members of theaters in East Berlin organized the demonstration in 
response to the violent crackdown on peaceful protestors during the 40th anniversary 
 128 
 
celebrations of the GDR on October 7th, 1989 or because it was the first legal GDR 
demonstration, but because it disrupted the symbol and value systems that legitimized 
the GDR’s political culture, political system, and legal principles and norms. This 
weakened the SED’s rhetorical power to continue to narrate desirable and reliable 
political futures for GDR citizens from within the Marxist-Leninist symbol and value 
system. The rhetorical exigency arose from the Alexanderplatz speakers’ discourse about 
new political cultures, systems, and legal norms for the GDR. Most speakers articulated 
desirable goals for GDR’s political culture and political system that guarantee an active 
political role for GDR citizens in the process of rebuilding East Germany’s political 
culture from within. While the Alexanderplatz speakers developed rather abstract goals 
which speak to the desirability of a new political culture, political system, and legal 
norms, these goals mostly demand tools that imply political symbols and values. The 
dominant goals concerning a new political culture for the GDR require a new political 
language, debate, and dialogue. The dominant goals regarding a new political system 
require deliberations about power relations and developing a political voice via peaceful 
protests. Finally, the political values of publicity, transparency, and accountability run 
through most statements regarding demands for a renewed rule of law. As political 
legitimacy exists within discourse about political values and symbols, the 
Alexanderplatz demonstration started to delegitimize the GDR’s political narrative along 
the lines of political culture, political order, and legal principles and norms.  
 The 26 Alexanderplatz speakers included opposition leaders of the popular 
citizens’ movements, representatives of the GDR regime, artists, novelists, actors, and 
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dissidents who articulated a range of different goals. However, as most speakers 
developed goal-tool ratios by which new political beginnings demand new political 
discourse, it is fair to say that the Alexanderplatz speakers started to enact a policy 
narrative where a desirable and reliable political GDR culture demands argument-
oriented dialogue, language as a form of political action, and peaceful and lawful 
demonstrations. Whereas only a few speakers explicitly enact the remaining elements of 
this collective policy narrative, it is worth-mentioning that 6 out of 26 speakers speak of 
the GDR remainers as the actors within this narrative. For example, Jan Joseph Liefers 
(1989) argues that the people who remain should decide who rules the GDR and 
Friedrich Schorlemmer (1989) explains: “In the fall of 1989 we rose up out of ruins and 
turned toward a new future. Now it is worthwhile being here, it’s getting exciting, stay 
here. We now literally need everyone”. Others describe the remainers as self-aware, 
active, and confident political actors (Wolf, Hein, Heym 1989). 5 out of 26 speakers 
explicitly depict the setting as a crisis caused by GDR politicians and the SED, while the 
other descriptions of the setting range from a country in doubt and skepticism to the 
streets as a political stage and political corruption. Interestingly, Christa Wolf (1989) 
specifically speaks of a bottom-up revolution and political systems as value systems. She 
explains: “I would speak of a ‘revolutionary renewal’. Revolutions start from below, 
below and above exchange places in the value system, and this change sets a socialist 
society standing on its head back on its feet”. Whereas Christa Wolf is the only speaker 
who explicitly depicts the political and societal setting as a revolution, she further enacts 
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a policy narrative where reaching the goal of a new value system for the GDR demands 
political action from below.  
 The Alexanderplatz speakers never overtly demanded the opening of the Berlin 
wall, nor a possible German-German reunification. Instead, they enact an alternative 
democratic vision for the GDR that largely requires reforms to GDR’s political culture 
from within. This is rather remarkable in that they articulated these alternatives within a 
political system and culture that offered few alternatives. The Alexanderplatz speakers 
developed this political discourse and language by themselves. This genuine grassroot 
discourse grew from within the citizen movements. Guided by values like solidarity, 
publicity, courage, hard work, and transparency the speakers searched for alternative 
public political discourse. Through this discursive search or public deliberation, the 
speakers enacted a policy narrative in which they play the role of independent, confident, 
and engaged political actors or GDR remainers who are recognized and protected by the 
GDR constitution and rule of law. Through political dialogue and deliberation, they will 
rebuild and maintain GDR’s political culture and system from within. Induced by the 
GDR leadership, this drama is set in a political crisis which invokes an atmosphere of 
skepticism about the future of the GDR as well as a spirit of revolutionary possibilities.  
Round Table Meetings 
 After the opening of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, the round table 
discussions aimed at dealing with the lack of political directions and leadership in the 
GDR and attempted to reconcile the old and new political tendencies within the GDR. 
On December 7, 1989, members of GDR’s former communist organizations like the 
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SED, trade unions, block parties, and the women’s league met with opposition leaders of 
the popular citizen movements (i.e., Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, the 
Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left) for the first time to discuss the 
future of the GDR. During their first meeting they decided to dissolve the GDR’s Office 
for National Security or Stasi, debated the possibility of new elections for the East 
German Volkskammer (i.e., GDR’s Parliamentary Chamber) on May 6, 1990,13 
deliberated the importance of the rule of law, and agreed to draft a new constitution for 
the GDR14.  
 Former members of GDR’s communist organizations used the roundtable 
meetings to distance themselves from the GDR’s Marxist-Leninist tradition and 
specifically the SED (Yoder, 1999, p. 71). During the months leading up to the national 
election, GDR citizens witnessed the beginning of new political influences that acted 
upon the political discourse by the GDR opposition movements represented at the round 
tables. While the old GDR constitution officially recognized other political parties, these 
parties remained under the control of the SED. These bloc parties included the CDU 
                                                 
13 Due to the worsening situation of the GDR’s economy, the round tables eventually moved the date for 
the first free elections in the GDR forward to March 18, 1990 
14 At its first meeting, the Round Tables formed a special working group to draft a new constitution for the 
GDR. While this working group presented the draft at the final meeting of the Round Tables on March 12, 
1990, the new GDR constitutional draft never exerted political power as the GDR eventually accepted the 
basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Further, after GDR’s first free election on March 18, 1990, 
which the conservative Alliance Party for Germany won by a landslide (48%) compared to parties that 
developed out of the citizen movements (e.g., Party of Democratic Socialism 16%, Green Party 2%), the 
newly elected GDR Volkskammer refused to even consider the Round Tables’ constitutional draft. For a 
detailed discussion of the history of the Round Table Draft, please turn to (Quint, 1997, pp. 28-34).  
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(Christian Democrats), LDPD (Liberals), NDPD (National Democrats), the SPD (Social 
Democratic Party) and the German farmers party. In December of 1989, one by one 
these bloc parties dissociated from the SED and its Marxist-Leninist tradition and started 
to embrace the possibilities of party pluralism. They formed new parties and forged new 
political alliances (Yoder, 1999, p. 72). However, while the process of developing a 
plural party system helped GDR bloc parties to distance themselves from the SED and 
GDR leadership, it worked against the realization of the citizen movements’ democratic 
ideals to reach a new GDR political culture, system, and legal norms through dialogue 
and deliberation. Members of the GDR’s citizen movements imagined realizing their 
goals independent of power politics.  
 At their first meeting, the East German Round Table members defined 
themselves as a politically independent watchdog and problem solver for the people of 
the GDR. Despite differences in political ambitions, the bloc parties attempted to build a 
new party system in the GDR while representatives of the citizen movement hesitated to 
strive for political power (Olivo, 2001, pp. 180-181), the members of the round table 
spoke of themselves as a collective political actor with common interests. Specifically, 
they explain:  
The participants in the Round Table are meeting out of profound concern for our 
country, which has fallen into crisis, for its autonomy, and for its long-term 
development . . . Although the Round Table cannot serve a parliamentary or 
governmental function, it wants to provide the public with proposals for 
overcoming this crisis. It demands from the Volkskammer and the government 
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that it be promptly informed and consulted about important decisions on legal, 
economic, and fiscal policies. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 92-93)  
 This self-ascribed role as independent political actor who generates political 
solutions via debate and dialogue further supports the enactment of the opposition 
movement’s policy narrative at Alexanderplatz. Just as the Alexanderplatz speakers 
imagined demonstrations and dialogue as a necessary tool to ensure political 
accountability and transparency, so too imagine the members of the round table a 
political future where they maintain their independent political voice. Depriving 
organized GDR citizens of their independent political voices to deliberate political 
alternatives and publicly scrutinize political leaders would render their goals impossible. 
 While the Central Round Table meetings present the clearest attempt by the 
former GDR leadership and GDR reformers to organize their political voices, the 
citizens movement’s discourse to maintain their political independence foreshadows a 
decline in the political power of their discourse. As Gladwell (2010) argues, independent 
political discourse is not a natural enemy of the political status quo or engine for political 
change. To exert political power, it is important for social movements to channel their 
concerns and demands through an organizational structure that allows them to speak 
with a politically authoritative voice. By not speaking with an authoritative political 
voice, the round table discussion would risk their goals and demands to appear less 
desirable and reliable in the public perception. After the opening of the Berlin wall, the 
idealistic and revolutionary goals and tools of the citizen movements had to be 
developed anew. To advance their original policy narrative and retain the relationship 
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between goals and tools, the round tables had to reconsider their role as independent 
political voice within a changing GDR system. The political vacuum of the opening of 
the Berlin wall offered an opportunity for GDR citizen movements and new political 
parties to adjust their goals and tools and redefine their political persona. However, 
despite the political vacuum that the opening of the Berlin wall created, the members of 
the GDR citizen movements as they are represented at the Round Tables continued to 
articulate solutions that are grounded in earlier discourse about the future of the GDR. 
Almost a month after the opening of the Berlin wall, we see that members of the citizen 
movements at the round tables hesitated to surrender their idealistic goals for a renewed 
political culture, system, and legal principle for the GDR.  
 Specifically, the discourse at the first round table meeting reveals that members 
of the citizen movement hesitated to relinquish their role as independent, confident, and 
engaged political actor of the GDR who are recognized and protected by the rule of law 
and the constitution. The members of the first round table discussion not only dedicated 
a large portion of their suggestions to the rule of law and the maintenance of GDR’s 
culture and interests, but the way they articulated their goals requires the rule of law, 
political independence, and direct citizen participation. Despite the opening of the Berlin 
wall, their demands for a new constitution, rule of law, and maintenance of GDR’s 
culture are tied to new political beginnings for the GDR, rather than new beginnings for 
Germany or Europe, which echoes the dominant goal-tool ratio of the Alexanderplatz 
discourse (i.e., Discourse as a tool for new political beginnings in the GDR). In their 
meeting notes on the rule of law, which make up the largest portion of the meeting 
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minutes, they demand that “[t]he government of the GDR is called on to define a legal 
framework to support the activity of independent citizens’ committees” (“Goals of the 
Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”). In addition, they demand: 
The government is called on to form a special department of investigation for the 
clarification of instances of abuse of office and corruption. This department of 
investigation will be placed directly under the Prime Minister for the duration of 
its activity. The functions of this department of investigation will be made 
publicly known. (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”) 
 Most of their demands regarding the rule of law address the GDR government as 
the political authority, which further speaks to the round table’s hesitancy to relinquish 
their original intentions to reform GDR’s political culture, system, and legal principles 
from within. They advise the GDR government to fight government corruption and 
political misconduct via a rule of law that is grounded in the existing or revised legal 
framework of the GDR: 
Any person who has engaged in abuse of office or corruption will be held 
responsible on the basis of the prevailing [emphasis added] penal code. In 
implementing preliminary proceedings or criminal proceedings, the provisions of 
the existing [emphasis added] code of criminal procedure will be applied. This 
necessarily means issuing arrest warrants, but not ordering illegal house arrests. 
(“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”) 
 In a way, the members of the first round table meeting appear to be preoccupied 
with refining and completing the policy narrative that some of their members started to 
 136 
 
articulate at the Alexanderplatz demonstration. Rather than replacing the existing 
political culture, order, and legal norms, the members of the Central Round Table still 
aimed at reforming the GDR from within.  
 Most passages in the first round table minutes include goals that can be 
subsumed under the three groups of goals that emerged in the Alexanderplatz speeches, 
namely a new political culture, system, and legal norms. However, the meeting notes and 
transcript of the round table meeting focus on the rule of law as the key goal for the 
GDR, rather than the political culture. This is an interesting shift in that the members of 
the round table recognized the political urgency to legitimize their demands and 
concerns through laws. But despite the shift from cultural to legal goals, the members of 
the round table still deliberated political solutions from within their idealistic and 
revolutionary discourse. While the Alexanderplatz discourse predominantly features 
goal-tool ratios where a revised GDR rule of law and constitution emerged as a group of 
goals relatively independent of speakers’ demands for a new political culture, at the first 
round table meeting a revised rule of law for the GRD now functions as a tool to 
maintain GDR’s culture and interest. As a lead-in to the section on the rule of law, the 
members of the round table explain: “In their efforts on behalf of the rule of law and the 
safeguarding of the interests and culture of our people, the participants in the Round 
Table call for immediate government measures on the following questions” (“Goals of 
the Central Round Table, December 7, 1989”). Further, they demand that “[t]he 
government of the GDR is called on to define a legal framework to support the activity 
of independent citizens’ committees” (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 
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1989”). Thus, whereas the members of the round table meetings dedicate most of their 
discourse to a discussion of a GDR constitution and rule of law, they remain on the 
narrative trajectory which they invoked at the Alexanderplatz demonstration. The 
relationship between narrative elements changes, specifically the rule of law and the 
desired political culture for the GDR, but the members of the round table meetings 
continue to enact solutions to the crisis from within the discourse of a sovereign GDR.  
 In line with the enacted policy narrative at the Alexanderplatz demonstration, the 
members of the round table demand rights for citizens to directly participate in the 
GDR’s political decision-making process. Specifically, they ask for political 
representation for citizens and opportunities for the public to vote for their constitution 
via a referendum. In the meeting notes, the members of the first round table discussion 
explain:  
[The Round Table] will appoint a working group with proportional 
representation that will get started immediately and will include additional 
citizens as needed. The participants in the Round Table agree that approval of 
this new constitution will take place in a referendum in 1990 following the 
Volkskammer elections. (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 
1989”) 
 By offering an opportunity for the GDR public to not only execute their interests 
through direct popular vote, but also participate in the law-making process of drafting 
the constitution (i.e. “. . . will include additional citizens as needed), the round table 
enacted a truly different democratic possibility. Via their deliberations and agreements at 
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the first round table meeting, the members of the citizen movements and members of the 
former GDR leadership enacted the role of politically active and engaged citizens. They 
wrote the role of active citizenship into the policy narrative of the round table and 
thereby invite GDR citizens who wished to actively contribute to the GDR’s policy- and 
law-making process. The tendency to redefine the power relations between state and 
society from the bottom up is not only reminiscent of the Alexanderplatz policy 
narrative, but it now attributes more political agency to GDR citizens. Finally, it not only 
fits within the set of goals which ask for a new political order and system, but it 
specifically addresses the goal of decentralizing political power within the GDR.  
 The meeting notes and transcript of the first round table meeting predominantly 
includes language of political urgency and crisis. Specifically, a setting-goal ratio 
emerged as the dominant ratio for the first meeting on December 7, 1989. They 
articulate their demands and goals regarding a GDR constitution, rule of law, and free 
elections in response to the urgency of the new political situation. Statements like “the 
participants of the Round Table call for immediate [emphasis added] government 
measures,” “The participants in the Round Table agree to start developing a draft of a 
new constitution immediately” [emphasis added], and “the chief public prosecutor of the 
GDR must immediately [emphasis added] guarantee that all tips, information, and 
communications are pursued on the basis of § 95 of the code of criminal procedure” or 
“the constitutional amendments required for holding new elections are to be developed 
without delay [emphasis added]” suggest that the members of the round table are not 
only aware of the political urgency that surrounds their discussions, but that this urgency 
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or crisis demands their goals to be a specific way. The political crisis created by the 
opening of the Berlin wall pressured the only organized political voice of the GDR, 
namely the round table to offer solutions for a quick way out of the crisis. While the self-
ascribed role as an independent political watchdogs and voice of the people of the GDR 
helped to articulate a wide range of goals for the political future of the GDR before 
November 9th, this role hampered them to envision and suggest expedient solutions for 
the acute political and economic crisis caused by the opening of the Berlin wall. To put it 
differently, despite the opening of the Berlin wall and the possibility of German-German 
unification, the round table discourse lacks enthusiasm for German and/or European 
unification. The setting-goal ratio emerged as the dominant ratio, however, the members 
of the round tables speak of an urgent political situation within the GDR and do not 
consider the exigency that a possible German-German unification created.  
 Whether it is the importance of a new rule of law, direct political participation by 
GDR citizens, a new GDR constitution, the maintenance of GDR political culture or the 
election of a new Volkskammer, the members of the round table discuss these goals as a 
desirable and reliable political future for the GDR. While their language of political 
urgency suggest that they are aware of the importance to present quick solutions to the 
people of the GDR, their narrative enactments indicate that a search for a new political 
culture, system, and legal norms still functions as a tool for new political beginnings 
within the GDR. They speak of the importance of creating citizen committees to aid in 
the policy- and law-making process of the GDR and “turn[ing] to the public with 
proposals for overcoming the crisis” (“Goals of the Central Round Table, December 7, 
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1989”). Like the Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the round tables never overtly 
demanded a possible German-German reunification. Instead, they enact an alternative 
democratic vision for the GDR that largely requires reforms to GDR’s legal system 
including a revised constitution and a rule of law that uphold the political values of 
transparency, accountability and representation. To a large extend, the members of the 
round tables continued to enact the policy narrative that the Alexanderplatz speakers 
invoked. They narrate themselves as independent watchdogs and problem solvers that 
see deliberation and direct public participation as a tool to establish a new rule of law 
and legal norms for the citizens of the GDR. Their ultimate goal is to maintain the 
political culture of the GDR, however, they see a revised rule of law and GDR 
constitution as a necessary short term goal to legitimize their political heritage long-
term. Also, while their discourse of political urgency suggests that the members of the 
round table are aware of the need to present quick solutions to the GDR public, they still 
consider deliberations over new political and legal directions as the right way to navigate 
the political exigency of 1989. Compared to the enactment of the policy narrative by the 
Alexanderplatz speakers, the round table narrative implies a stronger actor. Yet, the 
members of the round table do not enact themselves as masters of their political settings. 
A politically independent actor who relies on political discussion between and among 
citizens and politicians to reach its goals will struggle to quickly adapt to new political 
circumstances. The members of the round table enact a political setting of urgency and 
necessity, but they fail to write themselves into the narrative as an adaptive political 
actor. Finally, while the members of the round tables depict the setting as a political 
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crisis for the GDR, they do not see the crisis as a political opportunity for Germany as a 
whole.   
Conclusion 
 The Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables enacted policy 
narratives that allowed GDR citizens to imagine themselves as active participants in 
reforming the political culture, political system, and legal norms of the GDR. They both 
enact a narrative that does not consider German-German unification as a goal or setting. 
Instead, they dedicate most of their discourse to enact a narrative where the GDR 
reforms itself via citizen participation, dialogue, and deliberation. The Alexanderplatz 
speakers and the members of the round tables enacted a policy narrative in which they 
play the role of independent, confident, and engaged political actors who are recognized 
and protected by the GDR constitution and rule of law. While in the Alexanderplatz 
narrative the actor is hardly developed, the round table discussions bring the engaged yet 
independent political actor to the forefront. This is perhaps not surprising in that the 
opening of the Berlin wall put political pressure on the round table meetings to articulate 
desirable and reliable solutions to the crisis, but also to define themselves as a legitimate 
political actor.  
 The Alexanderplatz speakers gained political legitimacy by responding to the 
GDR’s unwillingness to reform its political culture, system, and legal norms. They 
earned their rhetorical rights to narrate an alternative political future for the GDR by 
developing a strong goal-tool relationship. For example, the goal of a democratic 
socialism necessitates dialogue and deliberation as well as self-organization. Further, 
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they developed their political legitimacy in opposition to the political inaction of the 
GDR leadership. However, the opening of the Berlin wall created a new rhetorical arena 
where the members of the round table had to earn their political legitimacy and 
rhetorical rights anew. Highlighting their political identity as a politically independent 
actor who depends on political discussion between and among citizens and politicians to 
reach its goals appears to be the round tables attempt to (re)gain political legitimacy in 
the weeks after the opening of the Berlin wall. In addition to the demands for a new 
constitution, free elections, and the maintenance of GDR’s political culture via a revised 
rule of law, the roundtable’s enactment of an independent political actor further supports 
the Alexanderplatz narrative. Their discussion of actors, goals, tools, and settings remain 
within the discursive boundaries of the Alexanderplatz narrative. While there is a 
noticeable shift in importance of the actor and the relationship between setting and goals, 
the round table policy narrative does not significantly divert from the narrative trajectory 
of the Alexanderplatz discourse.  
 The setting-goal ratio emerged as the dominant ratio. The members of the round 
table articulate their demands and goals regarding a GDR constitution, rule of law, 
maintenance of GDR culture, and free elections in response to the urgency of the new 
political situation. To articulate desirable and reliable solutions in a situation of political 
urgency requires an actor who is in control of the setting. Yet, the members of the round 
table discussions narrate themselves as an actor that is neither expedient nor adaptable. 
They describe themselves as an actor who is driven by political principles, rather than 
the situation. This not only lessens the likeliness for narrative identification and thereby 
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heighten the risk for the round tables to appear as undesirable and unreliable political 
actors, but their goals are possibly perceived as problems rather than solutions to the 
political crisis.  
 It is worth-mentioning that the round table’s reluctance to surrender their 
political ideals and principles indicates a truly new democratic alternative to deliberate 
political futures. Opportunity exploitation is often a trademark of western style politics 
(Boin et al., 2017; Boin et al., 2008; Boin et al., 2009; Hart, 1993), which demands a 
policy narrative where political parties manage and exploit situations. For example, the 
round table itself as a group of social movement representatives and aspiring politicians 
not only institutionalized the idea of political process through disagreement, but also 
practiced the idea of political reconciliation. The round tables suggested for the public to 
play an active role in the policy- and law-making process of the GDR via popular vote. 
In turn, this implies that under the round table draft for a new GDR constitution, 
German-German unification should have been decided through public referenda. This 
way, the round table truly represented the political values of representation and public 
debate that over years built up in the streets of the GDR. Thus, despite its shift in 
narrative elements and ratios, the Alexanderplatz and Round Table discourse enact what 
I would refer to as a human/defensive rights or egalitarian narrative that reforms political 
culture, order, and legal norms from within the GDR, while retaining its political 
independence.  
 Table 4: Comparison of Alexanderplatz and Round Table Policy Narratives 
summarizes the key similarities and differences between the Alexanderplatz and the 
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Round Table narratives. The relative significance of narrative elements is indicated by 
font size and the dominant ratios between narrative elements are illustrated through 
arrows pointing from the dominant term to the term that is controlled. If narrative 
elements are largely implied, dominated by other narrative elements, or emerged only 
rarely in the discourse, then they remain at the normal font size. 
Alexanderplatz Demonstration Policy 
Narrative 
Round Table Discussions Policy 
Narrative 
Actors: Independent, confident, active 
GDR citizens 
Actors: Round Tables as politically 
independent and principled watchdogs 
and problem solvers for GDR citizens 
Action/Conflict: Demonstration as action 
against the GDR’s unwillingness to 
reform/GDR’s political inaction 
Action/Conflict: Principled debates and 
deliberations as an alternative to 
opportunity exploitation 
Setting: Political Crisis/Revolutionary 
possibilities 
Setting: Political 
Crisis/Urgency/Political Vacuum  
Tools: Dialogue/Deliberation/Language Tools: Direct citizen participation in 
policy- and law-making processes 
Goals/Resolutions: New political 
culture for the GDR from within and under 
the protection of the rule of law 
Goals/Resolutions: GDR 
constitution, rule of law, maintenance of 
GDR culture, free elections, 
constitutional referendum 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Alexanderplatz and Round Table Policy Narratives 
 
 While neither the Alexanderplatz speakers nor the members of the round table 
explicitly articulate German-German unification as a desirable or reliable solution to the 
exigency surrounding the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the opening of the Berlin 
wall, these two narratives imply potential directions for the unification process between 
East and West Germany. For example, if Germany’s reunification process followed the 
round table suggestions for direct citizen participation as a tool for solving the crisis, 
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then East Germans and West Germans would vote for the political and legal future of the 
GDR and the FRG in open referenda. Specifically, they would vote on a common 
German constitution, rather than adapting the West German Basic Law. The distance 
between the state and society would be narrowed by focusing on the goal-tool 
relationship, rather than highlighting the importance of political actors for bringing about 
a specific solution. Policy- and law-making processes should be guided by a language 
and dialogue that liberates itself from the newspaper language and discourse of power 
politics. Further, the Alexanderplatz and Round Table narratives direct our attention to 
the possibility of building disagreement as an engine for societal progress into political 
deliberations without surrendering political independence. If these implied political 
directions had been followed through, then it would have challenged the traditional 
distribution of rhetorical power as outlined earlier.15 From the analysis of the political 
discourse of these two key events it is fair to say that the GDR remainers, political 
parties as well as GDR opposition movements are hesitant to surrender their idealistic 
and revolutionary principles. They are not the rhetorical master of the situation, which is 
a trademark of western style politics. The rhetorical game of opportunity exploitation 
works against the policy narratives by the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of 
the Round Tables. As stand-alone narratives, the Alexanderplatz and Round Table policy 
narratives reveal new political directions, however, these narratives exist within the 
interplay of narratives by the West German political elite and national newspapers.  
                                                 
15 See my discussion of Entman’s vertical model of political communication (p. 85-89). 
 146 
 
CHAPTER IV 
RAPID REUNIFICATION AND THE WEST GERMAN RHETORIC OF 
PRACTICAL POLITICS 
 This chapter traces the narrative trajectory of the FRG’s political discourse, 
specifically the discourse by FRG political leaders at key political events between 
November 1989 and February of 1990. The political discourse includes policy 
statements, political speeches, and press conference statements by West German 
politicians. As key narrators for German and European politics and policies, this analysis 
turns to public political discourse by the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the 
German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. While the FRG’s political and policy 
discourse will be presented in chronological order, this is not to suggest that the narrative 
trajectory developed in a linear or causal fashion. The goal is to explores Kohl’s and 
Genscher’s enactments of policy narratives not as a series of events and statements, but 
as a dynamic transformation of symbols modifying one another. What policy narrative 
does Kohl and Genscher enact with their speeches? What narrative elements do their 
speeches include or exclude? How do they address the topic of German-German 
unification and European integration? What is the relative significance of the narrative 
elements? And how do the relationships between narrative elements transform from one 
speech and speech event to another? Each analysis will start by contextualizing the 
political event and speech. This will help to understand to what extend Kohl’s and 
Genscher’s enactments of policy narratives function as a response to the rapidly 
changing political and economic situation in Germany and Europe or whether they 
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follow their own logic. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a comparison of the 
individual narrative enactments across the different political events and discuss them 
through Habermas’s ideas of strategic and communicative action. Thereby the reader 
sees how the West German policy narrative developed within the rapidly changing 
political environment between November of 1989 and February of 1990.  
Speeches at Schöneberg City Hall West Berlin 
 One day after the accidental opening of the Berlin wall, the former mayor of 
Berlin Willy Brandt,16 the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the German foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher addressed a rally of 30,000 people at the Schöneberg 
City Hall in West Berlin. Before delivering their speeches, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher 
sang the third verse of the German national anthem together, which triggered mixed 
reactions from the audience. Further, while Berliners welcomed their former mayor with 
applause—he embodies all the memories of the Berlin wall—Helmut Kohl received 
whistles and boos from people who opposed German-German unification. For East 
Germans, November 9th, 1989 represented a day of liberation, legitimization, and new 
political beginnings, rather than a day of unification. German unification would happen 
almost a year later on October 3rd, 1990. The former mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt 
clearly represents a different political figure to East and West Berliners than the West 
                                                 
16 Willy Brandt had delivered a historic speech against the decision to build the Berlin wall at Schöneberg 
City Hall in 1961. A member of the Social Democratic Party of West Germany, Willy Brandt is often 
remembered for his efforts to overcome Cold-War divisions and improve relations with East Germany and 
Eastern Europe (i.e., Ostpolitik). Further, he is remembered for expediting the rapprochement between 
East and West Germany and Western and Eastern Europe for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1971.  
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German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the West German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher. Yet, despite their differences, the following analysis synthesizes Brandt, Kohl, 
and Genscher’s, policy discourses for the Schöneberg City Hall speeches in that they all 
advocate European and German unification to varying degrees. With the booes and 
whistles, Kohl and Genscher realized that they had to fight for their rhetorical rights and 
political legitimacy if German-German unification ought to remain a political option.   
 Whereas the Alexanderplatz demonstrators responded to the exigency of the 
GDR’s unwillingness to reform its cultural, political, and legal structures, Brandt, Kohl, 
and Genscher articulate goals and solutions for the future of Germany and Europe which 
suggest that they are responding to the post-WWII and Cold War exigency of building a 
common Europe and German community of “freedom,” “peace,” “self-determination,” 
“democracy,” “security,” and “happiness”. Whether it is Brandt’s rhetoric of 
rapprochement and Ostpolitik, Genscher’s demand for free GDR elections and freedom 
of movement, or Kohl’s support for basic human rights, they see the political crisis of 
the opening of the Berlin wall as an opportunity to continue to work toward democracy 
and security within Germany and Europe. In a way, the all-pervasive urgency to 
militarily, economically, and politically rebuild Western Europe and break open the Cold 
War divisions, implies a view of the opening of the Berlin wall as an opportunity for 
Genscher, Kohl, and Brandt. Helmut Kohl explains: 
The people of the GDR have a right to the free expression of opinions, to a truly 
free press, to the free formation of labor unions, to the free founding of parties 
and, of course, according to the United Nations Charter and basic human rights, 
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to free, equal, and secret elections. Our fellow countrymen and countrywomen 
are in the process of fighting for these freedoms, and in this they have our full 
support . . . Berliners, the spirit of freedom is taking hold of all of Europe: 
Poland, Hungary, and now the GDR. The right to self-determination is a basic 
right of every human being and every nation. We demand this right for everyone 
in Europe. We demand it for all Germans. I appeal at this hour to all our fellow 
countrymen and countrywomen: we now want to be one at heart, to shape the 
future together in solidarity, to stand together now and collectively provide help 
to those who need help. We want to follow this path with a warm heart and with 
cool reason. (Gray & Wilke, 1996) 
 Kohl articulates goals that are in line with the Alexanderplatz speaker’s human 
rights or egalitarian narrative, however, his goals lack the defensive and egalitarian 
nature of the Alexanderplatz narrative. While Kohl, Genscher, and Brandt express 
democratic and egalitarian political goals, they do not articulate them to defend the 
political culture of the GDR but embed them within an all-German or European context. 
Only Genscher explicitly argues that “[w]e don’t want to replace the patronization in the 
GDR with unsolicited advice” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 67). While he recognizes GDR 
citizens as independent political actors, this statement loses significance in a speech that 
predominantly speaks of European integration and cooperation. Any references to GDR 
citizens as independent political actors remain implicit and vague or are discussed within 
the context of German-German and/or European cooperation and solidarity. For 
instance, Kohl explains:  
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Berliners have gathered for over forty years to demonstrate for peace and for the 
freedom of this city. They came in order to give expression again and again to 
the message of peace, the message of good will, the message of willingness to 
cooperate. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 64)  
 While Kohl speaks of the GDR citizens’ desire to cooperate, he, nor Brandt or 
Genscher explicate what they mean by cooperation, rapprochement, solidarity, or 
reconciliation. Likewise, they embed abstract goals like freedom, peace, self-
determination, and human rights within metaphors of a common path or journey. Kohl 
argues: 
I state here once again in the name of the Federal Republic of Germany that we 
are willing to support this process to whatever extent possible for us. We 
naturally support, out of a sense of moral responsibility for the unity of our 
German nation, a GDR that progresses in reforms with the goal of freedom 
[emphasis added], of concrete assistance for people in all areas of society. If 
these reforms are instituted and if the GDR progresses along this path [emphasis 
added], then our fellow countrymen and countrywomen who are now thinking 
about leaving the GDR will remain in their traditional homeland. They want to 
find their happiness at home. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 65) 
 Kohl reasons that the idea of GDR happiness and homeland is contingent upon a 
path to freedom. Diverting from this path not only implies unhappiness and potentially a 
foreign notion of home and homeland, but it also means that the FRG would withhold 
assistance for rebuilding the GDR. The FRG’s moral responsibility to help the GDR is 
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tied to Kohl’s understanding of a path to freedom. In a way, Kohl articulates an if-then 
or even or-else statement regarding possible cooperation between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. If the FRG and the GDR agree on a 
common path to freedom then this ensures common cooperation and the maintenance of 
the GDR as a traditional home for GDR citizens. With this if-then statement, Kohl 
communicates the possibility of retaining the GDR as a “traditional homeland” for East 
Germans while also introducing vague conditions for German-German cooperation and 
aid by the FRG to rebuild East Germany. As it is typical for if-then or or-else statements 
in political crisis discourse, they reduce the number of possible alternative solutions. 
Kohl’s discourse implies that the path-to freedom and German-German cooperation is 
the only desirable and reliable solution out of the crisis. 
 Overall, Brandt, Genscher, and Kohl use vague and abstract language regarding 
specific goals for how the GDR would integrate into West Germany and Western 
Europe. Table 5: Code System Political Goals Schöneberg City Hall Speeches 
summarizes the themes and codes for the political goals that Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher 
articulate in their speeches at Schöneberg City Hall.  
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Themes and Number of Codes Political Goals: Schöneberg City Hall 
Speeches 
26 
Freedoms, Peace, Self-Determination, Human Rights 12 
  Free elections for GDR citizens  4 
  Freedom of movement and travel  5 
  Citizen Participation/Bottom-up reforms 3 
A Common European Community 10 
  Common European happiness 4 
  European security 4 
  European democracy 2 
(Possible) German-German Unification/Rapprochement 6 
 
Table 5: Code System Political Goals Schöneberg City Hall Speeches 
 Despite Kohl, Genscher, and Brandt’s 26 statements regarding political goals, 
their discourse rather focuses on the context or political settings of the opening of the 
Berlin wall. Neither Brandt, Kohl, or Genscher addressed the accidental circumstances 
and confusion that led to the opening of the Berlin wall or put the opening of the Berlin 
wall within the context of the political reform processes in the GDR, the efforts by 
opposition movements, or the mass demonstrations during the spring and summer of 
1989. Further, instead of addressing the GDR’s attempts to reform the GDR politically 
and economically, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher depict the opening of the Berlin wall as a 
historic event that exists independent of these political developments. For example, 
while it was too little too late, with the announcement of new travel regulations at the 
night of November 9th, the SED regime intended to communicate a willingness to listen 
to the concerns of the East German people. Neither the political efforts and 
developments by the East German leadership nor the opposition movements emerge in 
Brandt’s, Kohl’s, and Genscher’s speeches. Instead, their language embeds the 
accidental opening of the Berlin wall into the setting of a common German and 
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European future and a logical or natural continuation of Europe’s post-World War II 
history.  
 Enactments of settings emerged as the dominant narrative element in the 
Schöneberg City Hall speeches. The two most frequently enacted settings include 
Europe’s political history post-World War II and a common German and European 
future. For example, as Berlin’s former mayor who experienced and publicly opposed 
the building of the Berlin wall in 1961, Willy Brandt explained: 
Those who today are still quite young and those who will come after us will not 
always have an easy time understanding the historical context in which we are 
embedded. For that reason, I want to say not only that before the division ends—
I spoke out against it angrily, but also with a feeling of helplessness, in 1961—
we have many things to accomplish, but I also want to remind us of the fact that 
all this did not just start on the thirteenth of August, 1961. The German misery 
started with the terroristic Nazi-remine and the war it unleased. That terrible war 
that transformed Berlin, like so many other German and non-German cities, into 
mountains of rubble. The division of Europe, Germany, and Berlin grew out of 
the war and the inability of the victorious allies to come to an agreement. Now 
what belongs together is growing together again. Now we are experiencing, and I 
thank God that I have lived to see it, how the two part of Europe are growing 
together again. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 62) 
 Here, Brandt depicts Europe’s post-WWII history in terms of division and 
unification and implies that a united Europe and Germany is a historically natural 
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situation. Brandt enacts a setting where, historically, Europe belonged together and is 
now growing together again. Brandt invites GDR citizens into a political setting that 
implies a return to unification. For Brandt, the opening of the Berlin wall offers an 
opportunity for Berlin, Germany, and Europe to finally grow together despite the 
artificial political and military divisions that Great Britain, the United States, France, and 
the USSR created after World War II. Brandt’s language creates a setting where German 
and European unity represents the historical context for what happened on November 
9th, 1989. He enacts a political setting which embeds the audience in Germany’s and 
Europe’s history of unity and division, while implying a united Germany and Europe as 
a natural setting. Along those lines, Willy Brandt speaks of European and German 
history as a natural force, which seeks unification, rather than division. Specifically, he 
equates history with the repetitive movements of tides. Drifting with the tide of 
European and German history implies a natural political development, while swimming 
against the tides of European history would translate into abnormal political progress. 
Brandt further reinforces the idea of a natural setting by using language from the domain 
of nature. Focusing on Berlin, he argues: 
The winds of change, which have been sweeping across Europe for quite some 
time, could not pass Germany by. I was always convinced that this division 
reinforced by concrete, this division by means of barbed wire and a death strip, 
swam against the tide of history. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 61) 
 Viewing the events surrounding the opening of the Berlin wall through the 
language of nature and movement not only evokes the impression of continuity but also 
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inevitability. Any abnormal political countermovement would upset the European and 
German tide of history and winds of change and succumb to its forces. Enacting the 
political setting of the opening of the Berlin wall through a nature metaphor implies 
European and German unification as a natural and even inevitable development. As 
settings are the dominant narrative elements in the speeches at Schöneberg City Hall, 
Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher enact a policy narrative which deemphasizes other elements 
of their policy narrative.  
 By narrating the events of November 9th through language of political 
continuities and historical trajectories, Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher rhetorically deprive 
GDR citizens of their political agency or tools. As the speakers enact a setting of 
Europe’s post-WWII history and a common German and European future, it is difficult 
for GDR citizens to imagine themselves as independent political actors who actively 
shape the political future of Germany and Europe. Table 6: Code System Political 
Settings in Schöneberg City Hall Speeches summarizes the themes and codes for the 
political settings that Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher articulate in their speeches at 
Schöneberg City Hall.  
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Themes and Number of Codes Political Settings: Schöneberg City Hall 
Speeches 
30 
European Political History Post-World War II 16 
  A Common German-German and European future 6 
 Europe and the World are watching 4 
 A European path/journey 3 
  Europe as a community of learning and collaboration 2 
  A new beginning for Europe 1 
Berlin Crisis as a Test of Political Prudency 8 
Berlin Crisis as a Creative Chance 4 
Home/Homeland for the GDR entails a unified Germany 2 
 
Table 6: Code System Political Settings in Schöneberg City Hall Speeches 
 
 By not addressing the accidental circumstances and confusion that led to the 
opening of the Berlin wall, or the mass demonstrations during the spring and summer of 
1989, or the political efforts by the GDR opposition movements, Brandt, Kohl, and 
Genscher avoid implicating political actors of the GDR as active and independent agents 
in their policy narrative. Within the setting of European political history and the natural 
trajectory toward a common German-German and European future, GDR citizens and 
GDR opposition movements are limited in their ability to reform the GDR from within. 
The dominant settings of the Schöneberg City Hall speeches demand political actors, 
tools, actions, and solutions to exist outside of the revolutionary language of the GDR 
citizen movements and opposition groups. A natural European political history that 
seeks unification does not offer rhetorical room to articulate goals like democratic 
socialism or solutions that come from non-institutionalized political groups like the 
round tables. Whereas Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher address the GDR audience at 
Schöneberg City Hall as “fellow citizens” and depict them as “one of us,” they 
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rhetorically deprive them of their earned political identity. They not only avoid enacting 
settings that would politically empower GDR citizens and GDR citizen movements, but 
they also ascribe political roles that constrain GDR citizens’ political independence and 
identity.  
 Brandt, Kohl, and Genscher see GDR citizens as wise political actors who 
respond to the new geopolitical developments in Europe and Germany with caution, 
care, and circumspection. Kohl explains: 
During this difficult hour in the history of our country it is important to remain 
prudent and act wisely. To act wisely means not to follow radical slogans and 
voices. To act wisely now means to see all the dimensions of the geopolitical, 
European, and German development. Anyone like us who, since we have just 
returned here from Warsaw, was able to experience what the reform process in 
Hungary and Poland made possible, knows that we now have to find a way, step 
by step and with circumspection, into a common future. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 
65) 
 For Kohl, wise GDR citizens turn their attention outward toward dimensions of 
geopolitical European and German politics. This not only ignores the GDR citizen 
movements’ efforts to develop an independent voice via mass demonstrations and public 
deliberation, but it also fails to recognize the key goals and solutions that GDR 
opposition groups deliberated through their public discourse. The Alexanderplatz 
speakers as well as the members of the Round Table meetings focused on internal 
problems like maintaining the GDR’s political culture, developing a renewed socialism 
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for the GDR, and reforming the existing rule of law and constitution of the GDR. By 
suggesting that GDR citizens should assume the role of a wise political agent who turns 
his or her gaze toward external issues and goals not only lessens the likeliness for 
narrative identification, but Kohl risks that his enactment of a wise political GDR actor 
appears as undesirable and unreliable.  
 Hans-Dietrich Genscher further reinforces this enactment of the GDR citizens as 
political agents for Europe by construing them as people who the international 
community is watching closely. With the eyes of the world upon East Berlin and East 
Germany, GDR citizens see themselves through the eyes of the world and the European 
community. This way, Genscher narrates the GDR people not as citizens of East Berlin 
or East Germany but narrates them through the political expectations of the international 
community. It evokes the impression that GDR citizens should live up to the world’s 
expectations regarding the geopolitical situation in Europe. Specifically, Genscher 
argues:  
Dear fellow citizens, in these hours the world is watching our country and this 
city. Our fellow citizens in the GDR have placed the fate of the Germans at the 
top of the agenda of international politics. Many of our neighbors are asking us 
what we Germans want. They are asking the question about the Germans’ future. 
I would like to tell them that the Germans first of all want to live in peace with 
all their neighbors and that they want to live in freedom. No nation in the world, 
no nation in Europe has to fear for itself if the gates between West and East are 
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now opening, if freedom and democracy are realized. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 
67) 
 As West Germany’s foreign minister, it is perhaps not surprising that Genscher 
articulates political actors and settings from a foreign policy perspective. However, he 
enacts GDR citizens as political actors who are responsible for the future or fate of all 
Germans. By rhetorically putting the future of all Germans in the hands of GDR citizens, 
Genscher empowers them while also enacting an actor who should work toward 
freedom, peace, and democracy in Europe, rather than the GDR. Like Kohl’s enactment 
of a wise political actor who sees all the geopolitical dimensions of the opening of the 
Berlin wall, Genscher asks GDR citizens to assess the future of Germany and Europe 
through the eyes of other Eastern European countries. Inspired by Glasnost and 
Perestroika, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic began to dismantle the physical 
and ideological legacy of the iron curtain throughout the summer of 1989. However, 
contrary to the Central Round Tables and the GDR citizen movements, the Polish and 
Czech opposition movements would not shy away from institutionalizing themselves 
and play the game of power politics. The GDR opposition movements refused to seek 
and accept political power and responsibility. This grew out of their general antipolitical 
and antigovernment position, but also out of their lack of political experience (Olivo, 
2001, p. 180). In this connection, Kohl’s appeal to the GDR opposition groups to join the 
political movements in Hungary and Poland is a little bit misguided. He asks GDR 
opposition leaders to “[j]oin in that spirit of reform that today, in Hungary, in Poland, is 
securing the future of these people! Free the way for the rule of the people, by the 
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people, and for the people” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 65). Enacting a political role that 
implies the political responsibility of deciding the future of German and Europe not only 
fails to speak to the GDR opposition movements’ identity as political reformers rather 
than rulers, but it also conflicts with their self-ascribed role as independent political 
watchdogs and problem solvers. Thus, rather than enacting GDR citizens as political 
actors in their own rights, Kohl and Genscher narrate GDR citizens as politically 
powerful European and international agents within a political setting that deprives them 
of their political independence and identity that they earned in the streets in the summer 
and fall of 1989.   
 The setting-goal ratio emerged as the dominant ratio in the Schöneberg City Hall 
speeches. While Brandt puts forward the goal of German-German rapprochement and a 
new Ostpolitik, Genscher’s demands free GDR elections and freedom of movement, and 
Kohl imagines a German and European future of peace, freedom, and basic human 
rights, they all see these goals as the result of the historical situation of the opening of 
the Berlin wall. Willy Brandt explains: “A lot will depend on whether we-we Germans 
on both sides prove ourselves equal to the historical situation. The rapprochement of us 
Germans, that is what is important” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 61). Elsewhere, Kohl 
explains that Germany cannot afford to let a political vacuum develop, which entails 
political cooperation between East and West Germany.  
 As the first immediate public response to the accidental opening of the Berlin 
wall by Western political leaders, the Schöneberg City Hall speeches establishes another 
important rhetorical baseline against which the discourse of Kohl’s rhetoric of practical 
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politics and rapid unification between November 1989 and February 1990 can be 
compared.   
Helmut Kohl’s Rhetoric of Practical Politics and Rapid Reunification 
 Between November 10th, 1989 and February 15th, 1989, Helmut Kohl delivered 
several policy statements including his 10-point plan speech to the German parliament 
on November 28th, his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) on 
December 19th, his New Year’s Eve television address, and finally his policy speech to 
the German parliament on February 15th. With each statement, Kohl builds toward a 
narrative of practical politics and rapid reunification. He enacts a policy narrative that 
further reinforces Europe’s natural history of unity as one of the key political settings for 
what happened on November 9th, 1989. He builds upon the enactments which he, Willy 
Brandt, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher introduced with their Schöneberg City Hall 
speeches. The “path to freedom” transforms into a “road” to German-German and 
European unity and there is a shift from abstract political language to a rhetoric of 
economic necessities. While his 10 Point-Plan speech to the German parliament, his 
speech at the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche), and his New Year’s TV address reveal 
a reluctance to speak of rapid German-German unification, his later speeches changed 
toward a rhetoric of practical politics. Before tracing this dynamic transformation of 
symbols in Kohl’s rhetoric, this section will first contextualize Helmut Kohl’s policy 
statements. Special attention will be dedicated to the historical context surrounding 
German and European integration. This will help to understand how Kohl’s enactments 
of policy narratives function to gain and maintain his rhetorical rights to define the 
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situation, whether it is a response to the rapidly changing political and economic 
situation in Germany, Europe, and the world, or whether they follow their own logic.  
 Initially, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan suggested German unification as a long-
term goal, but Hans Modrow’s plan for a unified Germany, which he presented at a press 
conference on February 1, 1990 introduced new terms into the debate about German-
German rapprochement. Modrow argued that both German nations should surrender 
their memberships in military agreements like NATO and assume a neutral position 
within Europe. Helmut Kohl quickly rejected Modrow’s proposal for a neutral Germany, 
explaining that a reunited Germany could not afford to be isolated in the heart of Europe. 
In addition, Modrow envisioned a united Germany in which a planned and market 
economy would exist side by side (Kamm, 1990). It is not clear why Modrow introduced 
these specific terms for German unification only three months after the opening of the 
Berlin Wall. Gray and Wilke (1996) argue that “positioning himself as the leading 
spokesperson of unification could serve as a preemptive strike that would allow 
[Modrow] to take the political initiative and create a better bargaining position for the 
GDR and its citizens in the unification negotiations with the FRG” (p. xx).  
 However, Helmut Kohl turned Modrow’s proposal into an opportunity to speed 
up the process of expanding West Germany’s legal, economic, and political systems 
eastward. The West German economic prosperity of the 1980s in connection with the 
economic and political crisis in East Germany, allowed Helmut Kohl and other West 
German political leaders to erode Modrow’s proposal until it conformed with their terms 
for German-German unification. While Modrow allegedly attempted to amplify and 
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strengthen the East German’s voice in the negotiations for the process of German 
unification, it backfired and rapidly silenced arguments for political independence of the 
GDR, referendums as common political tools for political decision making, and a GDR 
constitution. Instead of considering and debating alternative political directions with 
GDR opposition leaders, the Western discourse of rapid reunification and pan-European 
unity reduced discussions about a democratic socialism to political idealism and naiveté. 
With each policy statement between November 1989 and February 1990, Helmut Kohl 
rhetorically builds toward a policy narrative in which a united Germany represents one 
room in “a common European house” built by responsible European actors.  
 With his Ten-Point Plan, Helmut Kohl outlined his vision for overcoming the 
political and economic divisions in Germany and Europe after the opening of the Berlin 
wall. While Kohl alludes to the FRG as a responsible helper for a possible German-
German unification process and the importance of practical politics, ratios relating to 
goals, settings, and tools emerged as dominant narrative elements. Specifically, the goal-
tool ratio and the setting-tool ratio emerged as the dominant ratios. Kohl sees the goal of 
German and European integration as contingent upon political treaties and institutions. 
Whether it is Kohl’s argument that the abolishment of institutionalized socialism is 
necessary to achieve German-German and European integration, or that “[t]he centrally 
planned economy must be dismantled” to create conditions for German unification, the 
goal of returning to Europe’s natural state of unity requires political agreements and 
institutions, rather than new political deliberation and independent political watch dogs. 
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Kohl sees European agreements and institutions as the appropriate tools to build a 
common Europe and Germany. For example, Kohl argues: 
The CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] process is a key 
element of this pan-European architecture. We want to promote it by utilizing the 
upcoming forums: 
- the human rights conferences in Copenhagen in 1990 and in Moscow in 1991;  
- the Conference on Economic Cooperation in Bonn in 1990;  
- the Symposium on Cultural Heritage in Cracow in 1991;  
- and last but not least, the next follow-up meeting in Helsinki.   
There we should also think about new institutional forms of pan-European 
cooperation. We can well imagine a common institution for the coordination of 
East-West economic cooperation, as well as the creation of a pan-European 
environmental council. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 84-85)  
 While Kohl tends to turn to path, road, and journey metaphors to describe the 
political setting in his speeches between November 1989 and February 1990, he 
frequently uses metaphors from the domain of architecture to describe the goal of 
German-German and European unification. At the end of Kohl’s road to German 
unification there is a “common European house,” which rests upon a foundation of pan-
European agreements and institutions. Within this narrative, the goal of East-West 
cooperation demands pan-European tools and thereby would render the GDR’s political 
tools like self-organization, deliberation, dialogue, and language irrelevant. This goal-
tool ratio also implies that a tool only counts as a tool if it helps to build or construct a 
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common German-German and European architecture. Tools like dialogue and 
deliberation or even referendums, as the Round Tables suggested, lack the architectural 
design, which would complement and extend the construction metaphor of a common 
European house. To put it another way, the language of a common European house built 
through pan-European agreements and institutions only invites language and narrative 
elements from those domains.  
 Depicting the goal in terms of a pan-European construction also allows Kohl to 
describe the GDR’s opposition movements and Round Tables as one of many and 
thereby lessen the desirability and reliability of their suggestions. Within Kohl’s goal-
tool ratios the GDR’s suggestions for the future of Germany and Europe exist alongside 
other political suggestions and voices from other European neighbors. Demands by the 
Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the Round Table meetings to develop a 
new political culture for the GDR from within under the protection of a revised rule of 
law now exist within the goal of a pan-European architecture and pan-European 
cooperation. In his Ten-Point Plan speech before the German parliament on November 
28, 1989, Helmut Kohl specifically explains that “[t]he development of intra-German 
relations remains embedded in the pan-European process, and that always means in East-
West relations. The future architecture of Germany must conform to the future 
architecture of pan-Europe” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 84). Kohl continues to articulate 
the goal of European and German-German integration throughout the winter of 1989 and 
spring of 1990. For example, in a speech at the Centre des Conférences Internationales 
in Paris on January 17, 1990, Helmut Kohl argued that “the German house must be built 
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under a European roof” (as cited in Gilbert, 2012, p. 154). Language from the domain of 
architecture and construction helped the goal-tool ratio to dominate Kohl’s 10-Point Plan 
speech to the West German parliament and limit the enactment of tools and actors that 
would not contribute to the construction of a pan-European house of treaties and 
institutions. Table 7: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Helmut Kohl’s 10-
Point Plan Speech summarizes the number of goal-tool ratios and groups them according 
to their overall themes. 
Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios 15 
European/German Integration requires Treaties and Institutions 11 
  Reforms demand a proper political system 3 
 European unity demands abolishment of institutionalized socialism 2 
 New political institutions necessitate free elections 2 
  German integration demands a new GDR constitution 2 
  Federalism requires a legitimate GDR government 1 
  German-German Cooperation demands common institutions 1 
German Unity demands Practical Politics 4 
  Unification demands the freedom of movement 2 
  German Unity necessitates free elections in the GDR 2 
 
Table 7: Number and Themes of Goal-Tool Ratios in Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan 
Speech 
 
 As Helmut Kohl’s goal-tool metaphor of a common European house supported 
by pan-European treaties and institutions only invites language from those domains, it is 
not surprising that Kohl depicts GDR citizens as members of a European community and 
family. Instead of using the political language of the East German citizen movements 
and round table meetings who describe themselves as politically independent problem 
solvers for GDR citizens and watchdogs of the GDR government, Kohl enacts them as 
actors within the European project. Further, he enacts them as actors who exist along 
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other East and Central European countries, which will eventually be integrated into the 
European community or family. Frequently, Kohl enacts the GDR and other Eastern 
European countries not only as members of a European community and family but 
specifically as members of an economic community. Kohl explains:  
The European Community is now called upon to approach the reform-minded 
states of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe with openness and flexibility. 
The state and government leaders of the EC member states decided this a short 
time ago at their meeting in Paris. The GDR is, of course, included in this. The 
Federal Government therefore approves the speedy ratification of a trade and 
cooperation agreement with the GDR which would give the GDR wider access to 
the Common Market. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 84) 
 This not only confirms the Cold War narrative of economic expansion and 
Kohl’s goal-tool metaphor of a common European house supported by pan-European 
agreements and institutions, but it also functions as a first rhetorical step toward what 
Sarotte (Sarotte, 2014a) describes as the West’s pre-fabrication model for post-1989 
Germany and Europe. Kohl’s pre-fab model took “the West’s prefabricated institutions, 
both for domestic order and international economic and military cooperation, and simply 
extended them eastward” (Sarotte, 2014a, p. 8).  
 Along the lines of the prefab-model and Kohl’s goal-tool metaphor of a common 
European house supported by pan-European agreements and institutions, Kohl depicts 
the FRG as a responsible and humanitarian helper for the process of rebuilding the GDR. 
By focusing on the crisis of mass emigration from the East to the West and the economic 
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crisis in the GDR, Kohl depicts the FRG as a helper in need. Specifically, he argues that 
“[t]he Federal Government is willing to provide immediate concrete aid where it is 
presently needed. We will send humanitarian assistance and medical supplies as long as 
this is wanted and considered useful” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 82). While statements 
about the GDR and the FRG as political actors do not dominate Kohl’s 10-Point Plan 
like his statements about goals and settings, it foreshadows a common enactment that 
reemerges throughout Kohl’s policy statements between November 1989 and February 
1990. In his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden on 
December 19th, 1989, Kohl enacts GDR and FRG citizens as family members. While he 
embeds this enactment within the setting of Christmas, it nevertheless supports his 
metaphor of a common German-German and European house. Specifically, he said:  
Dear friends, we are only a couple of days away from Christmas—the celebration 
of peace. Christmas, that is the holiday for family and friends. Especially in these 
days, we in Germany feel ourselves to be a German family again. All of us felt 
this during these weeks and days. Let me remind us all of the moving images we 
saw in the middle of Germany in September, in October, in November—of those 
images that showed how friends and relatives met each other again; we waited 
for that for over forty years. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 101) 
 While the language of friends and family members supports Kohl’s rhetoric of 
reunification as a natural development within Europe’s post-WWII history, it reduces the 
role of GDR citizen movements to political helpers rather than initiators. Via the 
Alexanderplatz speeches and the round table discussion, the GDR citizen movements 
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defined themselves as actors operating outside of power politics, but Kohl does not treat 
them as exceptional. Instead, he tends to enact them as actors that are not particularly 
political. Within the language of friends and families, a common European road, and 
European cooperation and community, the GDR citizen movements do not emerge as 
powerful political actor. Occasionally, Kohl depicts the GDR opposition groups as 
courageous fighters for freedom. In his New Year’s Eve address he argues that “[w]e can 
be proud of our fellow countrymen and countrywomen for their courageous engagement 
for freedom, human rights, and self-determination. Their prudence, their persistence, and 
their political judgement are exemplary” (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 106-107). Largely, 
however, Kohl enacts GDR citizens and the GDR opposition movements within the 
context of European cooperation and the European family. In his speech at the ruins of 
the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) in Dresden on December 19th, 1989, Kohl enacts 
the GDR demonstrators and citizen groups within the context of Glasnost and 
Perestroika and other freedom movements within Eastern Europe. Kohl specifically 
explains:  
We are thankful that we can experience this now. All this did not happen by 
itself. Many people helped bring it about, not least of whom were the citizens on 
the streets and squares of the GDR. But in the outside world many also helped. 
And I have good reason for mentioning Michail Gorbachev’s politics of 
perestroika, which also created these possibilities, the Solidarity freedom 
movement in Poland, the reformers in Hungary. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, pp. 101-
102) 
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 Accrediting Michail Gorbachev and the politics of Glasnost and Perestroika for 
bringing about the political possibilities in East Germany not only weakens the political 
role of the GDR citizens movements, but it also depicts them as not exceptional. Yet, 
other than the freedom movements in Poland and Hungary, the citizen movements in the 
GDR insistently hesitated to surrender their political ideals and principles and play the 
game of power politics. This grew out of their general antipolitical and antigovernment 
position, but also out of their lack of political experience (Olivo, 2001, p. 180). By not 
recognizing the difference between citizen movements in East German and Eastern 
European, Kohl’s rhetoric neglects the political potential that the East German built up 
over years. Instead, he treats them as politically not exceptional and applies a one size-
fits-all rhetoric to their political efforts.  
 In addition to the goal-tool ratio, the setting-tool ratio emerged as the second 
dominant ratio in Helmut Kohl’s rhetoric. This ratio developed throughout his 10-point 
plan speech to the German parliament on November 28th, his speech at the ruins of the 
Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) on December 19th, his New Year’s Eve television 
address, his press conference with Modrow on February 13th, and finally his policy 
speech to the German parliament on February 15th. Between November 1989 and 
January 1990, Kohl often highlighted the setting of a divided Germany and Europe that 
requires German-German solidary, Western policies and institutions, and German-
European cooperation. However, with his February speeches Kohl starts to enact the 
political setting as an economic and humanitarian crisis that necessitates aid by the FGR. 
The economic crisis triggered by the opening of the Berlin wall demands economic 
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reforms for Kohl. During his press conference with Hans Modrow on February 13th, 
1990, Kohl explains: 
The economic crisis of the GDR cannot, in our view, be overcome if the GDR 
resists fundamental reforms. Therefore, the former economic difficulties can only 
be removed quickly with a market-oriented and, at the same time, socially 
supported process of transformation; that is the only way in which the flow of 
private capital can begin and new businesses and jobs that will be promising in 
the future can be created. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 137) 
 Instead of deliberating a range of tools to address the economic crisis in the 
GDR, Kohl narrowed it down to a market-oriented economy. While Hans-Modrow and 
members of the round tables envisioned a united Germany in which a planned and 
market economy would exist side by side (Kamm, 1990), Kohl enacted an economic 
crisis that requires Western tools to bring about a solution. This not only allowed Kohl to 
further develop his rhetoric of rapid unification as a desirable and reliable response to 
the urgency of an economic crisis, but it also enabled him to further support his pre-
fabrication model. An urgent economic crisis allows Kohl to suggest economic tools that 
work quickly. Advocating for his pre-fab model fits well into this setting-tool ratio as it 
allows for rapid solutions to the urgencies. While developing tools through deliberation 
and direct citizen participation like a constitutional referendum supports the GDR citizen 
movements’ goals for a renewed GDR political culture, it would entail a slow 
reunification process. Depicting the political situation—specifically the economic 
situation—as urgent demands (rhetorical) tools that bring about quick relief.  
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 Likewise, Kohl enacts the emigration situation as an urgent issue that 
necessitates quick political responses. At his press conference with Hans-Modrow on 
February 13th, 1990, Kohl not only defines the setting as an economic crisis but also a 
humanitarian crisis. Kohl explains:  
Without a doubt, we are facing a great humanitarian challenge. But I am certain 
that we can master it. The talks with Prime Minister Modrow and his delegation 
were business-like, open, and on the whole characterized by the mutual wish to 
send some signs of hope to the people in the GDR. They took place against the 
background of a situation that, above all as a consequence of the ongoing stream 
of immigrants, has clearly come to a head. The number of immigrants in 1989 
amounted altogether to about 340,000. Since the beginning of this year another 
85,000 were added. For that reason I made two things clear in our talks today. 
First, our repeatedly expressed willingness to help on a short-term basis wherever 
this is urgent and necessary, especially for humanitarian reasons. (Gray & Wilke, 
1996, p. 135) 
 Defining the immigration situation in the GDR and FRG as a humanitarian crisis 
enabled Kohl to enact his political tools as humanitarian necessities. This also allowed 
Kohl to reinforce the FRG’s political role as a responsible helper who acts in the interest 
of the people in the GDR. In his press conference with Hans-Modrow, Kohl highlighted 
urgency more than in his earlier speech, which not only gave him a rhetorical 
momentum to argue for the extension of Western policies and institutions eastwards, but 
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it also put political pressure on the East German political leadership to present tools that 
quickly address the economic and humanitarian urgencies of the situation.  
 While enactments of goals, settings, and tools emerged as the dominant narrative 
elements in Kohl’s 10-point plan speech to the German parliament on November 28th, 
his speech at the ruins of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) on December 19th, his 
New Year’s Eve television address, and his press conference with Modrow on February 
13th, his policy statement to the German parliament on February 15th largely enacted 
the GDR government and citizens as actors who act in the interest of Kohl’s pre-
fabrication model. So far, Kohl infrequently depicted GDR citizens as members of a 
European community or family within Europe’s natural reunification process post-1945. 
Elsewhere, he enacted the GDR as one among many other East European countries like 
Poland and Hungary that gained an advantage from Glasnost and Perestroika. Whereas 
these different enactments of the GDR as political actor remained quite insignificant in 
Kohl’s policy narrative in his policy statement to the German Bundestag, the GDR now 
plays the role of responsible political actors who advance Kohl’s vision of Europe as an 
economic community. He transforms the GDR government and the round tables into 
advocates or opinion leaders of his pre-fabrication model for European unification. 
While he continues to enact a setting of economic urgency, GDR political actors now 
play the role of one of many helpers on the German and European road to economic 
recovery. Specifically, Kohl explains:  
The situation has become more critical. The political parties and groups in the 
GDR at the so-called Round Table passed on to the Federal government a 
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position paper for the talks between the Prime Minister and myself in which they 
referred a situation, which is characterized by fast-paced destabilization. If the 
Modrow government, as I expected after the talks held in Dresden before 
Christmas, had already introduced the necessary laws for the protection of 
investments before January, as did Hungary, then we would already have a 
completely different situation in the GDR where investments are concerned. 
Those in positions of responsibility in the GDR—the government, the Round 
Table—have the power to send the proper signals so that the economic recovery 
can begin. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 144) 
 Here, Kohl continues his rhetoric of economic necessity and urgency, but he 
specifically enacts the GDR government and round tables as powerful actors who should 
communicate the importance of quick economic reforms to their citizens. In a way, they 
should act as opinion leaders who advocate Kohl’s model to extend Western economic 
policies and institutions eastwards. Kohl further reinforces this enactment of the GDR 
government and the members of the round tables by following up his earlier statement 
with an or-else statement. He argues that the FRG’s efforts to introduce West Germany’s 
currency and economic system to the GDR would be in vain if the GDR failed to 
communicate it well to their citizens. Kohl explains: 
If, for whatever reasons, these decisions are not probably communicated, then all 
financial assistance, even to the tune of billions of marks, will be without the 
desired effect. Therefore, it remains true: the introduction of the D-mark in the 
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GDR and the inducement of market-oriented reforms in the GDR are one and the 
same side of the coin of economic success. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 144) 
 As the election date for the first free GDR elections is only a little over a month 
away when Kohl delivered his speech to the German parliament on February 15th, 1990, 
it is perhaps not surprising that he dedicated a large portion of his speech to the 
enactment of the GDR as an important economic actor, helper, and opinion leader. 
While political leaders from West Germany were not allowed to campaign for East 
German political parties (Olivo, 2001), Kohl enacts important GDR policy makers like 
Hans-Modrow and the Round Tables as narrative allies or opinion leaders within his 
policy narrative of rapid eastward expansion. In a way, Kohl attempts to convince East 
German citizens to vote for his pre-fabrication model in the first free elections of the 
East German Volkskammer (i.e., GDR’s Parliamentary Chamber), by enacting them as 
helpers and key economic actors for German reunification. Elsewhere in his speech, 
Kohl argues that the economic potential of the GDR would help to solve economic 
problems together with the FRG, specifically those created by the unification process. 
Kohl further supports his enactment of the GDR as an important economic actor by 
avoiding depicting them as a financial burden for the reunification process. Not only 
does that dispel any doubts about the GDR being a financial burden, but it also solidifies 
the GDR as a real economic asset to the FGR. Specifically, Kohl argues: 
But it also seems important to me that the extent of the economic challenges with 
which we are now dealing be viewed soberly. In population the GDR does not 
quite reach the number of people in the state of Northrhine-Westphalia. If we 
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take economic strength as the basis, the Bundesbank assumes that we are dealing 
with the power of a medium-sized state in the Federal Republic—let’s say, for 
example, Hesse. President Pohl has also pointed to the fact that the capital 
created within a single year in the Federal Republic of Germany corresponds 
roughly to the entire savings in the GDR. I am not mentioning these comparisons 
in order to minimize the problems; that is far from my intent. But they also 
should not be limitlessly exaggerated. The challenges have to be seen as they 
really are, namely, anything but simple, but eventually solvable for a country like 
the Federal Republic of Germany and to be mastered together with the GDR. 
(Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 144) 
 This enactment of the GDR as a valuable economic actor not only implies the 
GDR as an important collaborator in the economic reunification process, but it also 
implies unification as an economically desirable and reliable future for the GDR. While 
it runs contrary to Modrow’s idea of a Germany where a planned and market-oriented 
economy exist side by side, a future in which the GDR functions as a relevant economic 
actor for Germany evokes a desirability to join the FRG and work toward a common 
economic future.   
 Settings emerged as the second dominant narrative element in Kohl’s policy 
statement before the German parliament on February 15th, 1990. All of Kohl’s 
enactments relating to settings in this speech revolve around the setting of economic and 
social security. While Kohl also enacts this setting through the metaphor of a common 
European and German road, this road does not end at a European house with many 
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rooms, but Kohl draws attention to the prosperous and secure economic situation in the 
FRG and implies how a market economy would bring about this situation in the GDR as 
well. Within this setting economic prosperity and social security, it is possible for Kohl 
to enact other narrative elements as desirable and reliable. Whether it is Kohl’s 
enactment of an economic setting where the GDR travels on a safe road to a market-
oriented economy, or the tightly knit social safety-net which saves the GDR from high 
unemployment rates, Kohl enacts a desirable and reliable social and economic future for 
the GDR by depicting the actors and goals of German unification against the setting of 
economic and social security. It allows him to imply rapid German unification as a 
desirable and reliable goal, while describing the GDR as helper and advocate for 
Western policies and institutions. Kohl explains: 
[GDR citizens] worry about whether traveling the road to a currency union and 
an economic community might not cause them to be pushed off to one side. I 
take these concerns, harbored especially by older citizens and by those who are 
threatened with unemployment, very seriously. However, I can assure the 
citizens of the GDR: a social market economy always also means social balance 
and social unity. To achieve this, the government of the Federal Republic is 
prepared to cooperate immediately [emphasis added] in erecting a modem order 
for the workforce and society. According to our experiences, the first step needs 
to be the further development of the social security systems for the elderly and 
the unemployed. (Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 145) 
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 Here, Kohl rhetorically extends the FRG’s setting of social balance and social 
unity generated by a market-oriented economy eastward. He rhetorically prepares GDR 
citizens for the extension of a market-driven economy, which implies the setting of 
economic and social security. Elsewhere in his policy statement, Kohl suggests that what 
helped the FRG to overcome its political and economic challenges after World War II 
will also bring about a solution for the GDR to deal with its political and economic 
problems. While Kohl speaks of different tools that helped the FRG to rebuild itself 
politically and economically after the World War II, he discusses them within the 
metaphor of traveling toward a market-oriented economy. It is Kohl’s attempt to 
rhetorically invite the GDR to join the FRG in traveling on this road together that 
influences and even weakens other narrative elements in Kohl’s speech like tools and 
goals, rather than the other way around. Specifically, Kohl explains: 
What is now important is that we remain on track politically and economically. 
Steering a clear course toward a social market economy is of central significance 
for the Federal Republic, but also for Germany as a whole. If in these days we 
stick to the fundamental principles that brought the Federal Republic of Germany 
from the economic null point after the Second World War into the leading group 
of industrial nations in the world, we can master the challenges of the nineties. 
(Gray & Wilke, 1996, p. 146) 
 For Kohl, within the setting of a market-driven economy it is possible for the 
GDR to master the challenges of the future together with the FRG. However, it is 
important for GDR citizens to remain on track and steer a clear course toward a market 
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economy. In a way, the language from the domain of traveling brings the setting to the 
foreground in Kohl’s rhetoric of rapid unification and economic necessity. It brings the 
other narrative elements in line with Kohl’s pre-fabrication model.  
 Finally, while enactments of actors and settings emerged as the dominant 
narrative elements in Helmut Kohl’s policy statement to the German parliament on 
February 15th, 1990, he articulated political goals or solutions which indicate that he not 
only gained his rhetorical rights to define the situation, but also that he attempted to 
establish political legitimacy for his political crisis narrative. Helmut Kohl’s speech 
enacts rapid unification and economic cooperation as desirable and reliable resolutions 
to the political crisis in East Germany. As he is not allowed to support East German 
parties in the run up to the elections of the GDR’s Parliamentary Chamber (i.e., 
Volkskammer) on March 18th, 1990, his rhetorical legitimacy solely resides within his 
rhetorical interaction with the East German citizens between November 1989 and 
February 1990. Kohl reached out to political opinion in the GDR17 and enacted them as 
key political and economic allies in his narrative of German and European integration. 
Yet, for East German voters, the legitimacy of Kohl’s narrative of rapid reunification 
and economic necessity rests upon the rhetorical desirability and reliability of his policy 
narratives. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that he enacts the upcoming East German 
elections in terms of political values, norms, and symbols that evoke East Germans’ 
appetite for a democratic political order. Specifically, he argues: 
                                                 
17 Kohl met with the members of the round tables and the Modrow government between November 1989 
and February 1989 to hear their ideas for a German-German reunification process. 
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General Secretary Gorbachev and I were in agreement about the fact that the 
Volkskammer elections scheduled for March 18 will be a key factor. In light of 
the campaign platforms with which the clear majority of all the parties and 
groups in the GDR have established themselves, I would reiterate my firm 
conviction—and the General Secretary did not contradict this—that the result of 
this election will not only be a democratically legitimate and, we hope effective 
government, but also a government policy with the clear aim: “unity as soon as 
possible!” The General Secretary and I further agreed that not only the campaign 
and the elections have to take an orderly course, but also that the process of 
unification must be embedded within a stable European framework. (Gray & 
Wilke, 1996, pp. 142-143) 
 As the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables both desired 
a democratically elected government, Kohl enacts a goal that is rooted in their discourse 
about the future of the GDR. But he enacts this goal within the process of rapid German-
German unification and Europe’s political system. He grounds his rhetoric of rapid 
unification in the desirability for a democratically elected GDR government, but it also 
functions as one decision within Europe’s expansion toward the East. Further, he enacts 
Mikhail Gorbachev, and thereby Glasnost and Perestroika, as narrative allies in his 
efforts to gain rhetorical legitimacy and bring about rapid reunification. As political 
legitimacy exists within the rhetorical reification of political values, norms, and symbols, 
it is key for Kohl to enact a post-1989 policy narrative that introduces and influences the 
GDR’s values, norms, and symbols so that they are more willing to accept West German 
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policies post-GDR election. To put it another way, Kohl could reference and rely on his 
rhetorical legitimacy from before the GDR election to publicly legitimize suggestions 
and implementation of additional political measures post-GDR election. Thus, by 
rhetorically enacting rapid German-German unification as the (natural) aim of a 
democratically legitimate GDR government, Helmut Kohl rhetorically legitimizes his 
pre-fabrication model through the voices of Mikhail Gorbachev and the voters of the 
GDR. This hedges against the impression of the FRG as a political and economic 
colonizer of the GDR.   
 Table 8: Rhetorical Transformation of Helmut Kohl’s Policy Narrative 
summarizes the key similarities and differences between Kohl’s policy statements 
between November 1989 and February 1990. The relative significance of narrative 
elements is indicated by font size and the dominant ratios between narrative elements are 
illustrated through arrows pointing from the dominant term to the term that is controlled. 
If narrative elements are largely implied, dominated by other narrative elements, or 
emerged only rarely in the discourse, then they remain at the normal font size.  
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Schöneberg City 
Hall Speeches 
(Nov. 10) 
Kohl’s 10-Point 
Plan Speech 
(Nov. 28) 
Kohl’s Speech at 
the Church of 
our Lady (Dec. 
19) 
Kohl’s New 
Years TV 
Address (Jan. 1) 
Press Conference 
with Hans-
Modrow (Feb. 
13)  
Kohl’s Policy 
Statement to the 
Bundestag (Feb. 
15) 
Actors:  
- GDR citizen 
movements as 
political actors of 
European unity; 
Deprived of their 
political 
independence 
- Wise and careful 
political actors 
focused on 
external political 
issues 
Actors: 
- FRG as a 
responsible and 
humanitarian 
helper 
- GDR citizens 
and citizen 
movements as 
members of a 
European 
(economic) family 
rather than 
political actors 
Actors: 
- FRG as a 
responsible and 
humanitarian 
helper 
- GDR citizens 
and citizen 
movements as 
members of a 
European 
community (one 
among many) 
Actors: 
- FRG as a 
responsible and 
humanitarian 
helper, not 
colonizer 
- GDR citizens as 
economic helpers 
and opinion 
leaders for Kohl’s 
pre-fab model 
- GDR citizens as 
wise actors 
focusing on 
external issues 
Actors: 
- FRG as a 
responsible and 
humanitarian 
helper, not 
colonizer 
- GDR citizens as 
economic helpers 
and opinion 
leaders for Kohl’s 
pre-fab model 
- GDR citizens as 
wise actors 
focusing on 
external issues 
Actors: 
- FRG as a 
responsible and 
humanitarian 
helper 
- GDR citizens as 
economic helpers 
and opinion 
leaders for Kohl’s 
pre-fab model 
- GDR citizens as 
wise actors 
focusing on 
external issues 
Action/Conflict:  
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions 
(- Vote for 
Unification 
friendly parties in 
the upcoming 
election) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions) 
(- Vote for 
Unification 
friendly parties in 
the upcoming 
election) 
Table 8: Rhetorical Transformation of Helmut Kohl’s Policy Narrative 
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Settings:  
- United Europe 
and Germany as a 
natural situation 
and development 
Settings: 
- Europe’s history 
of unity and 
division 
- Road to 
European and 
German-German 
Unity 
Settings: 
- Road to 
European and 
German-German 
Unity 
- Europe’s post 
WWII history of 
peace and unity  
Settings: 
- Europe’s history 
of unity and 
division 
- Road to 
European and 
German-German 
Unity 
Settings: 
- Economic Crisis 
- Immigration 
Crisis 
- Economic and 
Humanitarian 
necessity 
Settings: 
- FRG’s post 
WWII history of 
prosperity and 
social security; 
- Economic and 
humanitarian 
necessity 
Tools:  
- Circumspection, 
Political prudency, 
Pan-European 
Treaties, 
Multilateralism 
Tools: 
- Western/Pan-
European treaties, 
institutions 
- European 
cooperation 
- Market-oriented 
economy for quick 
humanitarian help 
- Political 
prudency 
Tools: 
- Pan-European 
treaties (Kohl’s 10 
Point Plan) 
- European 
cooperation 
- Political 
prudency 
Tools: 
- Pan-European 
treaties (Kohl’s 10 
Point Plan) 
- European 
cooperation 
Tools: 
- (Economic) 
German-German 
and European 
cooperation 
- Market-oriented 
economy for quick 
humanitarian 
relief 
Tools: 
- (Economic) 
German-German 
and European 
cooperation 
- Market-oriented 
economy for quick 
humanitarian 
relief 
Goals:  
- Building a 
common European 
community of 
freedom, peace, 
self-determination, 
democracy, and 
security 
Goals: 
- Common 
European 
House/European 
Architecture  
- Confederalism 
 
Goals: 
- Europe as a 
house of many 
rooms 
Goals: 
- Solidarity, 
Peace, and Human 
Rights  
Goals: 
- German and 
European 
unification 
- Expansion of 
Western 
institutions and 
policies eastward 
(pre-fab model) 
Goals: 
- German and 
European 
unification 
- Expansion of 
Western 
institutions and 
policies eastward 
(pre-fab model) 
Table 8: Continued 
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Conclusion 
 Helmut Kohl and other political leaders of the West used the crisis in the GDR as 
legitimation to advance their rhetoric of practical politics, rapid unification, and 
economic and humanitarian necessity. The rapid deterioration of the East German 
economy in connection with the influx of immigrants to the FRG after the opening of the 
Berlin Wall gave the political leaders of the West an advantage to shape the public 
discourse between November 1989 and February 1990. While during the winter of 1989, 
Helmut Kohl enacted strong rhetorical links between the setting of a united Europe and 
Germany as a natural development, the goal of building a common European 
community, and political prudency and pan-European agreements as tools, this changed 
toward the end of December 1989 and early January of 1990. In line with his pre-
fabrication model, Kohl highlighted the setting of a road to European and German-
German unity, which eventually transformed into a safe, but quick and urgent road to 
West Europe’s market-oriented economy. Kohl often articulates these different roads to 
German unity with reference to Europe’s post WWII history of division, peace, and 
unity. Along those rhetorical shifts in settings, Kohl built up his enactments of the GDR 
as an economic helper and opinion leader for German and European unification, while 
depicting the FRG as a responsible and humanitarian aid to the GDR.  
 Whereas the Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the round tables 
enacted policy narratives that allowed GDR citizens to imagine themselves as active 
participants in reforming the political culture, political system, and legal norms of the 
GDR, Helmut Kohl and other West German political leaders tend to rhetorically deprive 
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the East German citizens and citizen movements of their political independence and 
identity. Instead of enacting GDR citizens through the political language of the East 
German citizen movements and round table meetings who describe themselves as 
politically independent problem solvers for GDR citizens and watchdogs of the GDR 
government, Kohl enacts them as friends and family members within the European 
project. He enacts them as one among many other East European social movements that 
acted upon Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1985 Glasnost and Perestroika programs. This further 
deprives East German opposition movements of their political exceptionalism, which 
they earned through self-organization and a new form of political deliberation and 
discourse. Finally, in his speeches shortly following the opening of the Berlin wall, Kohl 
rhetorically equips GDR citizens with political prudency and pan-European treaties to 
build a common European house. In his February speeches, however, he enacts GDR 
citizens as economic helpers who use the tools of a market-oriented economy to not only 
bring about quick humanitarian relief, but also to adapt Western policies for social 
security and economic prosperity. This shift in rhetorical tools in conjunction with the 
setting-tool ratio as one of the key ratios in all his policy statements rhetorically 
legitimizes Kohl’s pre-fabrication model.  
 After the opening of the Berlin wall, Kohl had to develop and defend his ideas 
for the political and economic future of Europe against the restoration model by USSR’s 
hardliners, France’s revivalist model, and Gorbachev’s heroic model of multinationalism 
(Sarotte, 2014a). In the early days after the opening of the Berlin wall, Kohl favored 
French President François Mitterand revivalist model, which aimed at creating East and 
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West Germany as two sovereign states within a confederate structure. Each of the 
Germanies would maintain its own political and social order, but would share a common 
confederate roof. In the end, Kohl favored the pre-fabrication model, which not only 
entailed the extension of the western legal, economic, and political systems to eastern 
Europe, but it also aimed at embedding the GDR in European and international 
agreements like NATO, the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). West Germany’s political leaders argued to use the West’s 
prefabricated institutions, both for domestic order and international economic and 
military cooperation, and simply extending them eastward. Compared to the restoration 
model by USSR’s hardliners, France’s revivalist model, and Gorbachev’s heroic model 
of multinationalism, the prefab model aimed at harmonizing both domestic and 
international institutions in Eastern Europe and the GDR. Kohl’s speeches between 
November of 1989 and February of 1990 prepared the GDR and the FRG rhetorically for 
embedding the GDR in European and international agreements. Not only does Kohl 
enact the GDR citizens as economic helpers and opinion leaders for his pre-fab model 
within several European rather than specific German settings, but in his later speeches he 
depicts the GDR as wise and responsible actors who focus on external or European 
issues. Finally, Helmut Kohl’s and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s statements enact GDR 
citizens as political agents who are watched closely by Europe and the world, which 
further construes them as European and international political actors. With the rhetorical 
eyes of the world and Europe upon the GDR, Kohl and Genscher’s statements enact 
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GDR citizens as agents for European and international political future of the GDR, 
rather than a truly German-German future.  
 Despite this West German political discourse, which paved the rhetorical road to 
German-German unification, Helmut Kohl enacted the FRG not as a political colonizer 
of the GDR, but as an economic and humanitarian helper and facilitator. This contradicts 
Kohl’s pre-fabrication model,18 which is why it is tempting to simply view Kohl’s 
narrative of practical politics and rapid reunification as a way to politically colonize the 
lifeworld and public sphere of the GDR via his pre-fab model. However, discussing 
Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative through the Habermasian ideas of colonization, system, 
lifeworld, and communicative action should not draw our attention away from the 
communicative dimension of the process. It is all too tempting to highlight the 
institutional colonization of the German Democratic Republic through the expansion of 
western legal, political, economic, and military systems to Eastern Europe. Whereas 
others (Olivo, 2001) often focus on how the FRG exploited the crisis of 1989 to 
institutionally colonize the GDR, a rhetorical lens for political crisis narratives allows us 
to redirect our attention to the rhetorical colonization as it played out in Kohl’s 
discourse.  
 The West German political leadership introduced power politics and 
institutionalized political communication into the GDR, while the East German citizen 
                                                 
18 Between November of 1989 and February of 1990 Kohl’s narrative enactments change slightly, which is 
why it is difficult to speak of Kohl’s policy narrative as one grand post-1989 narrative. Yet, due to its 
overall tendency to build toward and support the expansion of Western-style systems to the East, I will 
refer to it as Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative. 
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movements aimed at building intersubjective political communication and maintaining 
the GDR’s public sphere. Independent political networks, direct democratic 
participation, and public deliberation reflect Habermas’s idea of communicative action, 
but do not translate well into a parliamentary party system and electoral politics. GDR’s 
citizen movements envisioned a political culture where political change happens via 
communication from outside of the political party system. Conforming to a political 
culture of strategic bargaining and personality and power politics works against the 
GDR’s demands for communicative action. The political crisis situation between 
November of 1989 and October of 1990 not only opened institutional opportunities for 
the GDR and FRG to change its political practices, but it also revealed new rhetorical 
opportunities to enact the GDR and East German public spheres in new ways. Thus, the 
following considerations will briefly focus on how Kohl’s enactments of the GDR 
actors, actions, settings, tools, and goals failed to rhetorically protect the GDR public 
spheres from the language of his pre-fabrication narrative. While Kohl’s pre-fabrication 
model implied the institutional colonization of the GDR’s lifeworld, it did not 
necessitate a colonization of their political language. Instead of articulating narrative 
elements through the language of the GDR citizen movements, Kohl enacted a narrative 
that exists outside of the political language that GDR opposition groups developed in the 
spring and summer of 1989. While Kohl’s pre-fab narrative speaks to the immediate 
economic and humanitarian urgencies and anxieties of GDR citizens, it induces Western 
German and European interest without clearly enacting the GDR’s political actors, 
settings, tools, and goals as political alternatives in their own right.  
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 The Alexanderplatz speakers enacted a new political culture for the GDR from 
within and under the protection of a new constitution and rule of law. Likewise, the 
members of the round table meetings desired a new GDR constitution, maintenance of 
GDR’s political culture, free elections, and a constitutional referendum. Both are key 
representatives of East Germany’s citizen movements who enacted themselves as 
independent yet engaged and confident political actors. With his speeches, Helmut Kohl 
dedicated a lot of statements to the depiction of the GDR and GDR citizens as economic 
helpers and opinion leaders for Kohl’s pre-fab model. This does not reflect an 
understanding of the Alexanderplatz speakers’ narrative enactments in that they 
deemphasized the importance of themselves as actors and emphasized the role of 
dialogue, deliberation, and language to build a new political order from within the GDR. 
It was only with the opening of the Berlin wall and the problem of power politics that the 
citizen movements, specifically the members of the round tables started to highlight 
themselves as an independent and principled watchdog of the GDR government and self-
organized problem solver for the people of the GDR. Further, they enacted the political 
crisis and political vacuum after the opening of the Berlin wall as a warrant for drafting a 
new constitution and improving the rule of law to maintain GDR’s interests. Speaking to 
this shift from an idealistic goal-tool radio to a deterministic setting-resolution ratio, 
would have preserved the original momentum of the GDR opposition movements’ 
rhetoric and guard against enacting their goals and tools via the success-oriented 
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language of institutionalized political communication.19 To put it differently, as the 
definitions of the individual narrative elements between Kohl’s pre-fab narrative and the 
GDR’s citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative differ significantly, there is no common 
definition of the crisis situation and the desired resolution, which is key to harmonize 
different plans of action. Habermas argues: 
In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own 
individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that 
they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation 
definitions. In this respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an 
essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for 
communicative action. (Habermas, 1984, pp. 285-286)  
 To rhetorically harmonize the egalitarian narrative by the GDR citizen 
movements with Helmut Kohl’s pre-fab narrative would first require similar enactments 
of key narrative elements and ratios. However, Kohl never really negotiated the 
meanings of the individual narrative elements and ratios, or incorporated the GDR’s 
language into his policy narrative. Settings, actors, and goals emerged as the dominant 
narrative elements in Kohl’s discourse, with the setting-tool ratio as the leading 
relationship. This differs significantly from the goal-tool ratio by the Alexanderplatz 
speakers and the members of the central round tables. While in the first free elections in 
                                                 
19 While the GDR citizen movements opposed power politics and institutionalized political 
communication, they aimed at building a new political culture for the GDR that is protected under a new 
rule of law and a new constitution. Future research should explore these demands through Habermas’s 
discourse theory as he outlines it in Between Facts and Norms. 
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the GDR on March 18th, 1989, 48% of GDR voters voted for the Alliance for Germany, 
which supported rapid reunification and memberships in pan-European and international 
treaties, Kohl’s narrative enactments do not preserve the political directions articulated 
by the GDR citizen movements. The political directions that the Alexanderplatz speakers 
and the members of the roundtables articulated grew out of a desire to reform the GDR 
from within. Whether it is their enactments of a democratic socialism or a politically 
independent and principled watchdog of the GDR government, all grew out of a deeply 
rooted distrust toward the abuse of political power. By not enacting a narrative that 
recognizes the citizen movements’ distrustful attitude toward government and instead 
enacting a policy narrative from the domain of Western political language possibly 
contributed to a lack of mutual political and cultural understanding between former 
members of the GDR opposition movements and today’s (democratic) political parties 
and institutions. The citizen movements’ desires for a new political order are embedded 
in a different language about political culture and systems.  
 In a 2017 interview with the Berliner Zeitung, Thomas Krüger, the leader of 
Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education (BPB), argues that Germany’s political 
institutions still struggle to break down the cultural and political walls in peoples’ heads. 
Specifically, he suggests that “[t]here is simply a lack of [political] translators of cultural 
differences. Then a positive appropriation of institutions becomes more difficult” (as 
cited in Knight, 2017). Krüger explains that today’s cultural disconnect between East 
and West Germany is grounded in a deep distrust among East Germans toward state 
institutions and democratic processes. This distrust manifests itself in voter turnout and 
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election results in East Germany. States in East Germany barely reached 50% in the 
2013 federal elections, compared to 63% in former West Germany (Lees, 2014). Also, 
political parties critical of Germany’s political and economic system are particularly 
popular and gain wide political support in East German states. Historically, the Socialist 
Left Party (Die Linke) benefitted from people’s deep distrust toward political 
institutions. In Germany’s 2009 federal elections, the Socialist Left Party gained 28.5% 
of the vote in East Germany. In 2013 they dropped to 22.7% (Hagen, 2017). Now, the 
far-right wing Alternative for Germany Party (AfD), exploits East Germans’ distrust 
toward democracy and political institutions. They gained 21.9% of the vote in East 
Germany, compared to only 11.1% in West Germany. For Krüger, East Germans are 
victims of cultural colonialism by the West, which started with Germany’s reunification 
process (Knight, 2017). While further research is necessary, the present results support 
Krüger’s argument from the perspective of rhetorical colonization.  
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CHAPTER V 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR RAPID GERMAN REUNIFICATION: THE WEST 
GERMAN PRINT MEDIA AS POLITICAL ACTOR 
 This chapter traces the narrative trajectory of the political discourse by West 
German daily newspapers between November 1989 and February of 1990. The discourse 
includes front-page articles and editorials in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 
and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), which represent two of the biggest daily national 
newspapers in the FRG between 1989 and 1990 regarding regional and national 
readership (Pürer & Raabe, 2007, pp. 151-155). The selected front-page articles and 
editorials address the key political events in West and East Germany analyzed so far, 
including the Alexanderplatz demonstration, the round table meetings, and Kohl’s 
numerous policy statements between November 1989 and February 1990. While the 
FAZ represents a centrist-conservative newspaper, the SZ generally attracts left-leaning 
audiences. Accordingly, the FAZ’s commentaries and editorials often reflect a 
conservative or center-right position, while the SZ’s editorials generally offer center-left 
positions. During the 1980s, the FAZ’s as well as the SZ’s readership included highly 
educated readers (Fletcher, 1991). The FAZ and the SZ not only grew out of a desire to 
rebuild a democratic post WWII Germany via a politically independent press, but they 
also gained financial independence from political parties. Advertising for jobs and 
businesses generated most of the FAZ’s and the SZ’s revenue in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This way, the FAZ and the SZ represent a sample of what Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
refer to as Europe’s democratic corporatist media model, which generally encourages 
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journalistic autonomy, diversity, and professionalism, but also features low levels of 
advocacy-journalism. To put it differently, whereas the FAZ largely supports socially 
softened free-market ideologies, the SZ tends to lean toward ideologies of social 
responsibility. Despite their differences in political leanings, as newspapers in west 
Germany and western Europe, the FAZ and the SZ generally reported about East Europe 
in a way that expressed an interest in overcoming the Cold War and specifically the 
German-German division (Mueller, 1999).   
 The Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the round table meetings, as well 
as the German Chancellor and the German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
played an important role in enacting the political crisis drama between November 1989 
and February 1990. Yet, as the West German daily press disseminated information to 
larger audiences than GDR demonstrators, citizen movements, and FRG politicians, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) exerted a lot of 
rhetorical and political power in defining the political crisis drama for the West German 
public. They amplified and/or distorted narrative elements introduced by other political 
crisis narrators. Specifically, they suggested the salience of specific narrative 
possibilities and resolutions, while deemphasizing and foreclosing others. In turn, this 
likely increased or decreased the narrative reliability and desirability of the egalitarian 
narrative by the GDR citizen movements and Kohl’s pre-fab narrative. As news 
discourses not only define, describe and delimit what is possible to say and not possible 
to say, but also how people discuss a specific political event or issue (Critcher, 2003; 
McCombs, 1997), it is key to trace how the FAZ and the SZ enacted the political events 
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by the East German citizen movements and West German politicians, specifically 
regarding the process of German-German and European unification.  
 As the FAZ and the SZ desired to rebuild a democratic post WWII Germany via 
a politically independent and objective press, it is to be expected that in the event of a 
political crisis like the opening of the Berlin wall, their news stories follow the news 
standard of describing the who, what, where, how, when, and why for the reader. This 
journalistic standard roughly corresponds to the narrative elements of a policy narrative 
(i.e., Actor, Action, Setting, Tools, Goals) and thereby makes it possible to treat the 
FAZ’s and SZ’s news articles and editorials as enactments of policy narratives. Further, 
in the event of political crises, journalists in Western countries tend to “seek information 
about scope or harm, cause, blame, responsibility, and remedial efforts” (Seeger & 
Sellnow, 2015, p. 20). They “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for 
the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). While journalists are generally guided by 
these journalistic standards, there are a few journalistic idiosyncrasies that are worth-
discussing before revealing the results of this analysis. These journalistic habits are 
important to account for when reconstructing news stories as policy narratives. 
 First, during the 1990s the West European press tended to frame European 
politics largely in terms of conflicts, us vs. them, and winners and losers (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000). In a way, these are rhetorical traces of the West’s Cold War 
narrative, which dominated the West’s political discourse between 1947 and 1991. 
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Second, in the great blooming and buzzing confusion of the political world of 1989, the 
West German press inevitably filtered the events through mental and cultural shortcuts 
or stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18). These shortcuts are summaries or generalization 
that journalists intentionally or accidentally create through word choice, sentence 
structure, metaphors, expressions, lead and concluding paragraph, headlines, photo 
captions, page placement, and quotes. While the following analysis relied upon the 
headlines and body text of front-page articles and editorials as the unit of analysis, 
quotes are particularly interesting in that they potentially amplify the political voices of 
specific crisis narrators and simplify or silence others. Further, to evoke the impression 
of balanced news reporting, journalists often quote opposing political voices. In effect, 
this generates conflict frames and only adds to the impression of an uncertain political 
future. While conflict frames and opposing quotes suggest political disagreement and 
possibly political deliberation, they lack or minimize information about narrative 
desirability and reliability. Thereby, depending on the framing devices, the FAZ and the 
SZ disproportionately heightened the salience of political actors and resolutions due to 
their use of direct quotes. Likewise, other framing devices like metaphors lend 
themselves to magnifying or diminishing the importance of political settings and thereby 
influence the perceived desirability and reliability of a crisis resolution. For example, by 
describing the influx of immigrants from the GDR to the FRG through the language of a 
humanitarian crisis evokes a sense of urgency, which implies rapid political and 
economic solutions. Third, when the press enacts a policy narrative where readers only 
hear about the implementation and adoption of a policy, while leaving out details about 
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the political, cultural, and economic consequences, then it minimizes the role that GDR 
and FRG citizens play in the political process of German-German unification. It 
rhetorically transforms citizens into consumers of political decision-making, rather than 
into active political participants. Consequently, readers would underestimate the degree 
to which citizen participation impacts the political decision-making process of German-
German and European unification. Finally, within West Germany’s democratic political 
system with a social-market economy, political symbols like security, freedom, 
democracy, and legitimacy are self-affirming and thereby not only support the FRG’s 
political system, but also imply the legitimate expansion of western systems to the east. 
To put it differently, West German readers of stories about GDR citizen movements and 
round tables would interpret them from within the ideologically hardened political 
binaries of democracy vs. totalitarianism and capitalism vs. socialism, which warrants 
the implementation of western economic and political systems. Instead of interpreting 
the political efforts by the GDR citizen movements and round tables in their own rights, 
Cold War narratives functioned as a filter for political efforts by the GDR citizen 
movements and turned them into enactments within it.  
 As a key rhetorical amplifier and political narrator for the people of the FRG, the 
FAZ and SZ reflected, selected, and deflected the enactments of policy narratives by the 
GDR citizen movements and round tables, as well as the West German political 
leadership in different ways. While the FAZ’s and the SZ’s reporting and commentary of 
the political discourse will be presented in chronological order, this is not to suggest that 
the narrative trajectory developed in a linear or causal fashion. The goal is to explore the 
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FAZ’s and SZ’s enactments of policy narratives not only as a reenactment of the GDR 
citizen movements’ egalitarian and Kohl’s pre-fab narrative, but also as a dynamic 
transformation of symbols modifying one another. How do the FAZ and the SZ support 
or distort the rhetorical enactments by the Alexanderplatz speakers, the members of the 
round tables, and Helmut Kohl? Or do they follow their own narrative logic? What is the 
relative significance of narrative elements compared to Kohl’s pre-fab narrative and the 
egalitarian narrative by the Alexanderplatz speakers and members of the central round 
tables? And how do the relationships between narrative elements transform compared to 
how they changed in the other narratives? This will help to understand the differences 
and similarities between and among the different policy narratives. Further, it will allow 
to reveal how the different policy narratives influenced each other, where different 
narrative elements conflict, and why Kohl’s pre-fab narrative won the battle over the 
rhetorical rights to define the situation and legitimize his crisis resolution. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with a comparison of the FAZ’s and the SZ’s narrative enactments 
across the different political events.   
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
 As the Alexanderplatz demonstration happened on Saturday November 4th, 
1989, the FAZ reported about it on Monday November 6th. Enactments of settings, 
actors, and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories for that day. 
Specifically, the FAZ front-page news stories as well as the teasers, editorials, and op-
eds predominantly discussed the Alexanderplatz demonstration and speeches within the 
setting of an unstoppable political reform process in the GDR and Eastern Europe. Each 
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story which addressed the mass demonstration at Alexanderplatz also mentions other 
political reform processes in the GDR and Europe. The headline of the lead article reads 
“Mass exodus, Reform Agreements, Demands: Hundreds of Thousands cross the Czech 
border into the FRG/Hundreds of Thousands demonstrate in East Berlin” (1989, 
November 6, FAZ). The article opens by describing the Alexanderplatz demonstration as 
a peaceful event and expression of the GDR citizens’ demands for human rights. The 
remainder of the lead article discusses recent political developments in the SED as signs 
for fundamental reforms in the GDR. Following the introductory remarks about the 
Alexanderplatz demonstration, the article discusses the resignation of numerous SED 
members, the easing of travel restrictions with Czechoslovakia, and the SED’s intentions 
to initiate important political reforms. While the front-page news stories suggest the 
inevitability of political change in the GDR through the salience of GDR reform 
initiative and the influx of immigrants into the FRG, the op-ed on the FAZ’s front page 
specifically speaks of the political reform process as an unstoppable process. Not only 
does the author depict the GDR’s political and economic system as a system “born 
yesterday,” but specifically he argues:  
This weekend, the days of the ‘sublime leaders’ as Stefan Heym called them in 
his thoughtful speech, were counted. . . . Yesterday’s rulers, or those who will 
soon belong to them, are not willing to share their power. Some might be flirting 
with the idea to reignite the old machinery of political oppression. But the 
erosion of political power is too far along. Whoever now resorts to tools of the 
past risks further protest . . . No matter how the SED looks at it: The 
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democratization of this run-down system, where politicians complain about a 
lack of phone lines—one reason among many—is inevitable. (1989, November 
6, FAZ) 
 The language of inevitability in conjunction with the detailed reporting about the 
resignation of SED members, the easing of travel restrictions with Czechoslovakia, and 
the SED’s intentions to initiate important political reforms all enacted a political setting 
of an unstoppable political reform process in the GDR. Further, as political discourse 
naturally tends to deal with the future, enacting the GDR’s political and economic 
system through a language of the past evokes a rhetorical momentum for change and 
reform.  
 While the enactment of the GDR’s political setting as an unstoppable political 
reform process dominated the FAZ’s front-page articles and op-ed, the setting of 
political possibilities emerged as the second dominant setting. Specifically, the authors 
of the editorials and op-eds enacted the Alexanderplatz demonstrations as a political 
opportunity to contemplate different directions for Germany’s future. In one of the front-
page stories titled “A German Opportunity?”, the author explains:  
After the dramatic events in East-Germany over the weekend, which heralded the 
end of the communist party monopoly in the GDR, the frequently repeated 
statements by the Soviet leadership about its former satellite states to take 
matters into their own hands became more important . . .  What will happen if the 
people of a renewed GDR decide to join the FRG? (1989, November 6, FAZ) 
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 The author of this opinion editorial answers this question by suggesting that an 
integrated GDR in Western Germany with economic ties to the USSR would allow the 
USSR to build its influence in Western Europe. Likewise, he advocates that slow or 
rapid German-German unification and Germany’s integration in European agreements 
would be in the interest of the USSR in that it would allow the USSR to access European 
markets. Elsewhere, he discusses the importance of a slow unification process, due to the 
cultural, political, and economic differences between the GDR and the FRG. While 
enactments of the unstoppable political reform process in the GDR and political 
possibilities or opportunities emerged as the dominant enactments for political settings, 
the FAZ’s front-page articles included a range of political settings. A few articles 
enacted the influx of immigrants from the GDR to the FRG as an urgent humanitarian 
and economic setting, while others focused on the Alexanderplatz speeches as a 
historical moment. Yet other, discussed the recent developments in East Berlin and East 
Germany within the context of Glasnost and Perestroika and international and European 
agreements and treaties.  
 Among the enactments of actors, the FAZ front-page news stories as well as the 
teasers, editorials, and op-eds predominantly enacted the GDR as the winner of a 
possible German-German reunification process. While the Alexanderplatz speakers are 
occasionally depicted as confident, courageous, and self-critical actors who demand free 
elections and human rights, most stories quickly direct the reader’s attention to the 
political role of the GDR for a possible reunification process. In the article titled “A 
German Opportunity?”, the author argues: 
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The GDR would benefit from German-German reunification in every aspect—
including the rights and access to the European common market. Besides, the 
GDR could commit the newly born German state to invest in East Germany . . . 
Integrating the GDR not only into West Germany but also into strong 
international political structures would minimize their exposure to threats from 
the East and strengthen Germany’s position as a mediator between West and East 
Europe. (1989, November 6, FAZ) 
 Enacting the GDR as the winner of German and European unification not only 
highlights German-German unification as a desirable and reliable goal for the future, but 
it neglects to distinguish between the numerous GDR opposition groups who deliberated 
alternative futures for the GDR at the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the GDR as a 
whole. The rapid cycle of news events, lack of immediate access and detailed 
knowledge, and editorial and journalistic practices often result in general rather than 
specific enactments of political actors. However, while the Alexanderplatz speakers 
enacted themselves as independent political actors who aimed at changing the GDR 
from within, discussing them as winners of a possible German-German reunification 
process rhetorically reduces them to representatives of the GDR, which is simply another 
political player within the process of Europe integration. Even though the 
Alexanderplatz demonstration represented the first legal demonstration in GDR history, 
the FAZ largely used this event as lead-ins to discussions about German and Europe 
unification and enacted the demonstrators as representatives of the GDR as a political 
agent of European integration.  
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 The FAZ’s front-page news stories as well as the editorials, and op-eds largely 
enacted the abolition of the SED’s monopoly on political power and free elections as the 
key resolution to the political crisis in the GDR. In an article titled “Bonn’s Political 
Parties collectively demand free elections in the GDR: The SED must surrender its Party 
Monopoly/The Demonstration in East-Berlin as a historical event,” the author explains: 
The GDR political leadership is well advised if they surrender its party 
monopoly, which the people of the GDR inherited this weekend. They should 
realize that in the future their claim to leadership will depend on the outcomes of 
free elections. (1989, November 6, FAZ) 
 Like the enactments of the Alexanderplatz speakers as representatives of the 
GDR and the GDR as a beneficiary of the German-German unification process, by 
discussing political resolutions at the level of GDR’s political leadership rather than at 
the level of citizen movements diverts attention away from resolutions articulated by 
speakers at the Alexanderplatz demonstration. Only two days after the biggest and first 
legal demonstration in GDR history, all front-page articles, editorials, op-eds, and teasers 
neglected to explicitly mention the Alexanderplatz speakers’ intentions to rebuild a new 
political culture for the GDR under the protection of a new rule of law. Likewise, the 
goal of a democratic socialism for the GDR would not be enacted in any of the front-
page articles. These political goals rhetorically disappeared in discussions about goals at 
the level of political leadership, specifically in enactments about the abolition of the 
SED’s party monopoly.  
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 Enactments of settings and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, 
editorials, and op-eds regarding Willy Brandt’s, Helmut Kohl’s, and Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher’s speeches at the Schöneberg City Hall in West Berlin on November 10, 1989. 
The FAZ’s front-page on November 10, 1989 featured a range of political settings 
including the influx of immigration from East to West Germany, an ambiguous path to 
German unification, the opening of border crossings in East Berlin, European 
integration, international agreements and treaties, the opening of the Berlin wall as a 
historic European moment, and the opening of the Berlin wall as an urgent humanitarian 
necessity. Among those enactments, the opening of the border crossings in East Berlin 
and European integration emerged as the dominant narrative settings in articles that 
referenced Brandt’s, Kohl’s, and Genscher’s Schöneberg City Hall speeches. In the lead 
article titled “Concrete and Barbed Wire don’t divide any longer: New Border 
Crossings/Demonstration in front of Schöneberg City Hall/Ten Thousands pour into 
West Germany/Reunion Moments,” the author describes how East and West Germans 
greeted each other at the border crossings in East Berlin and at the Brandenburg gate and 
mentions what border crossings will open within the following days. It is not surprising 
that reencounters between people from East and West Berlin and the openings of border 
crossings in East Berlin emerged as the dominant narrative settings at the day after the 
accidental opening of the Berlin wall. Yet, as with the quick rhetorical transformation of 
the Alexanderplatz speakers from demonstrators to political representatives of the GDR 
as an agent of European integration, several front-page articles shifted from an 
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enactment of the opening of border crossings to enactments of European integration and 
treaties. 
 The opinion editorial on the FAZ’s front-page for the day after the opening of the 
Berlin wall begins by describing the accidental opening of the border crossings on 
November 9th, 1989 as a “natural political event”. But for the rest of the op-ed, the 
author enacts the opening of East Berlin’s border crossings as “a historical event within 
Europe’s history of political integration” (1989, November 11, FAZ). Elsewhere, the op-
ed argues that “[i]n principle, Brussels can welcome German reunification as long as it 
fits within the overall design of European treaties and integration” (1989, November 11, 
FAZ). This enactment of the opening of the Berlin wall and German unification within 
the setting of European integration functions as a political pre-condition for the GDR to 
integrate into West Germany and Europe. This way, it supports Helmut Kohl’s 
architectural rhetoric of his pre-fabrication narrative. Within Kohl’s narrative, the GDR 
only functions as a political architect for a common European house if it adapts pan-
European agreements and a market-oriented economy. The author of this op-ed narrates 
German-German unification through the eyes of European institutions and within the 
context of a European architecture. This not only pre-determines the political future of 
the GDR, but it opposes the Alexanderplatz speakers’ enactment of the setting as 
revolutionary possibilities. The setting of European treaties and integration rhetorically 
restraints the GDR opposition movements to political possibilities that are in line with 
Kohl’s pre-fab narrative.  
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 In addition, the FAZ’s front-page on November 10, 1989 featured a range of 
political goals and resolutions including a new political leadership for the GDR regime, 
maintaining socialism for the GDR, freedom of speech and assembly and human rights, 
and democratic socialism. Socialism for the GDR emerged as the dominant goal. While 
one article briefly enacted the goal of a democratic socialism for the GDR, the lead 
article and the op-ed extensively discussed the GDR’s intentions to uphold socialism in 
the GDR despite the GDR’s political and economic crisis. In an article titled “Modrow: 
It is all about the Socialism in our country,” the author opens the article by quoting a 
speech by Hans Modrow, which he delivered on national TV a day before the 
Alexanderplatz demonstration. The quote reads: 
During these times of crisis, it is about the survival of socialism in our country . . 
. the ‘Wende’ [i.e., turn or turning point] was initiated by people in the streets 
and we must not forget the Leninist principle that if a party fails to acknowledge 
its mistakes it will lose its power to rule. (1989, November 10, FAZ) 
 The article continues by discussing different initiatives by the SED to introduce 
political reforms while maintaining their idea of GDR socialism. This way, the FAZ’s 
font-page directed the reader’s attention to goals articulated by the old GDR leadership, 
rather than the GDR citizen movements or the Alexanderplatz speakers. By highlighting 
the goals of the old SED leadership, it minimized the voices and demands by the GDR 
citizen movements and Alexanderplatz speakers and reduced the desirability and 
reliability of any resolutions proposed by the social movements of the GDR. As the FAZ 
often neglects to distinguish between the numerous GDR opposition groups who 
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deliberated alternative political resolutions for the GDR at the Alexanderplatz 
demonstration and the GDR as a political actor for German and European integration, it 
appears likely that the frequent enactments of defending GDR socialism as a goal for 
GDR’s political future creates a distorted and fragmented reenactment of the settings, 
goals, and actors of the egalitarian narrative by the GDR citizen movements. As news 
discourses not only define, describe and delimit what narrative elements dominate, but 
also influences how people reconstruct and reenact narrative enactments, the FAZ’s 
font-page coverage of the Alexanderplatz demonstration and the Schöneberg City Hall 
speeches and demonstration only partially supported the Alexanderplatz speakers’ 
egalitarian or human rights narrative. By enacting the Alexanderplatz demonstration 
within the context of German-German unification as an unstoppable political reform 
process and the architectural design of European integration, the FAZ’s front-pages for 
these dates helped set the rhetorical stage for Kohl’s prefabrication narratives. While 
Helmut Kohl received whistles and boos for his remarks at the Schöneberg City Hall 
demonstration, the lead article in the FAZ only mentioned that briefly at the end of the 
article, which let it disappear in numerous enactments of the opening of border 
crossings.  
 Enactments of settings, goals, and actors largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page 
stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Kohl’s Ten Point-Plan speech to the German 
parliament on November 29, 1989. The FAZ’s front-page featured a range of political 
settings including the influx of immigration from East to West Germany, the bad 
political and economic situation in the GDR, European integration and architecture, and 
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the German unification process as process within the European project. Among these 
settings, German unification as a process within the European project and European 
integration and architecture emerged as the dominant narrative settings. In the lead 
article titled “Kohl’s Ten Points for a German-German Path: After free elections in the 
GDR/A community of treaties/Confederation/The SPD agrees,” the author extensively 
quotes statements from Hans-Jochen Vogel who was a member of the West German 
parliament and member of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The author 
dedicates almost two of the four columns of the lead article to Vogel’s support of 
German-German unification as an important step toward European unification. 
Specifically, the author quotes Vogel saying: “The process of German unification is tied 
to the process of European unity. Whoever attempts to go it alone risks German and 
European unity” (1989, November 29, FAZ). Elsewhere, the lead article summarizes 
Kohl’s Ten Point-Plan speech as follows:  
At the core of Kohl’s 10-point speech was a step-by-step outline for overcoming 
the inner German division and linking it to the development of European 
integration. Kohl sees this as a prerequisite to overcome the inner German 
division. The design of Germany’s future must fit into the overall architecture of 
Europe. (1989, November 29, FAZ) 
 These direct quotes from Helmut Kohl’s speech and Hans-Jochen Vogel not only 
reenact Kohl’s idea of a road to European and German-German unity, but they also 
dispel doubts about the West German position toward the reunification process. 
Historically, the SPD functioned as the opposition party to Helmut Kohl’s Christian 
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Democratic Union Party. However, by mentioning support from the SPD side by side 
with quotes from Kohl’s 10-Point Plan evokes the impression that West German 
political leaders unanimously see European architecture as the political setting for 
German-German unification. Toward the end of the lead article, the author not only 
quotes passages from Kohl’s 10-Point speech that refer to the expansion of Europe 
eastwards, but also explains that Helmut “Kohl considers the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the centerpiece of Europe’s design” (1989, 
November 29, FAZ). By reenacting and highlighting the institutional dimensions of 
Kohl’s 10-Point Plan, the lead article foreshadows Kohl’s pre-fabrication model for the 
reunification process.   
 Enactments of goals generally emerged as goal-tool relationships. Whether it is 
the op-ed which suggests that the German-German road demands free elections in the 
GDR or the editorial which advocates that confederalism requires close collaboration 
between the GDR and the FRG, goals and tools are enacted through the language of 
institutionalized German and European politics. In an op-ed titled “Looking Ahead,” the 
author speaks of political commitments, a European community of treaties, GDR 
sovereignty via a parliamentary party system, and “politics of contracts and deal 
making” as tools to reach German and European unification. This not only opposes the 
GDR citizen movements’ hesitation to play the game of power politics, but it also hints 
at the political and rhetorical dilemma for the GDR opposition movements in Germany’s 
reunification process. At the Alexanderplatz demonstration, Christa Wolf argued that “ . 
. . language is liberating itself from the official, newspaper-German in which it was 
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wrapped, and it is remembering the words that express feelings” (Wolf, 1989). Further, 
their desired goal of a new political culture from within the GDR demanded the tool of 
political dialogue, deliberation, and language. Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan speech and 
the FAZ’s reporting and commentary enacted a goal-tool ratio where German and 
European integration depends upon institutionalized politics and treaties. This offers 
hardly any rhetorical room to advance a goal-tool ratio that introduces the development 
of new forms of society-state interactions as a reliable and desirable tool for Germany’s 
and Europe’s political future.  
 Whereas enactments of settings and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-
page articles and op-eds regarding Kohl’s Ten Point-Plan speech, one opinion editorial 
enacted the GDR’s citizen movements as political groups who lack competent 
politicians. In an op-ed titled “Only Truth Liberates,” the author argues the following: 
Today, there are hardly any men or women left in the GDR who were not 
involved with the SED and could take on the political tasks of the future . . . This 
is why it is so difficult for political organization like the block parties as well as 
the New Forum and the Social Democratic Party to find people who have the 
makings of good politicians and enjoy the trust of the people. (1989, November 
29, FAZ) 
 The SED’s party monopoly limited the emergence of party pluralism, however, 
by depicting GDR block parties and the New Forum and the Social Democratic Party, 
which grew out of the GDR citizen movements, as politically inexperienced and inept 
actors, the author applies western standards for what a good politician means. GDR’s 
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citizen movements envisioned a slow process for German-German unification. Their 
self-ascribed identity as politically independent and engaged watchdogs and problem 
solvers exists in conjunction with a slow process of German rapprochement. A policy 
narrative which suggested a slow German-German reunification process would have 
opened rhetorical room for GDR opposition groups and newly emerging political parties 
to defend their political identities. Kohl’s pre-fab narrative of rapid reunification allowed 
enactments of GDR citizen movements as politically inexperienced actors.   
 Enactments of actors and goals largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, 
editorials, and op-eds regarding the first round table meeting on December 8, 1989. 
While these enactments often emerged within the settings of German unification inside 
of European structures and a Europe’s history of cooperation, settings would not 
dominate the reporting or commentary about the first meeting of the GDR round tables. 
All FAZ’s front-page articles that discussed the first meetings of the round tables either 
enacted them as an independent political player or described the GDR as a prudent and 
careful political actor in the reunification process. In the lead article titled “The GDR 
Government urges the Public to practice Prudence: The first round at the round 
table/Drafting a constitution,” the author quotes directly from the self-definition that the 
members of the round table formulated at their first meeting. The lead article dedicates 
one out of four columns to quotes from their self-definition. Specifically, the article 
includes the following quote:  
Although the Round Table cannot serve a parliamentary or governmental 
function, it wants to provide the public with proposals for overcoming this crisis. 
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It demands from the Volkskammer and the government that it be promptly 
informed and consulted about important decisions on legal, economic, and fiscal 
policies. It defines itself as part of the civil control in our country. It is planned 
that its activities will continue until free, democratic and secret elections are held. 
(1989, December 8, FAZ) 
 While the lead article reenacts the members of the round tables through their own 
political voice, only two other articles reference the first meeting of the round table. The 
rest of the front-page articles deal with foreign policy issues including talks between the 
French President François Mitterand and Mikhail Gorbachev as well as domestic issues 
about German-German collaboration. Kohl’s enactments of the round tables as a 
political actor often neglects to enact them through their own language. Often Kohl 
enacts them as members of the European family by comparing them to other round 
tables and citizen movements in Eastern Europe. In Kohl’s pre-fab narrative, the round 
tables appear as one among many, while the lead article in the FAZ narrates them in 
their own right. Yet, despite the prominence of the first round table meeting in the lead 
article, the front-page for this day rather focused on foreign policy actors and possible 
cooperation between the FRG and the GDR.  
 Finally, while the FAZ’s reporting and commentary of Kohl’s speech at the ruins 
of the Church of our Lady (Frauenkirche) and his New Year’s Eve address follows a 
familiar pattern of highlighting the setting of European agreements, German-German 
cooperation, and German unification within the context of European integration, the 
FAZ’s coverage of Kohl’s and Modrow’s joint press conference and Kohl’s policy 
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statement to the German parliament rhetorically solidifies Kohl’s pre-fabrication 
narrative.  
 Enactments of settings largely dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, editorials, 
and op-eds regarding Modrow and Kohl’s joint press conference on February 14, 1990. 
The FAZ’s front-page included familiar settings like German reunification within 
Europe’s architecture and the economic and humanitarian crisis in the GDR. However, 
one setting emerged that depicts a political tension between the GDR and the FRG 
regarding Germany’s reunification process. In the lead article titled “Kohl and Modrow 
are not Making Progress on their way to a Currency Union: Unification is possible/The 
bitter defeat of Socialism,” the author describes Modrow’s demands for a slow 
unification process, while explaining that the GDR, FRG, and USSR agree about 
Germany’s reunification process. Specifically, the author writes: “After meeting the 
Chancellor, Modrow said that we are nearing German unity, but the necessary steps 
should be carried out in increments. The GDR contributes to the unification process with 
the bitter defeat of socialism” (1989, February 14, FAZ). This is followed by a 
description of a recent meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, which enacts a setting of 
political agreements between the GDR, FRG, and the USSR, while also leaving room for 
the GDR to decide for itself how the reunification process should unfold. Embedded in a 
metaphor of a common road or path to German unity, the author writes:  
Kohl said about his meeting with Gorbachev last weekend: Gorbachev cleared 
the path to German unity, this deserves our gratitude . . . Between the GDR, 
FRG, and the USSR there are now no differences of opinion about the German 
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question. Germans must now decide for themselves under what political rule, in 
what timeframe, at what pace, and under what conditions this unity should be 
achieved. German unity is not a question of unilateral decisions but must be 
embedded in Europe’s overall architecture. (1989, February 14, FAZ) 
 Modrow’s concerns about rapid German-German reunification rhetorically 
disappear in the broader setting of agreements between the GDR, FRG, and USSR. The 
GDR opposed the introduction of Glasnost and Perestroika to East European countries in 
1985 and had distanced itself politically and economically from Moscow to develop its 
own understanding of socialism. Implying a setting of a political consensus between the 
GDR, the FRG, and the USSR diminishes any inner German disagreements about 
German-German unification. While the article quotes Modrow saying that German unity 
comes at the expense of GDR’s socialism, Kohl’s quote about political agreement 
between the GDR, FRG, and USSR minimizes these concerns.  
 Kohl is also quoted for saying that German unification is not a question of 
unilateral decisions. This quote evokes the impression that slow as well as rapid 
reunification are equal options for Germany’s future. It creates a political setting for 
Germany’s reunification process that exists within a tension of unanimous agreements 
about German unification at the level of foreign politics and vague agreements about it 
at the domestic level. Kohl minimizes this tension in his pre-fab narrative not only by 
highlighting the economic and humanitarian crisis in the GDR, but also by continuously 
enacting a setting of a united Germany within a united Europe. .  
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 Finally, enactments of settings also dominated the FAZ’s front-page stories, 
editorials, and op-eds regarding Kohl’s policy statement to the German parliament on 
February 16, 1990. In an op-ed titled “Unity or Dispute,” the author describes GDR 
citizens not only as supporters of German unification but suggests a political setting 
where the GDR and the FRG agree about German unification. Specifically, the op-ed 
echoes Kohl’s setting of an agreement between the GDR, FRG, and USSR that is free of 
differences of opinions. The author argues:  
More than ever do Germans in the GDR want unity. There is a growing 
consensus within Western countries, even among those politicians who until 
recently doubted the entire enterprise. Why should Western politicians give up 
on a united Germany, now that the Soviet leadership included a united Germany 
into its political plans for the future. (1989, February 16, FAZ) 
 Here, the setting of political agreements or consensus exists at the level of 
foreign politics and the GDR lives within these agreements. This further reinforces 
Kohl’s pre-fab narrative in that it minimizes the narrative elements of actors and tools 
within the citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative. While the FAZ occasionally 
amplifies the political voice of the GDR opposition movements and depicts them 
through their own language, the reporting and commentary of Kohl’s and Modrow’s 
joint press conference and Kohl’s policy statement to the German parliament further 
supports the narrative elements of settings and goals.  
 Table 9: Rhetorical Transformation of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Narrative summarizes the key similarities and differences of the FAZ’s narrative 
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regarding political events between November 1989 and February 1990. The relative 
significance of narrative elements is indicated by font size. If narrative elements are 
largely implied, dominated by other narrative elements, or emerged only rarely in the 
discourse, then they remain at the normal font size. While the table for Kohl’s pre-fab 
narrative indicated the relationship between specific narrative elements, the format of 
newspaper articles does not allow to determine clear overarching narrative ratios for 
front page news articles. If a row for a narrative element remained empty, then this 
means that the element was not sufficiently developed in the articles or only implied. 
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Alexanderplatz 
Demonstration 
(Nov. 6) 
Schöneberg City 
Hall Speeches 
(Nov. 11) 
Kohl’s 10-Point 
Plan Speech 
(Nov. 28) 
First Round 
Table Meeting 
(Dec. 8) 
Press Conference 
with Hans-
Modrow (Feb. 
14)  
Kohl’s Policy 
Statement to the 
Bundestag (Feb. 
16) 
Actors:  
- GDR as a 
beneficiary of the 
German-German 
unification process 
- GDR opposition 
groups as 
representatives of 
the GDR as a 
European political 
actor 
Actors: 
- People in the 
streets of the GDR 
 
Actors: 
- GDR citizen 
movements and 
new political 
parties are 
inexperienced  
Actors: 
- Members of 
round tables as 
independent and 
prudent political 
actors 
Actors: 
- GDR and FRG 
citizens as 
supporter of 
unification 
- GDR citizens as 
prudent political 
actors 
 
Actors: 
- GDR and FRG 
citizens as 
supporter of 
unification 
 
Action/Conflict:  
(- …) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Defend GDR 
socialism) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Careful and 
responsible 
political actions) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Deliberate 
alternative 
political solutions) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- … ) 
Action/Conflict: 
(- Vote for 
Unification 
friendly parties in 
the upcoming 
Volkskammer 
election) 
Table 9: Rhetorical Transformation of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Narrative 
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Settings:  
- Unification as an 
unstoppable 
political reform 
process 
- Political 
possibilities for 
Europe 
Settings: 
- Opening of 
border crossings 
in East Berlin 
- European 
integration/GDR 
fitting into the 
European design 
Settings: 
- German 
unification as a 
process within the 
European project 
- European 
architecture  
Settings: 
- Europe’s history 
of cooperation 
- European 
architecture 
Settings: 
- Consensus GDR, 
FRG, and USSR 
about German 
unity (foreign 
policy level) 
- Vague 
agreement at 
domestic level  
Settings: 
- Consensus GDR, 
FRG, and USSR 
about German 
unity (foreign 
policy level) 
Tools:  
- Free elections in 
the GDR 
Tools: 
(- …) 
Tools: 
- Institutional 
Politics 
- Kohl’s 10-Point 
Plan 
- Closer 
Cooperation 
between GDR and 
FRG 
Tools: 
- Pan-European 
treaties and 
institutions 
(OSCE) 
- Kohl’s 10-Point 
Plan 
Tools: 
- Early elections in 
the GDR  
 
Tools: 
- Early elections in 
the GDR 
 
Goals:  
- Abolition of the 
SED party 
monopoly 
 
Goals: 
- Maintaining 
Socialism for the 
GDR 
Goals: 
- (Con)federalism 
- Expansion of 
Western systems 
eastwards 
Goals: 
- New 
Constitution for 
the GDR  
- German future 
with a European 
future 
Goals: 
- German 
Unification within 
Europe  
Goals: 
- (Rapid) German 
Unification  
Table 9: Continued 
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The Süddeutsche Zeitung 
 The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) largely echoed the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung enactments of Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative by frequently enacting German 
unification as a process within a European architecture, depicting GDR citizens and 
politicians as supporters and helpers of German-German rapprochement, and describing 
early elections as a means for (rapid) German reunification. The SZ’s front-page news 
stories as well as the teasers, editorials, and op-eds frequently enact settings, goals, and 
actors that support Kohl’s pre-fab narrative, while they enact narrative elements from the 
GDR opposition groups’ egalitarian narrative less frequently. Despite these overall 
similarities, a few important differences emerged regarding the relative significance of 
narrative enactments and the depictions of the GDR round tables and citizen movements 
as well as Kohl’s path to German-German unification. The following explanations will 
focus on those enactments which differ significantly from the FAZ’s reenactment of 
Kohl’s pre-fab narrative and the citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative. It is important 
to remember that while the FAZ largely supports socially softened free-market 
ideologies, the SZ tends to lean toward ideologies of social responsibility. This possibly 
influenced their reporting and commentary regarding the key political events between 
November 1989 and February 1990.   
 Enactments of settings, goals, and actors largely dominated the SZ’s front-page 
stories on November 6th, 1989. While the SZ front-page news stories predominantly 
discussed the Alexanderplatz demonstration and speeches within the familiar settings of 
mass immigration and the easing of travel restrictions, it enacted goals that highlighted 
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the importance of creating conditions for GDR citizens to remain in the GDR and 
rebuild the GDR from within. Like the FAZ, the SZ’s front-page stories enacted the 
political goal of abolishing the SED party monopoly, however, the goal of creating 
livable conditions for GDR citizens in the GDR emerged as another dominant narrative 
element of the news discourse for that day. In the lead article titled “Mass Demonstration 
and Mass Immigration: Mass Exodus is not a solution to the German question,” the 
author quotes a speech by Helmut Kohl which he delivered to the German Red Cross a 
few days before the Alexanderplatz demonstration:  
Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that letting 150.000 people immigrate to Western 
German this year could not be a proper solution to the German question. . . . At 
the federal convention of the German Red Cross in Bonn, Kohl said: ‘We want 
that those who can stay—under conditions that make life worth living—should 
get the chance to do so. Our fellow citizens in the GDR should get the 
opportunity to find their happiness. (1989, November 6, SZ) 
 Elsewhere, the author writes that “leading politicians, among them Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, said that we must create conditions in the GDR which allow for people to 
stay in their homeland” (1989, November 6, SZ). These enactments of political goals 
help to set the stage for Kohl’s 10-Point Plan and his early suggestion to build a united 
Germany under a confederate roof, but it also draws our attention to a political future for 
the GDR from within. Thus, instead of dwelling upon the abolition of the SED or the 
building of a European community as a political goal, the SZ’s enactments of political 
goals evokes the impression of the GDR as a sovereign state.  
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 As the FAZ and the SZ historically feature low levels of advocacy journalism, it 
is not surprising that their enactments of political actions remain at the descriptive level, 
rather than trying to inspire or motivate their readers to act on behalf of their 
commentary or reporting. Yet, there are a few enactments of political actions that catch 
the reader’s eye. Quoting statements by Hans-Jochen Vogel who was a member of the 
West German parliament and member of the West German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), the author explains: 
The SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel asks GDR citizens who intend to 
leave the GDR to reconsider their decision. The SPD respects people’s decisions 
to leave but ‘We ask everyone who thinks about leaving the GDR to carefully 
consider whether you wouldn’t want to support the process of democratization at 
home, from within the GDR’. (1989, November 6, SZ) 
 This supports the often-implied enactment of political prudence and even the 
enactment of GDR citizens and citizen movements as careful and responsible political 
actors, but it is rather direct and explicit than abstract. The front-page articles in FAZ for 
that day do not include these quotes from Kohl and Vogel. The action for GDR citizens 
remains rather implicit, while the SZ amplifies it in its front-page discourse.  
 While the SZ’s lead article for the Schöneberg City Hall Speeches featured 
familiar enactments of opening of border crossings, German unification with European 
integration, and people in the streets as political actors of change in the GDR, the op-eds 
disproportionately highlighted the economic uncertainty and challenges due to the 
possible influx of immigrants into the FRG. Quotes by Brandt, Genscher, and Kohl 
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about German unification within a European design appear frequently, but they are often 
followed by questions about the economic costs of German unification. Specifically, 
these opinion editorials raise questions about the effect of immigrants on employment 
rates and residential construction. Compared to the FAZ’s front-page stories, the SZ 
enacts a rather detailed setting of economic demands and challenges due to an influx in 
immigration. The authors of these op-eds discuss in detail how the German economy 
should react toward a possible influx in immigrants from the GDR, but also from Poland 
and Hungary.  
 Enactments of political settings, goals, and actors dominated SZ’s front-page 
reporting and commentary regarding Helmut Kohl’s 10-Point Plan speech on November 
28th, 1989. Among the SZ’s enactments of political settings, the West’s political 
consensus regarding German-German unification stood out in comparison to the FAZ’s 
enactments of settings. The lead article as well as op-eds enacted an agreement among 
West German political parties and Western European countries about German 
reunification. The subheading of the lead article reads “As an intermediate step Kohl 
consider the creation of a confederation/SPD: Kohl’s plan is our plan/Kohl coordinated 
his plan with western powers and Moscow is informed” (1989, November 29, SZ). 
Specifically, in one of the op-eds the author writes:  
All parties agreed with Helmut Kohl that the first step should be immediate 
assistance to the GDR . . . For the SPD, the parliamentarian Voigt said that 
between Kohl’s plan and the SPD’s plan are ‘no conceptual differences’. 
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According to Voigt, now there is a realistic chance for a new European 
unification and thereby also a German unification. 
 While the FAZ largely enacts the setting of political agreements or consensus 
about Kohl’s 10-Point Plan and German unification at the level of foreign politics, the 
SZ discusses this political consensus at the level of political parties. Despite a few 
enactments of Kohl as a political actor who single-handedly initiated the discussions 
about German unification without consulting other parties and the West German Green 
party who opposed Kohl’s 10-Point Plan, the SZ front-page generally enacts a political 
setting where most West German parties support German unification and Kohl’s 10-
Point Plan. This not only builds the narrative confidence of Kohl as the initiator and 
facilitator of German-German unification, but it also sets the stage for Kohl to carry out 
German unification according to his 10-Point Plan.   
 Finally, enactments of settings and goals largely dominated the SZ’s front-page 
stories, editorials, and op-eds regarding Modrow and Kohl’s joint press conference on 
February 14, 1990. The SZ’s front-page included familiar settings and goals like German 
reunification within Europe’s architecture, a united Germany under a confederate roof, 
and the economic and humanitarian crisis in the GDR. However, one goal emerged that 
suggests rapid unification not initiated by Helmut Kohl but by Hans Modrow. In one of 
the front-page stories titled “Kohl: Quickly realizing a Community of Treaties,” the 
author writes:  
Modrow proposed a German-German treaty, which should be agreed upon before 
the Volkskammer election in May. Modrow said that ‘the process for radical 
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reforms in the GDR are irreversible’. Kohl agreed to this accelerated process for 
inner German treaties because he was very impressed by Modrow’s dramatic 
description regarding a looming disorder in the GDR. (1989, February 14, SZ). 
 Initially, Helmut Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan suggested German unification as a long-
term goal, but Hans Modrow’s suggestion for a German-German treaty threatened 
Kohl’s and the FRG’s narrative role as a responsible and humanitarian helper. Thereby, 
it opened an opportunity for Kohl appear as only reacting to Modrow’s suggestions, 
rather than initiating them. This further supported Kohl’s role as a reliable and desirable 
facilitator of German-German unification. What is surprising is not that Kohl exploited 
the situation, but that the depiction of him in the SZ after the joint press conference with 
Modrow let him appear as only responding to what Modrow suggested, when in reality 
Kohl followed his 10-Point Plan ever since he gained widespread support for it at the 
end of November of 1989.  
Conclusion 
 The FAZ and the SZ (re)enacted policy narratives that generally supported 
Helmut Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative, while minimizing the Alexanderplatz speakers’ 
and the Round Table egalitarian narrative. While the rapid cycle of news events and 
editorial and journalistic practices influence the salience of narrative elements and their 
relationships, the FAZ generally tended to reenact Kohl’s pre-fabrication narrative, 
specifically by including quotes that highlight the setting of German unification within 
European treaties and integration. Further, despite occasional conflict frames regarding 
disagreements between Kohl and Modrow, the enactment of a political consensus 
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between the GDR, FRG, and USSR allowed Kohl to win the battle over the rhetorical 
rights to narrate Germany’s political future. It transcended the inner German 
disagreements about the details of German unification and thereby rendered them as 
insignificant within the setting of European and foreign politics. FAZ’s reporting and 
commentary suggested that Modrow sought to answer questions regarding the 
sovereignty of the GDR and German-German cooperation at the level of domestic 
politics, while depictions of Kohl’s solutions imply that the German question should be 
answered within wider European structures. This difference in enactments regarding the 
political setting for German unification set the stage for Kohl to further advance his pre-
fab narrative and implement his 10-Point Plan. By consistently enacting a European 
setting for the process of German unification, Kohl created a rhetorical demand or 
appetite for a European resolution. The narrative enactments of the Alexanderplatz 
speakers, the members of the round tables, and Hans Modrow remained at the level of 
party politics and Germany’s domestic issues. The enactments of political settings 
followed their own logic or narrative trajectory without really incorporating enactments 
from other narratives.  
 The FAZ and the SZ both amplified these differences in political settings, goals, 
and actors, however, the SZ tended to focus on domestic settings, goals, and actors over 
European and international narrative elements. Specifically, the SZ selection of quotes 
by West German politicians often restricted the enactments of settings and actors to the 
domestic level. Further, the SZ’s commentary and reporting regarding the 
Alexanderplatz demonstration and speeches at the Schöneberg City Hall evoked the 
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impression that Helmut Kohl and other west German politicians are mostly interest in 
helping the GDR to help itself. This portrayed Kohl as an even more responsible and 
prudent politician than the enactments in his speeches and the FAZ’s reporting and 
commentary suggest. In a way, the SZ’s tendency to reenact Kohl’s pre-fabrication 
narrative and the GDR citizen movements’ egalitarian narrative at the domestic level 
worked in tandem with the FAZ’s focus on German reunification at the foreign policy 
level. The FAZ generally enacted Kohl as a responsible initiator and facilitator of 
German reunification at the level of European politics and foreign affairs, while the SZ 
tended to depict Kohl as a prudent politician of German unification at the domestic level.  
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis 
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, 
I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to 
keep them alive and available until the politically impossible become inevitable. 
(Friedman, 1962, p. 42) 
 This dissertation explored the rhetorical battle over Germany’s and Europe’s 
political future and the narrative possibilities that it revealed and concealed. The 
accidental opening of the Berlin wall on November 9th, 1989 created a political and 
rhetorical vacuum for key political crisis narrators like the East German public spheres, 
West German political leaders, and the West German national press. At key political 
events between November 1989 and February 1990, these narrators enacted a range of 
narrative elements that implied different alternatives for the future of Germany and 
Europe. Through narrative analyses of political discourse by representatives of the GDR 
citizen movements, policy statements and speeches by Helmut Kohl, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, and Willy Brandt, and front-page news article by the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, this dissertation traced the similarities and 
differences of these narrative trajectories and compared them to Mary Elise Sarotte’s 
historic account of Helmut Kohl’s pre-fabrication model for the future of German and 
Europe after the opening of the Berlin wall. Sarotte’s revolutionary examination and 
explanation of the opening of the Berlin wall inspired me to analyze how and why the 
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strategic crisis narratives of the East German citizen movements, the Western German 
national press, and West German political leaders rhetorically enabled or constrained 
Kohl’s pre-fabrication model.  
 To this end, I developed a rhetorical lens for political crisis narratives, which 
integrates insights from political crisis communication theories, strategic narratives, and 
rhetoric. This rhetorical lens treats individual statements by crisis narrators as 
enactments of broader narratives, which potentially help to reestablish political 
legitimacy. To rhetorically rebuild political legitimacy, it is key to not only transform 
fluid crisis events into situations that imply the audience as working toward a crisis 
resolution, but also to win and defend the rhetorical rights to define narrative elements. 
This then enhances the rhetorical desirability and reliability for a specific crisis 
resolution. Helmut Kohl’s enactments of political actors, settings, tools, and goals 
increased the desirability and reliability for early elections in the GDR and rapid German 
unification within the architecture of European agreements. While members of the round 
tables and the Alexanderplatz speakers articulated a slower process of German 
unification, Kohl’s enactments of settings at his joint press conference with Hans-
Modrow and his policy statement to the German parliament eventually solidified his 
settings-tools and settings-goals ratios, which further set the stage for his pre-fabrication 
model. It is important to remember that even though Kohl’s rhetorical enactments 
accompany his decision to extend West German and European legal, political, and 
economic systems eastward, this does not mean that it triggered it. It rhetorically 
legitimized his foreign policy in the political vacuum that opened between November 
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1989 and February 1990 and limited the goal- and tool-driven discourse by East German 
opposition groups. To put it differently, while Kohl’s rhetoric of practical politics and 
European architecture rhetorically legitimized his 10-Point Plan and later his rapid 
reunification policies, the discourse only suggested a perfectionist tendency but did not 
dictate it.  
 Kohl’s enactments of German reunification within European integration implied 
tools, goals, and actors that exist outside of Modrow’s and the GDR opposition 
movement’s narratives. The East German revolution movements and their demands for a 
new political culture under the protection of a new constitution and rule of law existed 
within a narrative trajectory of moving away from the iron grip of the SED’s party 
monopoly and Marxist-Leninist traditions. Set within domestic politics and guided by 
tools of new political dialogue and deliberation, the narrative trajectory of the 
Alexanderplatz speakers and the members of the Round Tables remains at the political 
level of the GDR and possibly at the level of a confederation with the FRG. While 
Modrow’s enactments of goals at his press conference with Kohl offered new 
possibilities for the future of Germany, Kohl’s settings-driven narrative already gained 
widespread support and political legitimacy. Up until Hans Modrow’s press conference 
with Kohl, the GDR’s political discourse implied a setting of slow domestic 
rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG. Helmut Kohl’s narrative, however, 
enacted a narrative that involves European and international treaties and free-market 
ideologies. This conflicts with an egalitarian narrative that involves direct local and 
regional political decision-making processes like referendums. International and pan-
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European treaties as well as foreign ventures defy narratives that rest upon idealistic 
political goals. Although the East German Round Tables sought to develop a new 
constitution for an independent and egalitarian GDR, their focus on the relationship 
between goals and tools, rather than settings-goals ratios restrained them to developing 
political futures within the GDR and not extend their communicative power beyond their 
own political networks.  
 While reluctant to institutionalize themselves and play the game of power 
politics, the East German opposition movements and Round Tables exercised what 
Manuel Castells (2013) refers to as counterpower. By playing the role of politically 
independent watchdogs and problem solvers for the reunification process, East German 
public spheres aimed at reprogramming the political network of the GDR and possibly 
the FRG and introduce new switches between networks. For their egalitarian narrative to 
exert political power and legitimize their demands for a new political culture from 
within, the Round Tables and opposition movements had to build or program a political 
network that would exist within the larger network of western party politics. Network 
programmers and switchers are social actors, but they exert power by operating in and 
linking different political networks. This way, they do not necessarily belong to only one 
social group, organization, or institutions. Political alliances are not enough, rather, it is 
the network itself that would allow for GDR opposition groups to spread its interests and 
values via their human rights narrative. This means that for the GDR Round Tables to 
program its political network, they required other political programmers and switchers to 
enact their political ideas and demands. Whereas the GDR round tables involved 
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members from different areas of the GDR’s civil society, they often existed in social 
networks that operated outside of institutionalized political networks. Members included 
people from environmental groups, peace groups, migration groups, opposition groups, 
as well as small political parties. While these groups (i.e., Democracy Now, Democratic 
Awakening, the Greens, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the New Forum, the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the United Left) envisioned different goals for 
the political future of the GDR, they all opposed rip and replace approaches for 
rebuilding the GDR. The values and interest of this loosely organized political network 
rested on the implicit agreement that the future of the GDR should emerge from within.  
 While this shared interest loosely linked the different opposition movements in 
the GDR, it also isolated them within the reunification process. Kohl’s pre-fabrication 
model implied pan-European and international treaties, which imposed political 
networks that aimed at rebuilding the GDR as a member of the European military and 
economic network. The (independent) political power of the GDR Round Tables would 
not exist in its own right in these networks, but would diminish in the broader goals and 
values of the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steal Community, 
and NATO. Further, whereas the GDR opposition groups attempted to program a 
political and cultural network through direct citizen participation in legal and political 
decision-making processes, Kohl’s pre-fabrication model largely implied economic and 
military networks. As the pro-unification and pro-Europe Alliance for Germany party 
received 48 percent of the GDR vote in the March 18 elections, which consisted of 
members of the Christian Democratic Union, the Democratic Awakening movement, 
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and the German Social Union, it further reinforced the goals and interest of the economic 
and military networks of Western Europe and Germany. Driven by concerns about the 
economic and military future of the GDR, the political networks by the Round Tables 
appeared less desirable and reliable to the electorate. The communicative power resided 
within the economic, military, and political networks of the West. In addition, the first 
free elections in the GDR created opportunities for upcoming East German political 
parties to forge new alliances. This further weakened the Round Tables ability to build a 
politically independent network that advocates for a GDR constitution and the 
maintenance of GDR culture under the protection of a revised rule of law.  
 As political power exists within relationships or connections between and among 
networks (Castells, 2013), the West German political leadership not only relied on its 
network connections to European treaties and institutions, but also its links to West 
German media. The FAZ and the SZ not only grew out of a desire to rebuild a 
democratic post WWII Germany via a politically independent press, but despite their 
differences in political leanings, the FAZ and the SZ generally reported about East 
Europe in a way that expressed an interest in overcoming the Cold War and specifically 
the German-German division (Mueller, 1999) and thereby programed Kohl’s network. It 
is this imbalance in network-making power that further weakened the impact of the East 
German opposition movements’ egalitarian narrative. The narrative did not flow through 
the networks that would have enhanced its impact with the German and European 
reunification process. Despite the importance of networks and relationships between and 
among different networks for the production and diffusion of desirable and reliable 
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political crisis narratives, communication remains key to the process of rebuilding 
political legitimacy. It is not only the networks of NATO, the EEC, the ECSC, West 
Germany’s political party and media system that won the battle over the economic and 
military futures after November 9th, 1989, it is also the language that defines the goals 
and values of these networks that lead to a specific vision for the future. Without the 
interaction between and among the different networks vis-à-vis narratives it would be 
impossible to differentiate the diverse interest among social actors and identity desirable 
and reliable political futures out of a crisis situation. Narratives codify values and goals 
of a network in a way that encourages deliberation between and among the different 
members of a network. To exert political power, a network must resort to 
communication or narratives, which not only exposes that network’s values and goals to 
public scrutiny and deliberation, but also reduces its ability to dominate society solely on 
the basis of network programmers and switchers. It is the influence over the 
communication process or narratives that legitimizes the values and goals of a network.  
 For people and governments to succeed in dealing with a political crisis means to 
draw important lessons for the future (Boin et al., 2017). This not only means that a 
government revises its ways of dealing with a crisis or introduce new norms for 
assessing a crisis, but it implies that a government learns how to learn. While Boin 
largely discusses lesson drawing at the institutional level, a perspective of political crisis 
narratives draws our attention to rhetorical crisis learning. Initiated in 2013 and 
implemented in 2014, the EU Parliament and the EU Commission formed a Cultural 
Committee of European artists, intellectuals, and scientists to develop a new narrative 
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for Europe. This cultural committee then submitted their declaration, “A New Narrative 
for Europe: The Mind and Body of Europe,” to the then European Commission’s 
President José Manuel Barroso and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The cultural 
committee assumed that an official declaration of a European narrative channeled 
through political institutions and the political elite would bring into existence a new 
cultural narrative and political culture. Evidently, this initiative favored a top-down 
approach to polity building and failed to flesh out the rhetorical possibilities for 
European narratives for enduring political and cultural integration. The “New Narrative 
for Europe” project developed as an ad hoc “reaction to the economic and financial crisis 
since 2008 and the EU’s related apparently deepening legitimacy crisis” (Kaiser, 2015, 
p. 374). The declaration of the New Narrative for Europe initiative draws upon historical 
events like the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the first and second World Wars, the 
fight against Communism, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the 2008 financial crisis. 
Rhetorical crisis learning would help to recover the forgotten political languages that 
remained after a crisis and harness the rhetorical resources and possibilities for European 
initiatives to build pan-European political culture.  
 The founding fathers of the European Union used terms like a “United States of 
Europe” and “European Family” to create a transnational narrative of solidarity and 
community. These terms, however, disguise that the EU started out as an economic 
community, rather than a political community. Advanced by the French Foreign Minister 
Robert Schuman after WWII, the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) replaced the production of weapons for war with the production of weapons for 
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economic integration. Through the Schuman Plan and later the Treaty of Paris, European 
political leaders from France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries facilitated 
a common market for steal and coal, which led to growth in international trade, 
modernization of production, and improved living standards. Other economically driven 
agreements and treaties followed, as for example the European Economic Community 
(EEC). While these agreements helped to encourage economic ties between and among 
EU member states and expedite the expansion of the EU, the lack of political integration 
problematized the development of transnational political narratives. Between 1945 and 
1989, European policy-makers anchored Europe’s economic narratives in appeals to 
peace and prosperity and the need to transform Europe into a new global player. This 
economic narrative of European integration problematizes Europe’s ambitions to 
politicize itself.  
 Examining the languages of political action generated by the East German 
opposition movements turns our attention to the hidden narratives of German-German 
and German-European integration and the importance of narratives as a tool to facilitate 
and hinder political integration. The rhetorical resources that political crises leave behind 
offer the opportunity to set new rhetorical anchors for narratives of European political 
integration. The opening of the Berlin wall as a rhetorical anchor for a narrative of 
European political integration draws our attention to the importance of recognizing 
demands for independent and egalitarian political cultures. It would direct us to language 
of political action that minimizes the importance of political actors in favor of crisis 
resolutions. Further, it would inspire to enact settings that integrate narrative elements of 
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domestic politics with enactments of pan-European and international settings. Finally, it 
would help to appreciate the importance of communication for the process of 
reestablishing political legitimacy and the role that rhetorical power relations play. 
While my analyses demonstrated that enactments of democratic ideals like self-
organization, public deliberation, and political independence resist narratives of power 
politics and political institutionalism, the forgotten language and political directions that 
remained from the rhetorical crisis of the fall of the Berlin Wall offer rhetorical 
possibilities for new enactments of European and German political integration.  
 While the recent negotiations between the US and North Korea focused on issues 
of denuclearization, the situation also raises questions about the political rapprochement 
between North and South Korea. Future research should examine the rhetorical role that 
setting-driven narratives play in the political discourse about reunification between 
North and South Korea. Who’s narratives remain at the level of domestic politics and 
who highlights the importance of international treaties? What rhetorical role does the 
rule of law play? And what type of political culture do the two nations envision for the 
future of North and South Korea? There are rhetorical lessons to learn from the hidden 
narratives of 1989.  
 Due to logistical reasons it was only possible to obtain digitalized copies of the 
front-pages of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Future 
research should include other forms of newspaper discourse to further explore the 
political role of the western press in Germany’s reunification process.  
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